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Prioritizing public investments is arguably one of the most important and complex tasks 
Governments face. In this thesis, I contribute to such a task by examining the Elasticity of the 
Marginal Utility (EMU). This parameter is central to the determination of the Social Discount 
Rate, which is the discount rate used for Cost-Benefit Analysis in the public sector. I estimate the 
EMU using an unprecedentedly large dataset and test variants of the estimation technique 
which include National Insurance Contributions and Supernumerary Income. I also test the 
robustness of the estimates obtained. I further investigate the validity of the estimates by testing 
for the first time the key assumption underlying the estimation technique that the degree of 
progressivity of the income tax schedule represents society’s inequality aversion. Next, I 
examine causality between tax progressivity and income inequality, which is a theme that 
emerges from testing the assumption mentioned. Finally, I estimate the EMU in different 
contexts, relating the estimated values and their context-sensitivity to psychological traits. 
Overall, the results suggest an EMU of 1.5 and that the estimation methodology implemented 
is acceptable. They also show bidirectional causality between progressivity and inequality, and 
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Introduction to the Thesis 
 
The pressure on public administrations to evaluate investments in a way that maximizes social 
welfare grows as societies organize around centralized Governments, which largely take on the 
complex responsibility for societal planning. The Social Discount Rate (SDR) (often estimated by 
the Ramsey rule) is essential for such activity, given it sets the discount rate used to assess public 
projects via Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA), the main economic tool for prioritizing investments.1 
The fact discounting of future events has been depicted as “one of the most critical problems in 
all of economics” (Weitzman 2001: 260) gives an idea of the magnitude of the matter. 
The SDR, already important for influencing the prioritization of investments with a large impact 
on society, becomes even more significant in times where policy makers increasingly have to 
deal with questions involving the very long run, as those regarding infra-structure and long-lived 
pollutants.  
To illustrate the point consider an example related to climate change found in Gollier (2013). 
Using a discount rate of 5% Nordhaus (2008) estimated the Net Present Value (NPV) of future 
damages caused by the emission of one more tone of CO2 as 8 dollars. In this scenario it would 
not be worthwhile to immediately use high technology projects to decrease carbon emissions, 
given it would cost more than 8 dollars for them to curb one tone of CO2. On the other hand, 
using a discount rate of 1.4% Stern (2007) estimate the future damage of a tone of CO2 emission 
as 85 dollars, in which case the immediate use of high technology projects would be acceptable.  
The Ramsey rule gives the minimum return rate to compensate deferring consumption, and is 
composed of three parameters, one of which is the Elasticity of Marginal Utility (EMU or 𝜂).2 The 
parameter reflects inequality aversion and makes reference to a normative value, i.e. to an ideal 
level of inequality aversion. It is clear that the quality of the SDR and therefore of investment 
decisions depend on the accuracy of the EMU estimation.  
A relevant issue bearing on the accuracy of the EMU used in the determination of the SDR is the 
amount of long-run data used in the estimation process, given the discount rate is often applied 
                                                          
1 In basic terms the CBA can be defined as a technique to compare projects by examining their benefits 
and costs scattered over time. It consists of measuring monetarily an investment’s benefits and costs 
(spread over time), bringing such values to their present value via an appropriate discount rate and then 
comparing the costs and benefits in order to see whether (and in what magnitude) one outweighs the 
other.   




to evaluate long-run projects. If the parameter is derived with few observations it is more likely 
it will be subject to idiosyncrasies involving the events taking place at the time the observations 
refer to. On the other hand, if the EMU is obtained using long time series such specificities are 
dissolved, resulting in a more general and useful estimate.  
Another factor bearing on the EMU estimation accuracy is the technique used to estimate the 
parameter, such that it is important to establish ways to identify reliable EMU estimation 
methods e.g. by testing alternative techniques’ assumptions and the robustness of the resulting 
estimates. Nonetheless, it is important not to lose sight of the fact that the number of studies 
estimating the value of the EMU is not commensurate with the perceived importance of the 
parameter. 
One of the methodologies occasionally used to estimate the EMU [the Equal Absolute Sacrifice 
Approach (EASA)] is based on data from income tax rates. The key assumption underlying the 
technique is that societal aversion to inequality is reflected in the Government's choice of 
income tax rates and the progressivity thereof. 
In chapter 1 I contribute to the crucial task of providing an accurate estimate of the EMU as one 
of the three components defining the value of the SDR via Ramsey rule. I do that by estimating 
the parameter via EASA using an unprecedentedly large income tax dataset. I also test the 
adequacy of the utility function assumed in the EASA (which implies a constant EMU) by testing 
the constancy of the EMU across income levels, time and cultural background (countries). In 
addition, I test the robustness of the technique by comparing it’s estimates with estimates 
obtained with other two different methodologies – each of them estimating the EMU in a 
different context (as risk aversion, intratemporal inequality aversion and intertemporal 
inequality aversion). These tests are carried out in order to determine the reliability of the EASA, 
given the impact different estimation techniques have on the EMU value.  
In estimating the EMU via EASA and the technique’s reliability, I systematically approach works 
using the estimation procedure and compare variants within the methodology in order to 
understand the extent to which these variants influence the estimated values. Although some 
studies have compared different approaches within the EASA, none has done it as systematically 
and as comprehensively as I do in chapter 1.     
As mentioned above, the key assumption made in the EASA is that Governments express 
society’s aversion to inequality through the degree of progressivity of the income tax schedules 
they set. After writing chapter 1, it drew my attention that, although such assumption is 
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sometimes mentioned as one of the possible problems of the technique, there were no works 
(to the best my knowledge) actually testing it.  
So, in chapter 2 I attempt to further validate the EMU estimates obtained in chapter 1 by testing 
the EASA underlying assumption that Governments set income tax rates in order to 
democratically represent societal inequality aversion. To do so, I investigate factors determining 
the EMU estimates obtained in chapter 1 (via EASA) allowing for the possibility that 
Governments take decisions without considering people’s preferences, and thus that the EMU 
reflects administrations’ inequality aversion only. 
I take advantage of the fact the EMU estimated by the EASA can be interpreted as an index of 
tax progressivity and collect variables supposedly associated with tax progressivity to examine 
whether they are also associated with the EMU as measured by the EASA. It must be noticed, 
however, that my intention is not to analyse the determinants of tax progressivity. Rather, my 
interest is in the susceptibility of the EMU estimates of chapter 1 to variation due to factors 
having nothing to do with the underlying aversion to inequality of society. 
The analysis includes variables describing the population of a country e.g. its demographic 
composition. The statistical significance of these variables could simply reflect that a society with 
a different demographic composition wants different things. On the other hand, variables whose 
statistical significance are harder to explain except for saying that Governments do indeed face 
constraints or have purposes apart from reflecting society’s aversion to inequality, decrease the 
reliability of EMU estimates obtained by EASA.   
The results suggest the dependency ratio,3 Government stability, openness, population size and 
governmental expenditure with education are associated with the EASA measures of the EMU. 
Given the population size variable strongly affects the EMU estimates obtained by the EASA, my 
trust in the EASA is weakened somewhat, although not much. For in face of the evidence in 
favour of the technique found in chapter one and of the fact that all other variables considered 
in the concerned chapter do not strongly affect the estimates concerned, I think it is possible to 
regard EMU estimates obtained via EASA as reasonable measures of societal inequality aversion.    
The causes and possible solutions to income inequality – which have been much debated lately 
– are themes that are closely related to the issue addressed in chapter two, in that if 
Governments set income tax schedules reflecting societal inequality aversion, one would expect 
tax progressivity to be used as a tool to curb actual income inequality. Such a use for tax 
                                                          
3 Percentage of those with more than 65 and less than 14 in the population. 
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progressivity is often mentioned in political and economic discussions regarding inequality. The 
United Nations, for example, clearly points to “making the tax system more progressive” as one 
of the policies to be implemented to tackle inequalities4 and Piketty (2014), when commenting 
on the results found by Piketty et al. (2011), claims only progressive taxation could put an end 
on the “skyrocketing executive pay”, designated as one of the great causes of inequality.  
Also politicians – Sanders, Corbyn and Mélenchon (in US, UK and French, respectively) are 
evident examples – clearly relate more progressive income taxes to less income inequality. In 
addition, standard optimal taxation theory regarding income tax, largely organized around the 
foundational work of Mirrlees (1971), points out that greater inequality tends to make the 
optimal tax more progressive (Mankiw et al., 2009). 
Interestingly, few works test whether inequality really plays an important role in determining 
the degree of progressivity of income taxes. Many of them, instead, investigate the effectiveness 
of progressivity in decreasing inequality (e.g. Joumard et al., 2012; Cooper et al., 2015; Verbist 
and Figari, 2013; Duncan and Sabirianova Peter, 2012). However, if tax schedules are not used 
as a means to react to growing inequality levels the efficiency of progressivity is of little 
relevance in practice.    
Thus, in chapter 3 I investigate the causal relationship between pre-tax income inequality and 
income tax progressivity.  
It is remarkable that the few studies found examining the issue suggest that if Governments 
used progressivity to stop inequality before it is not the case anymore. Moreover, the only work 
(Scheve and Stasavage, 2016, referred to as SS) formally analysing causality between the 
variables (i.e. using statistical causality tests) found little evidence to support inequality is 
important to drive income tax progressivity. Their results suggest there is causality from 
progressivity to pre-tax inequality only.  
It is important to stress that information on the phenomenon under scrutiny is highly important 
to address inequality issues, since if authorities setting income taxes are not sensitive to 
arguments involving actual inequality, progressivity will not be used to curb inequality even if it 
is an effective form to do so.  
I build on the work aforementioned (SS, which was published whilst my study was ongoing) in 
that I also formally test causality between progressivity and inequality, but using different 
                                                          
4 See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development: Tackling inequality through trade and 
development in the post-2015 development agenda (2014), page 12. 
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(arguably better) indexes of progressivity and income inequality, and different (again arguably 
better) causality tests. 
Our results suggest there is causality both from progressivity to inequality and vice-versa, which 
contradicts SS’s conclusions regarding the issue.  
After comparing the EASA estimates with estimates from another 2 methodologies in chapter 1, 
I concluded the EMU does not vary across contexts, since each estimation method mentioned 
estimates the parameter in a different context and the estimated values obtained coincide. 
However, in chapter 1 I compare EMU estimates across contexts in a revealed-preference 
setting. In a stated-preferences setting not only the results may change, I can explain differences 
in the EMU across contexts by reference to psychological traits, which is interesting for a couple 
of reasons.  
Therefore, in chapter 4 I test the EMU context-sensitivity in a stated-preferences setting and 
examine how psychological traits affect both EMU context-sensitivity and EMU value. 
The research contributes to resolving a puzzle in the literature regarding the EMU context-
sensitivity. Atkinson et al.’s (2009) results – obtained in a stated-preference setting –  suggest 
the parameter changes significantly across contexts, while Groom and Maddison’s (2013) results 
– obtained in a revealed-preference setting –  suggest the opposite. None of them however, 
examine how EMU context-sensibility relates to psychological traits, which may account for 
some of the differences found in the results.       
The analysis also contributes to the achievement of an EMU value possessing more relevance. 
To the extent that normative significance can be related to desirable psychological traits, it is 
possible to estimate more relevant EMU parameters if the sample which the estimation 
procedure is applied to is composed of individuals possessing desirable psychological traits. To 
explore such idea, however, it is necessary to define the traits associated with normatively 
desirable behaviour. 
Two clear candidates for that, although others can certainly be included, are empathy and 
reflectivity. The first (which basically means the ability to put one’s self in someone else’s shoes) 
is directly associated with the notions of goodness and morality. Baron-Cohen (2011) defends 
what is commonly understood as evil can be better described as ‘empathy erosion’, and Rifkin 
(2009) claims an increase in global empathy is the only way humanity can survive ‘global 
entropic collapse’. Irrespective of whether these perspectives are right (and they have been 
challenged), they underline the importance of the trait for policy makers. Reflectivity is 
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important basically because of the potential harmfulness of cognitive biases in the context of 
social policies. The trait is responsible for making the mind “engaged”, i.e. less superficial and 
“lazy” when facing problems. Thus, it is less likely that those highly reflective will be subject to 
cognitive biases. It can be understood, moreover, as the main aspect to be considered when 
investigating rationality (Stanovich, 2011).     
In order to carry out the investigation proposed I apply an experiment containing 10 tasks. I use 
it to measure the EMU in three contexts (risk aversion, inequality aversion and time preference), 
and to measure participant’s level of empathy and reflectiveness (it must be said I also consider 
other traits besides empathy and reflectiveness, but these two traits are the central ones). 
The results show basically that the EMU context-sensitivity varies with the traits mentioned and 
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Chapter 1: Addressing the Equal Absolute Sacrifice Approach to 
Estimating the Elasticity of Marginal Utility Systematically   
 
1.1. Introduction 
The importance of how to evaluate public investments is straightforward since it directly affects 
society's resource allocation, and for such task discounting is indispensable. To illustrate the 
point consider two kinds of projects Governments are supposed to evaluate: one concerning the 
decrease of GHG emissions and another regarding small-size infrastructure improvements. The 
costs relative to both are incurred in the present and near future, but the time the benefits come 
vary greatly between them. The first has in view benefits that start to accrue in the distant 
future, whilst for the second the benefits come within a few years. To prioritize these projects it 
is necessary, among other things, to account for the time at which costs and benefits accrue, an 
exercise that requires a discount rate.       
In this chapter I expect to contribute to this subject by estimating one of the compounding 
parameters - the elasticity of marginal utility (EMU or 𝜂) - of the Ramsey equation, which is 
widely used to determine the social discount rate (SDR), which in turn gives the minimum return 
rate a public project should yield in order to be undertaken. The EMU may also be used to derive 
welfare weights,5 but in the present case the parameter estimation aims to contribute mainly to 
the public investment appraisal literature. 
Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) is a relatively simple technique which enables public investments to 
be prioritized.6 It basically consists of bringing (by an appropriate discount rate) all the 
investments impacts, which take place at different points in time, to present value equivalents. 
This procedure allows comparing in a straightforward way costs and benefits and identifying the 
                                                          
5Although the focus of the estimation here is not the use of 𝜂 in weighting distributional impacts, it must 
be noticed that the coefficient essentially defines how much utility one derives from an infinitesimal 
variation in income, being therefore useful to establish the optimal way society should weight the income 
change (or welfare change) of the individuals or groups considered. So, if a project affects individuals 
possessing different income levels, and therefore different utility levels, the variation in social welfare 
induced by the project will be different depending on how much weight is given to the utility variation of 
the different parts, such that CBA may be carried out taking into consideration these weights to indicate 
the most valuable project in terms of welfare. Yet another use for 𝜂 regarding inequality is the one 
concerning the measurement of actual income inequality by the procedure indicated in Atkinson (1970), 
which explicitly takes into account the social welfare function implied in ranking income distributions to 
measure inequality. 




most desirable projects. The efficiency of this technique, however, depends on the discount rate 
used (usually called social discount rate (SDR) when applied to public projects), and one of the 
most direct applications of the EMU parameter occurs in this context. 
The conceptual justification of the CBA is given by the Kaldor-Hicks compensation idea (Kaldor, 
1939, and Hicks, 1939) that basically states a project which can more than compensate those 
who lose with the implementation of it is a worthwhile undertaking. Nothing is said about 
whether the compensation does indeed take place or not, but just about the possibility of 
compensation.  
In the literature there are basically four ways to get a defensible value for the social discount 
rate (Boardman et al., 2001): to set the SDR equal to the estimated Social Rate of Time 
Preference (SRTP) obtained via Ramsey rule, for example;7 the Social Opportunity Cost (SOC); a 
weighted average of the rates given by the SRTP, SOC and the government’s foreign borrowing 
rate; or the shadow price of capital. All these approaches to obtaining the SDR are very briefly 
commented upon in the next section, and the derivation of the SRTP via Ramsey rule is 
illustrated.  
It is important to notice that methods to estimate the SDR apart from the SRTP (as estimated by 
the Ramsey equation) use information from financial markets. However, there are many 
different indices in such markets that could indicate the value of the SDR (Boardman et al., 
2001), such that aggregating them all in order to estimate a unique discount rate becomes 
difficult. This fact clearly favours the use of the SRTP method. Moreover, tax revenues are 
arguably the main source of governmental resources (Pomerleau, 2014), implying that for the 
most part, governmental investments are funded with deferred consumption. Therefore, the 
SRTP method giving the return rate that compensates for consumption deferment also favours 
its use. Once the use of the STPR is established to derive the SDR, the importance of the EMU 
estimation is obvious to the public investment appraisal debate.8       
There are a variety of different ways to approach the estimation of the EMU, and the result 
achieved is sensitive to the methodology employed. Some are based on stated preferences (via 
                                                          
7 There are two ways to estimate the SRTP. One is derived from Ramsey’s (1928) growth model and the 
other by looking at low risk securities in the market. Concerns relative to the second way of deriving the 
SRTP are that people systematically do not reflect inter-temporal preferences in the market and their 
individual preferences do not reflect what they think is best for society as a whole (Zhuang et al., 2007; 
Dasgrupta and Pearce, 1972). 
8 It also must be noticed that in a risk-free environment, with frictionless financial market, the SDR 
obtained by the STPR would be same as the one given by the financial market interest and the return on 
the marginal productive capital of the economy. 
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experiments and questionnaires), others on revealed preferences [via market data or tax data, 
like the Equal Absolute Sacrifice Approach (EASA) used herein], and others on ethical constraints 
mathematically represented imposed on specific models. All of them are presented in more 
detail in the course of the study.  
Many estimates of the EMU are available, but with the dataset I use it is possible to provide 
more trustworthy estimates, since they take into consideration a long period of time and many 
countries. It also permits me to compare different variations of the EASA thereby contributing 
to the debate related to this approach. Moreover, the dataset permits to test some assumptions 
made by the EASA, such as the constancy of the EMU over time. To anticipate my results the 
calculated estimates clearly concentrate around 1.5.   
To estimate the EMU with a large data is important given that, as argued by Groom and 
Maddison (2013), most public projects take many years to be materialise, such that a proper 
coefficient to be used in an SDR which intends to evaluate these projects should itself be based 
on many years of observation. Moreover, an SDR intended to consider intergenerational 
projects should take long run data into account due to the fact that different generations will 
have to keep on funding the investment in order to complete the undertaking.9  
In the literature consulted regarding the estimate of EMU, only Van Dalen (1995) considered a 
larger dataset in terms of time (1830 to 1990) than the one presented here, using a life-cycle 
behavioural model. But this data is available only for the UK. Evans et al. (2005) and Kula (2004) 
are examples of studies that derived the parameter using large datasets (1963 to 2002 and 1965 
to 1995, respectively), but still they do not cover as much time as the one used in the present 
study and involve observations from only one country (the UK and India, respectively). 
The methodology that I use to estimate EMU requires data related to income tax rates. My 
interest in this approach is due to the large dataset on income tax data available to me, which 
permits me to estimate the parameter over the long run, for different generations and countries. 
More specifically a reasonably long time-series for income tax rates and hence EMU can be 
derived for nine different Western European countries using the dataset and the EASA approach. 
In what follows, the literature related to the EASA is comprehensively revised, such that all the 
                                                          
9 Also insofar as the Ramsey formula depends on the growth rate this too has to be estimated over a 
significant period of time, such that the Ramsey formula has gone through considerable modifications due 
to for example uncertainty in the growth rate and autocorrelated growth rates. These modifications, 
however, highlight even more the importance of the EMU, as discussed in the next section. 
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works deriving the EMU by EASA are included. This has not been attempted so far, and it reveals 
several unresolved issues which I will attempt to address.  
Lastly, I compare the EMU estimates obtained using the EASA with estimates obtained with 
other two revealed-preferences methodologies in order to validate the approach and check 
whether the value of 1.5 is consistent across the different estimation methods. One of the 
referred methods uses data on consumption growth rates and the other uses data on insurance 
to derive EMU estimates. The results indicate the value of EMU is broadly the same across the 
methodologies, which greatly reinforces the 1.5 value obtained via EASA. This is one of the most 
novel aspects of the chapter, given there are (to my knowledge) no other works comparing the 
EMU across different methodologies and countries with the amount of data considered by me.     
In short, I organize and systematize the literature regarding the derivation of the EMU via EASA 
in that I classify the different estimation methods coexisting within the EASA framework and 
compare the parameter values obtained with each of them. I also validate the EASA comparing 
the EMU value obtained with it with estimates obtained with two other estimation methods. A 
further attempt to validate the EASA approach is deferred until the next chapter.  
The remainder of the research is as follows. In the next section I make a theoretical review 
linking the parameter to be estimated to public investments and listing the most common ways 
to estimate it, including the EASA. In the next section I undertake a comprehensive literature 
review, describing and commenting on all the studies found employing EASA to obtain EMU 
estimates. Then I discuss the literature searched, trying to clarify the main ambiguities found in 
it and how they could be solved, providing a brief description of the dataset utilized just after. 
Next I present the results, giving details on the suggested EMU value. In section 7 I compare the 
estimates obtained with the EASA with estimates obtained with two other revealed-preferences 
methodologies. Section 8 concludes. 
1.2. Theoretical review 
In this section I give more details on the CBA, present the most widely used methods to obtain 
the SDR (which reveals the importance of the Ramsey equation in this context), illustrate how 
the Ramsey equation is derived and present the most common ways to obtain the 𝜂, including 
the EASA – the method to derive the EMU utilized in this study. 
1.2.1. Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) and the Social Discount Rate (SDR) 
The CBA is a tool that enables to prioritize investments and which is highly used in the public 
sector (see HM Treasury, 2003, as an example). It basically consists of estimating the benefits 
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and costs of a project in monetary terms, through time (presuming the impacts occur at different 
points of time), and then converting them to their present values (PV) by applying a discount 
rate, making it possible to compare them even if they are scattered over time. The desirability 
of the project being evaluated can be judged in terms of the net present value (NPV) of the 
project. 
Boardman et al. (2001) define 9 steps to undertake a CBA. The first is to identify the alternative 
projects relative to the counterfactual; the second is to decide whose benefits and costs are 
going to be considered; the third is to classify the project impacts as benefits or costs; the fourth 
is to predict how the impacts are going to be distributed over time; the fifth is to monetize the 
impacts; the sixth is to discount the benefits and costs to obtain their present values; the seventh 
is to calculate the net present value of each alternative; the eighth is to conduct sensitivity 
analysis for the alternatives, to see what is the effect of utilizing different values (for the impacts 
and discount rate, for example) in the calculations; and the ninth is to recommend one of the 
alternatives.  
The procedure presented above clearly depends on the discount rate used to convert the costs 
and benefits to their PV equivalents (step 6). In the context of public sector investments 
evaluation, this discount rate is commonly called the Social Discount Rate (SDR), meaning the 
minimal real return rate an investment should yield. It must be stated that many projects are 
acutely sensitive to the choice of the SDR, mainly those whose benefits and costs are accrued in 
the long-run, like environment-related projects. 
The SDR is (usually) obtained in five different ways. It may be equalized to the Social Rate of 
Time Preference (SRTP), which is described by the Ramsey equation, and basically indicates what 
the minimal future return an investment should give to make society willing to defer 
consumption. The equation is composed of two terms, the pure time preference parameter and 
a multiplication between the elasticity of the marginal utility (EMU) of consumption and the 
consumption growth parameters. The main criticism of this approach is that it does not take into 
consideration the effect of displacing investments undertaken by the private sector, being more 
appropriate to evaluate projects which are funded by deferred consumption solely (Baumol, 
1968). On the other hand, there seems to be some agreement in the literature concerning SDR 
and the conclusion is that the SRTP is the most suitable to discount intergenerational projects 
(Zhuang et al., 2007).  
The SDR can also be equalized to the marginal Social Opportunity Cost of capital (SOC). The basic 
idea underpinning this approach is that public investments mostly displaces private investment, 
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and should therefore at least equal the rate of return given by private projects (Harberger, 
1972). One of the ways to estimate the SOC is to search for the real pre-tax return on low risk 
corporate bonds, which can be made by, for example, looking at the monthly average yields of 
Mody's AAA corporate bonds (Boardman et al., 2001). Some shortcomings of this approach are 
that returns caused by negative externalities are not accounted for (Dasgupta et al., 1999), the 
fact that the risk structure faced by corporations is different from the one faced by Governments 
causes the discount rate to be overestimated (Arrow and Lind, 1997), and there is no fixed pool 
of investments, such that many public projects do not replace, but enhance and enable private 
investments (Morrison and Schwartz, 1996). 
The SDR may also be equalized to the Governments borrowing rate, which is by many regarded 
as the rate reflecting the cost of financing the project (Boardman et al., 2001). A major criticism 
about this approach is that it does not take into account that in many countries governmental 
borrowing (even borrowing abroad) increases real domestic interest rates, which causes 
investments and consumption crowding out that is not accounted for (Boardman et al., 2001). 
The other two approaches to obtain the SDR are the Weighted Average approach (WA) and the 
Shadow Price of Capital approach (SPC). The WA emerged as a result of different contributions 
(as Burgees, 1888 and Sandmo and Dreze, 1971), and is based on the idea of combining the rates 
obtained by the SRTP, the SOC and the governments foreign borrowing rate by averaging them, 
with the weights reflecting the proportion of funding coming from the different sources 
(consumptions deferment, private capital displacement and foreign borrowing). This approach, 
although considering the cost of deferring consumption and the private capital displacement, 
does not allow for the possibility of reinvestment of part of the public investment return, 
assuming implicitly it is all consumed. A complicating factor about the WA approach is that the 
weights obviously vary across projects, given that they are often funded in different ways, 
making it difficult for policy makers to follow this rule. Moreover, the critiques relative to the 
previous three approaches also apply to this one, since it combines them. 
The SPC also makes use of the SRTP and takes into account the return a project may give to the 
private sector in the form of reinvestments, besides considering the private capital displacement 
caused by public investment. In this case the costs associated with the project are given by the 
decrease of current consumption and future consumption, the latter being caused by private 
capital displacement. And the benefits are given by the consumption of the return and by the 
reinvestment of it, which generates more consumption in the future. To illustrate the SPC I 
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resort to the work of Zerbe and Dively (1994), where the net present value (NPV) calculated by 





𝑡=0 ,      (1.1) 
where 𝐵𝑡[𝑔𝑏𝑉 + (1 − 𝑔𝑏)] and 𝐶𝑡[𝑔𝑐𝑉 + (1 − 𝑔𝑐)] are the consumption level equal to benefits 
and equal to costs at time 𝑡, respectively; 𝑔𝑏 and 𝑔𝑐 are the proportion of benefits that return 
to the private sector by reinvestment and the proportion of costs caused by displacement of 
private capital, respectively; 𝑖 is the SRTP and 𝑉 is the SPC parameter, which converts the 
benefits and costs caused by generation and displacement of private investments into 




,          (1.2) 
where 𝑟 is the gross return on private investment, 𝑑 is the rate of depreciation and 𝑠 is the saving 




,          (1.3) 
where 𝑙 is the return rate on private investment net of depreciation and 𝑗 is the saving rate from 
𝑗. 
The shortcomings of this approach are that the SPC parameter may vary too much according to 
the parameters assumed in 1.2 and 1.3 (Lyon, 1990), and the resulting NPV varies according to 
the time it takes for the project to be completed (Harberger and Jenkins, 2002), which makes it 
quite difficult for policy makers to utilize this approach in their SDR estimations. 
In practice, the SRTP and the SOC are the most used methods (mainly due to the complications 
related to the WA and SPC approaches), the SRTP preferred by developed countries (e.g., France, 
Italy, Spain, the UK and several US departments), whilst the SOC is preferred by the developing 
countries (Zhuang et al., 2007). 
As seen above, besides being simple to apply and, in general, recognized as the best way to 
estimate the SDR associated with intergenerational projects, the SRTP is also used both in the 
WA and SPC approaches. Thus, I give special attention to this methodology for obtaining the 
SDR, illustrating its derivation (via Ramsey equation) below. 
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1.2.2. The Ramsey equation and the SRTP 
In this section I illustrate how the Ramsey equation can be derived in a simple two-period 
context (based on Gollier, 2013), showing the relation between this formula and the EMU. 
Considering a two-period (current, represented by the subscript 0, and future, represented by 
the subscript 1) model and a utility function based on current and future consumption amounts, 
one can argue that the minimum return an investment [in which the costs are given in the 
present (0) and the return in the future (1)] should yield to be profitably made is given by 
∆𝑈 = − 𝑈𝑐0 + 𝑅 𝑈𝑐1, ∆𝑈 = 0,          (1.4) 
where  is the per capita investment cost, 𝑅 is the gross interest rate returned by the project in 
period 1 (both are assumed to be small), 𝑈𝑐0 is the derivative of the utility with respect to the 
current level of consumption and 𝑈𝑐1 is the derivative of the utility with respect the future level 
of consumption. It means that the future return in terms of utility should at least compensate 
the loss of utility in the present. Rearranging it we have that 
𝑅 = 𝑈𝑐0/𝑈𝑐1.             (1.5) 
Writing 𝑅 in terms of an infinitely compounded interest rate we have that 
𝑅 = 𝑒𝑟𝑡 = 𝑙𝑛𝑅 = 𝑟𝑡,            (1.6) 
and then the infinitely compounded interest rate is 
𝑟 = 𝑡−1ln⁡(𝑈𝑐0/𝑈𝑐1).            (1.7) 
Making the further assumption that the utility function is separable in time and discounted in a 
constant rate fashion (time consistency) we have that 
𝑈(𝑐0, 𝑐1) = 𝑢(𝑐0) + 𝑢(𝑐1)𝑒
𝑑𝑡,           (1.8) 
where 𝑑 is the rate of impatience through which the utility is discounted. Substituting equation 
1.8 in 1.7 gives 
𝑟 = 𝑡−1 ln (
𝑢0
𝑒𝑑𝑡𝑢1
) = 𝑑 − 𝑡−1ln(𝑢0/𝑢1).         (1.9) 
Approximating 𝑢1 by a first order Taylor expansion around 𝑐0 gives 
𝑟 = 𝑑 − 𝑡−1ln⁡(1 +
𝑐1+𝑐0
𝑐0
𝜂𝑐0),         (1.10) 














𝜂𝑐0,        (1.12) 
we have that 
𝑟 ≅ 𝑑 +
𝑐1−𝑐0
𝑡𝑐0
𝜂𝑐0,          (1.13) 
which is the Ramsey equation. It shows that two factors should be considered in the choice of 
the SDR, the pure time preference, or impatience and the wealth effect. The latter is composed 
of two elements: the consumption growth and the EMU, which is interpreted in this context as 
inequality aversion. The Ramsey formula is commonly written as 
𝑟 = 𝑑 + 𝜂𝑔,           (1.14) 
where 𝑑 is the pure rate of time preference, 𝜂 is the elasticity of marginal utility of consumption 
(income) and g is the average rate of growth of per capita real consumption (income). The right 
hand side of equation 1.14 is conventionally called social time preference rate (STPR), and 
essentially measures the rate of return some investment should provide in order to preserve the 
welfare level negatively affected by consumption rescheduling. 
It is also important to notice further theoretical developments have been made affecting the 
Ramsey rule that allow, for example, to account for growth rate uncertainty. In the case where 
growth is assumed to be i.i.d and to follow a normal distribution with variance 𝜎2, the extended 
Ramsey rule can for example be written as  
𝑟 = 𝑑 + 𝜂?̅? − 0.5𝜂(𝜂 + 1)𝜎2,         (1.15) 
where ?̅? is the growth rate of expected consumption. Notice that besides the pure time 
preference rate 𝑑 and 𝜂𝑔, which refers to the wealth effect,10 the equation includes another 
term which reflects the ‘prudence effect’, i.e. the understanding that people tend to invest 
(save) more when future consumption is not certain. The extension of the Ramsey rule further 
highlights the importance of the EMU (𝜂) for the SDR; besides reflecting inequality aversion it 
also appears in an additional component referred to as the ‘prudence effect’.     
                                                          
10 Notice that the term 𝜂𝑔 reflects the idea that if 𝑔 is expected to be high people will be more willing to 
invest only if the investment return is higher, which gives the intuition as to why 𝜂 is interpreted as a 
parameter indicating inequality aversion.   
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1.2.3. Methods to estimate 𝜼 
Having established the importance of this parameter in this section I briefly explain the main 
methods found in the literature to derive EMU. I also provide some remarks about the diverse 
possible interpretations of the parameter. 
There are basically six methods to derive EMU: those eliciting inequality or risk aversion by 
experiments or surveys, those doing it by analysing lifetime consumption behaviour, demand 
for wants-independent goods or insurance data (thus collecting data based on individuals’ 
revealed preferences), those doing it by observing governmental income tax schedules (looking 
at socially revealed values) and those doing it by choosing an 𝜂 which satisfies some desirable 
ethical properties in an intergenerational context model (essentially deriving the EMU by an 
ethical thought experiment). Further details on all the methods cited are provided later. 
It must noticed that in the usual model to investigate societal welfare (where the utility functions 
are assumed to be iso-elastic and the social welfare function is assumed to be utilitarian) 𝜂 can 
be interpreted in three ways: as an indicator of intra-generational inequality aversion, 
intergenerational inequality aversion and risk aversion. It is the diversity of ways in which the 
EMU can be interpreted which opens the door to the wide variety of methods for estimating its 
value. 
The literature is ambiguous about whether this representation of the elasticity of marginal utility 
is consistent. Atkinson et al. (2009), for example, sustain that people do not think of the three 
referred aspects as the same, whilst Groom and Maddison (2013) find, for UK data, that different 
methodologies (which result from different views on how to interpret 𝜂, as exemplified below) 
for estimating 𝜂 generate statistically equivalent results, which can be interpreted as evidence 
that the three aspects should indeed be regarded as equal. Also there seems to be 
neuroscientific evidence suggesting a linkage between intergenerational and intra-generational 
inequality aversion (Da Silva et al., 2015), and Epstein and Zin (1989) disentangle inter-temporal 
substitution and risk aversion as generalizing the expected-utility model.11 
                                                          
11 They basically derive a class of recursive utility function over inter-temporal consumption lotteries for 
which the von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility function is just one of the possible cases. The time 
aggregator is assumed to be a linear homogeneous CES, and different certainty-equivalent functions (risk 
aggregator) relative to future utilities are considered. As a means of example regard it as 𝑈𝑡(𝑈𝑡+1) =
[𝐸𝑡𝑈1+1
𝑎 ]1/𝑎, where 𝑈𝑡 is the utility at time t, 𝐸𝑡 is the expected value conditional on information given at 
t, and 𝑎 implies risk aversion. Once the 𝑈𝑡 is given by [(1 − 𝛽)𝑐𝑡
𝑟 + 𝛽𝜇𝑡(𝑈𝑡+1)
𝑟]1/𝑟, where 𝛽 gives the 
marginal rate of time preference and 𝑟 implies the elasticity of inter-temporal substitution, it can be seen 
how risk aversion is disentangled from inter-temporal substitution. 
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The different approaches to estimate 𝜂 reflect these varied ways of understanding the 
parameter. The estimation based on income tax rates, for example, assumes the progressivity 
of an egalitarian (in terms of equal absolute sacrifice, as discussed below) tax schedule reveals 
the degree of inequality aversion. This way of eliciting 𝜂 clearly focuses on intra-generational 
inequality aversion, once tax schedules are basically income transfers amongst different persons 
at a given time and world state. The approach based on lifetime consumption behaviour 
measures the elasticity of inter-temporal substitution (EIS) which given some assumptions is 
equal to the reciprocal of EMU by maximizing an inter-temporal utility function. The fact the 
model is concerned with individual (not societal) utility maximization over time shows the 
coefficient in this case is interpreted primarily as an inter-temporal inequality index. Moreover, 
considering the expected utility framework, where individual utility is dependent on different 
states of the world, it is largely known that the relative risk aversion (RRA) measure (equal to 𝜂 
for an iso-elastic utility function) gives the degree of risk aversion, such that studies concerned 
with EMU estimation may instead interpret it as a parameter indicating risk aversion. 
Below I detail four of the six methods to estimate the EMU. The other two are described in 
section 1.7, where I compare the EMU value estimated via EASA with EMU values obtained from 
analysing consumption growth rates and insurance data.  
1.2.3.1. Survey methods 
The survey method is exemplified by studies like Pirttila and Uusitalo (2008), Amiel et al. (1999) 
and Carlsson (2005), which use questions about wage distributions and/or of the leaky bucket 
type (addressed below) to elicit inequality aversion.12 The first approach basically poses income 
distributions differing in mean and variance to be seen by the respondents, who have to choose 
a preferred one. The leaky bucket approach infers inequality aversion by asking questions 
bearing the idea of a transfer from a rich to a poor in which just part of the contribution reaches 
the latter.13 The amount of loss undergone by the rich which is accepted by the respondent 
indicates how inequality averse her or she is. In a context where an iso-elastic social utility 
function is assumed, a person with an EMU equal to 2 would accept someone five times richer 
than another to make a sacrifice of 25 currency units to transfer just 1 to the poorer, for example 
(Cowell and Gardiner, 1999).  
                                                          
12 There are other methods of eliciting 𝜂 via experiments, as for example looking at self-reported 
wellbeing (Layard et al., 2008), or at risk aversion (Barsky et al., 1997). The two methods presented here, 
however, seem to be the most popular and direct way of measuring inequality aversion by surveys. 
13 See Appendix 1.A for an example of a leaky bucket type question. 
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The comparison between different income distributions can reveal the EMU if one assumes 
individuals rank the distributions according to a given criterion function which involves the EMU. 
So, for example, if after devising two distributions which should be hypothetically ranked equally 
by an individual with EMU equal to 2, the respondent comparing them is indifferent between 
the two, such choice can be interpreted as indicating that his EMU is indeed around 2. On the 
other hand, if he prefers the more egalitarian distribution, such choice can be seen as an 
indication that his EMU is larger than 2. By contrast, if he chooses the less equalitarian 
distribution, he can be seen as possessing an EMU smaller than 2.14  
The main problem faced by this kind of research is that estimates vary across context and with 
the wording of survey questions,15 something which casts doubt on any particular value 
obtained based on a given survey. Also, the representativeness of the participants (students in 
many cases or experts) is an issue, that may limit the relevance of the estimate obtained (see 
Carlsson et al., 2005 and Amiel et al., 1999).  
1.2.3.2 Method based on demand for wants-independent goods  
It is also possible to derive EMU by considering the demand for wants-independent goods. These 
are goods for which the marginal utility of consumption is independent of the amount of other 
goods consumed. So a utility function in which food and non-food goods are taken as wants-
independent would imply the form  
𝑈 = 𝑢𝑓(𝑓) + 𝑢𝑛(𝑛),           (1.16) 
where 𝑓 is the amount of food goods consumed and 𝑛 is the non-food goods consumed. In this 
case the increase in utility caused by an increase in the amount of food consumed is independent 
from the consumption of all other goods. Given an additively separable utility function Frisch 




,          (1.17)  
where 𝑘𝑖 is the income elasticity of demand, 𝑤𝑖 is the income share and 𝑖 is the own 
compensated elasticity for 𝑖. 
                                                          
14 See Appendix 1.A for an example of this type of question. 
15 Pirttila and Uusitalo (2008) find a median inequality aversion below 0.5 using the leaky bucket type 
question, which is in accordance with Amiel et al. (1999), who use the same technique and get a median 
inequality aversion between 0.1 and 0.2. Using the income distribution comparison, Pirttila and Uusitalo 
(2008) find a median inequality aversion larger than 3, which is a result similar to the one found by 




The most common assumption utilized for EMU estimation purposes is the one assuming wants 
independence between food and non-food goods. The next step is to estimate the demand for 
food16 to obtain the parameters entering the Frisch equation. 
The additive preference assumption is probably the factor posing most difficulties to the 
approach’s acceptance. Some do not even consider the method in their reviews of estimates of 
EMU (e.g. Cowell and Gardiner, 1999 and Pearce and Ulph, 1995). On the other hand, some 
consider it is reasonable to assume that food enters the utility function in an additive way (as 
Fellner, 1967; Evans and Sezer, 2002; Kula, 2002 among others), and Groom and Maddison 
(2013) test the assumption and find it holds.  
1.2.3.3. Method based on ethical criteria imposition 
All the methods to measure 𝜂 seen before are positive (as opposed to normative), in the sense 
that they look for a parameter consistent with people’s behaviour. The problem with this kind 
of approach is policy makers are arguably more interested in working with a normative value for 
the EMU, i.e. in an inequality aversion coefficient which is more consistent with ethical 
requirements. To address this issue, Buchholz and Schumacher (2010) derive EMU by imposing 
ethical criteria in an inter-generational allocation context. What they basically do is to assume a 
two-generational model with a linear transformation curve and no pure time discount and 
impose ethical restrictions mathematically represented in the model (such as solidarity between 
generations, meaning that both generations should be better off if productivity increases). By 
proceeding in this way, they define a value of 2 for EMU. 
This way to approach the question of the correct value of EMU has the merit of explicitly 
considering the normative nature of the issue. The ethical principle underpinning measurements 
of EMU based on positive approaches is that policy makers should use an estimate of EMU 
consistent with society’s behaviour as revealed in markets (savings behaviour or wants-
independent goods), via experiments or tax schedules (as discussed below). But if Governments 
are interested primarily in utilizing ethically defensible values of EMU, why would they accept 
any estimate based on a revealed preference approach?  
                                                          
16 The most used models for estimating the demand for food are the CEM (constant elasticity model), 
AIDS (almost ideal demand system) and QAIDS (quadratic almost ideal demand system) models. For more 
detail on their use to estimate 𝜂 see Evans et al. (2005). 
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One could however argue there is merit in the positive type of estimate presented, which is that 
Governments should represent its population, and therefore apply a number as representative 
of society as possible. 
1.2.3.4. The EASA 
The equal absolute sacrifice approach (EASA), the method used in this study, basically extracts 
EMU – interpreted in this context as an index of societal inequality aversion – from income tax 
progressivity data. 
The assumptions needed to apply the estimation method are twofold. The first is that the 
income tax schedule considered is grounded on the Equal Absolute Sacrifice Principle (EASP), 
which basically states that taxes should be designed in such a way that all individuals would pay 
equally in terms of sacrifice. This principle was first stated by Mill (1848): “Equality of taxation, 
therefore, as a maxim of politics, mean equality of sacrifice”. It can be expressed mathematically 
as17  
𝑈𝑖(𝑌𝑖)−𝑈𝑖(𝑌𝑖 − 𝑇(𝑌𝑖)) = 𝑐, 𝑖 = 1, 2, 3,… ,𝑁,        (1.18) 
where 𝑈𝑖  is individual i's utility function, 𝑌𝑖  is individual 𝑖's income, 𝑇 is the tax applicable to 𝑌𝑖  
and 𝑐 is a constant (and society is composed by N tax payers). A form for the utility function also 
has to be assumed, and usually it is the isoelastic form (all the studies reviewed in the literature 
review use an iso-elastic utility function). Thus, the presuppositions can be summarized in 






.           (1.19) 










= 𝑐.        (1.20) 
Differentiating 1.20 with respect to 𝑌𝑖  and isolating 𝜂 yields 
                                                          
17 Notice there is other principle related to equal sacrifice in taxation, which is the equal relative sacrifice 
principle (ERSP), given by 
𝑈(𝑌−𝑇)
𝑈(𝑌)
= 1 − 𝑐. Notice as well that this principle corresponds to using the EASP 
with 𝑙𝑛𝑈(𝑌) as the utility function instead of 𝑈(𝑌) (Young, 1990). Since there is no prior reason for us to 
use the log utility form in the EASP and the ERSP can be thought as a particular case of the EASP, just the 












,          (1.21) 
where 𝜕𝑇(𝑌𝑖)/𝜕𝑌𝑖  is the marginal tax rate (MTR) and 𝑇(𝑌𝑖)/𝑌𝑖 is the average tax rate (ATR). 
There are two different ways to estimate EMU by the model described above. The first is 
referred to as direct calculation, and consists on simply calculating the MTR and ATR at a given 
income level, thus obtaining EMU. The second is the regression method, consisting of running 
the following regression: 
log(1 − 𝑀𝑇𝑅𝑖) = 𝜂 log(1 − 𝐴𝑇𝑅𝑖) + 𝑖,       (1.22) 
where it is assumed that  is normally distributed, has mean zero and constant variance, and 𝑖 
indicates a point of the income distribution at which the MTR and ATR are derived. 
It must be noticed that in the present context the regression is just a means of finding the curve 
best fitting the terms log⁡(1 − 𝑀𝑇𝑅𝑖) and log⁡(1 − 𝐴𝑇𝑅𝑖), there being no special interpretation 
for the error term, such that it just indicates the deviation of the observed values from the curve. 
The direct calculation is simpler, but considers just one income level and/or year, whilst the 
regression method potentially considers many income levels and/or years, such that although 
the latter is in general more desirable, it is more demanding in terms of the number of 
observations required. In this study I use both methods.  
Direct calculation is used to obtain the estimates corresponding to different years, countries, 
income levels and tax units, whilst the regression approach is used to compare different ways 
of implementing the EASA methodology. For each year, country, income level and tax unit there 
is just one observation on the ATR and MTR, such that it is not possible to use the regression 
approach. On the other hand, once the ATR and MTR are calculated for many countries, or years, 
or income levels and so on, it is possible to use the regression approach (the study estimation 
procedure is further explained ahead in the chapter). 
Some concerns related to the method are that it cannot be exactly known to what extent a tax 
income schedule follows the equal absolute sacrifice principle (EASP), since to do this it would 
be necessary to know the utility functions of the individuals. Clearly it is not possible to fully test 
the isoelastic utility function assumption, i.e. there is no way to provide a conclusive answer 
about people’s utility function form, although indirect evidence may indicate some general 
features, as for example in relation to the constancy of the EMU. Some empirical evidence for 
the constancy of the elasticity of marginal utility is provided by Blue and Tweeten (1997) and 
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Evans (2005). Richter (1983), Vitaliano (1977) and Young (1987) find empirical support for the 
influence of the EASP in tax structures.  
One should also be aware that other principles, such as work incentives (Spackman, 2004), also 
influence the formulation of income tax schedules, something which undermines the 
assumption of the EASP as the only motivation for setting income tax schedules.18 I will return 
to this topic in the next chapter. 
Finally, it must be noted that also the EASA is a revealed preference approach, being therefore 
not based upon normative criteria. This could be viewed as a disadvantage. However, one could 
regard the EASP as a normative principle to be followed by the Government: the Government 
ought to implement tax schedules based on this principle. If that happens then there should be 
a close correspondence between the curvature of the utility function and the progressivity of 
the income tax schedule. In other words, in such case a simple criterion to decide what countries 
set the tax schedule closer to the norm would be to consider how well log⁡(1 − 𝑀𝑇𝑅) and 
log⁡(1 − 𝐴𝑇𝑅) fit into a curve, as shown in equation 1.22. It would indicate the extent to which 
a country follows the EASP when setting income tax schedules.  
1.3. Literature review on 𝜼 estimates based on EASA 
Before the literature review a brief description of how it was undertaken is presented. The 
review is intended to be as comprehensive as possible, listing and commenting on all works 
estimating 𝜂 by EASA. Lastly, a short comment on the studies reviewed intends to further classify 
them. 
1.3.1. Brief description of literature review undertaking 
Since the current chapter aims to review works in which the EMU is estimated by EASA, and this 
parameter is often used for SDR or welfare weights derivation, the key words employed in the 
search were separated into three groups: the first comprises words related to the parameter's 
name, the second contains words referring to the context in which the parameter is required 
and the third relates to the methodological assumption underpinning the technique. These 
words are presented below. 
Table 1.1. Key words categorization 
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 
Elasticity of marginal utility Social discount rate EASA 
Inequality aversion Welfare weights Estimation 
                                                          
18 Da Costa and Pereira (2014) argue, however, that in an environment equal to the one found in Mirrlees 
(1971) and an income tax schedule following the EASP, inefficiency arises just at the top of the income 
distribution and for MTR above the ones seen nowadays in most developed countries. 
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Source: see text. 
Using the key words above and Boolean operators the word combination by which the search 
was undertaken can be written as (“Elasticity of marginal utility" OR “Inequality aversion" OR 
“social discount rate" OR “welfare weight*") AND (sacrifi* OR approach OR estimat*).19 The 
databases employed were EconLit, ProQuest and Web of Science, and the number of works 
retrieved in each database were 467, 332 and 61 respectively. Since many studies found in the 
EconLit and ProQuest search were irrelevant, the analysis had to be narrowed by diminishing 
the number of words contained in groups 1 and 3. Following this strategy just 17 works (from 
both databases) were kept for further investigation, and out of these, only 10 were used in the 
literature review. 
The search undertaken in ProQuest did not present any novelty in relation to what was found in 
the EconLit database. In the analysis with the Web of Science database, on the other hand, 2 
works reviewed in the literature review below were detected by a citation search involving 2 key 
articles. In addition, 2 more works reviewed in the literature review were found by looking at 
the references of papers obtained in the search described above. A summary of the bibliographic 
investigations carried out is presented below. 
Table 1.2. Summary of literature review research 
Database Total of entries Saved for further research Used 
EconLit 467 17 10 
ProQuest 332 - - 
Web of Science 61 4 2 
References - - 2 
Source: see text. 
1.3.2. Literature review 
This section reviews works estimating EMU by EASA. All the studies found in the search 
described before are presented (in chronological order) and briefly discussed.  
In the literature consulted for this work, the first author to explicitly use the EASA was Stern 
(1977). He used UK data for the tax year 1973/1974 and tax rates for families with two children, 
achieving results for EMU by regression. To calculate the average tax rate (ATR) he did not use 
supernumerary income, i.e. did not subtract subsistence income from the taxable income 
                                                          
19 The asterisk indicates all different forms the word ends in must be tracked. So if one searches for 
estimat*, for example, words like estimate or estimation will be tracked. The operator OR indicates 
interchangeable names which should all be tracked out. So once 𝜂 can be tracked by various names, such 
as elasticity of marginal utility or inequality aversion, both names are, in this case, assigned as 
interchangeable. The operator AND indicates conjunction, such that in the case of the present research, 
for example, elasticity of marginal utility must be tracked in conjunction with the words sacrifi* or in 
conjunction with the word approach and so on. 
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amount. Cowell and Gardiner (1999) seem to be the second to estimate EMU by the EASA.20 
They did so for the tax years of 1998/1999 and 1999/2000, using a single non-elderly man with 
no special circumstances tax rates (also for UK). They also used regression, but it is not clear how 
they calculated the ATR. In addition to the results obtained just with income tax, the parameter 
was also estimated with income tax and employee’s National Insurance Contributions (NICs) 
[Stern (1977) uses income tax rates only]. Stern (1977) obtained a value of 1.97 for EMU and 
Cowell and Gardiner (1999) obtained a value of 1.43 and 1.41 (for the tax year of 1998/1999 and 
1999/2000, respectively) for EMU when considering just income tax data and 1.29 and 1.28 (for 
the tax year of 1998/1999 and 1999/2000, respectively) when considering income tax and NICs 
data. Although Stern (1977) suggests weighting the data by number of tax payers in a given 
income category, none of the aforementioned works weighted the data. 
We also find estimates of the EMU using EASA in Evans and Sezer (2004), where the main goal 
is indeed to establish a SDR grounded on the same theoretical framework (STRP) for different 
nations (Australia, France, Germany, Japan, UK and US) in order to yield a consistent criteria for 
public resource allocation in these countries.21 Data was considered for the year 2001 and for 
single persons in full time employment with no dependants.22 They use direct calculation to 
obtain the final values and NICs are included (this is subsequently referred to as all-in taxes).  
The justification for including NICs is that the EMU in this case were revealed to be steadier and 
more plausible by prior experimentation. They do not inform, however, what and how such 
experimentations were applied, besides they leave aside the issue of whether only the 
“steadiness” of the results found is enough to justify the inclusion of NICs. Results for EMU are 
first presented for the average production wage (APW) in manufacturing industries. In this 
context, the outcomes achieved are in the interval of 1.3 to 1.6. The highest (1.6) is for Germany 
and the lowest (1.3) are for France and the US. They draw attention, moreover, to the fact that 
if a change in the tax rate comes just below (above) the APW level, the 𝜂 derived will be 
overestimated (underestimated). This matter gives rise to another set of 𝜂 estimates (one 
estimate for each country) calculated by averaging the results achieved for each different wage 
                                                          
20 Young (1990) also derives 𝜂 using the EASP and an iso-elastic utility function. The latter is, however, of 
a generic form, and the procedure employed to obtain the parameter is not the one described in section 
1.2.3.4. In the study the 𝜂 is given by regressing ln⁡(𝑇(𝑌)) against 0.5ln⁡(𝑌(𝑌 − 𝑇(𝑌))). It must be noticed 
that the derivation shown in the section referred is also valid for a generic iso-elastic utility function and 
that Young (1990) makes some further assumptions and approximations in order to derive 𝜂. 
21 The issue of adopting a consistent SDR among countries is further commented ahead. 
22 They follow Cowell and Gardiner (1999) in this aspect instead of Stern (1977) who considered families. 
To collect data for single person started indeed to be the case for virtually every work using EASA since 
Cowell and Gardiner (1999). 
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levels (proportional to APW, namely, 0.67xAPW, APW, 1.33xAPW, 1.67xAPW). In this second 
analysis the parameter was between 1.28 and 1.72 (for France and Australia respectively). 
Evans and Sezers (2004) calculate 𝜂 at different income levels and averaging the results does 
not seem to solve completely the problem of over (under) estimation, but just to soften it, since 
the tax rate change may come before or after the income levels they consider. Moreover, the 
resulting estimates are weakened in terms of representativeness, given there are fewer people 
in the income levels lower and higher than the APW. 
Evans (2004) focuses on deriving a SDR for France and on the way he estimates 𝜂 by EASA. The 
worry related to France is a result of the considerably high social discount rate adopted by the 
country in public investment appraisal. In the referred to work the regression approach is not 
considered appropriate because of the small sample size. It is also claimed that it does not make 
behavioural sense to suppose that the ATR causes the MTR, as it is implied in the methodology 
under consideration, such that he uses direct calculation, estimating 𝜂 at different points of the 
income distribution. According to Stern (1977), however, the regression is just used to obtain a 
best fit, such that there is no suitable causality interpretation in this case. 
The 𝜂 estimates refer to the proportions of the APW in French manufacturing industries [the 
same ones used in Evans and Sezer (2004)]. The data utilized was for the year 2001 and single 
persons with full time employment and no dependants. To calculate the ATR supernumerary 
income was used. The justification given is that it would make more theoretical sense to apply 
the decreasing marginal utility of consumption concept (implied in the utility function assumed) 
to the income in excess of personal tax allowance. The authors supposed that the income 
amount under the allowance level would correspond to the basic subsistence level, under which 
it would not make sense to consider decreasing marginal utility of consumption.23 The average 
𝜂 was 1.35 and the estimates for different income levels were between 1.3 and 1.4. The 
parameter calculated for the income level equal to 1.33xAPW (𝜂 = 1.56) was not considered 
since there was detected a change in the marginal tax rate just below this wage level, which 
caused the observed estimate to be overestimated.24 
As pointed out before in the introduction, the EMU with respect to consumption is essential to 
the achievement of welfare weights, and in Evans et al. (2005) the effort to estimate 𝜂 is a step 
                                                          
23 This argument favouring the use of supernumerary income seems to have influenced other researchers 
regarding standard allowances. 
24 Note that the same method of averaging 𝜂 across different income levels found in Evans and Sezer 
(2004) was adopted. 
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to obtain distributional regional welfare weights for the UK (England, Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland), which are defined in the considered work as 
𝑤𝑗 = (𝑌
∗/𝑌𝑗)
𝜂,          (1.23) 
where 𝑤𝑗 is the distributional weight for region 𝑗, 𝑌𝑗 is the per-capita income in region 𝑗 and 𝑌
∗ 
is the national per-capita income. Basically, the purpose in estimating these weights is to use 
them in CBA, thereby accounting for equity issues regarding regional income distribution. 
The data is for personal tax of 2002/03 and the results are obtained via regression. Estimates 
are achieved with weighted (by number of tax payers or income amount) and non-weighted 
data, and the intercept is not assumed to be 0, so that before removing it, it’s statistical 
significance is tested. This procedure is said to detect to some extent whether the model 
assumptions have empirical support. There is no comment, however, on how to interpret an 
intercept in the given context, and on exactly how the procedure tests the model. Another 
device used in the paper is to calculate the reciprocal of 𝜂 in order to improve the causal relation 
underpinning the model, since according to the authors it makes more sense to assume that 
variation in the ATR depends on variation on MTR. As seen before, however, there is no point 
on thinking about causality in this context, once the regression is just a curve-fitting procedure. 
Two models were selected as being preferred. In the first the reciprocal of 𝜂 is used, the data is 
weighted by income25 and, after the intercept was shown to be statistically insignificant, it was 
removed, rendering an estimate of 1.63. In the second, 𝜂 (=1.57) is estimated directly, the data 
is also weighted by income and there is no intercept (it was removed after displaying statistical 
insignificance). The models were preferred because the intercepts were not significant, the R2 
were higher and the Durbin-Watson (DW) statistic suggested less correlation in the error than 
for the other models. In addition, in the case of non-weighted data the intercept was significant, 
which was seen by the authors as empirical support for weighting data. 
Evans and Sezer (2005) propose a SDR grounded on a consistent basis (STPR) for several EU 
members (19 countries), and on the way they estimate 𝜂 by EASA. They stress the importance 
of consistency in SDR values for the EU in a context of expansion and development of a single 
European market, although without giving any further explanation of why consistency across 
countries is important. It seems reasonable to think, however, that large SDR disparities would 
preclude different countries from investing in a common project, once their considerations on 
the profitability of the project would differ. 
                                                          
25 No specific reason or explanation is given to weight the observations by income. 
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The tax data used is for the year 2001 and single persons with no dependents. All-in tax rates 
were used (income tax rates and NICs), and the justification for this procedure is the same given 
in Evans and Sezer (2004). The estimations are obtained by direct calculation, first for the APW 
in manufacturing for each country and after for different levels of wage [same proportions of 
APW presented in Evans and Sezer (2004), mentioned before]. Using just the APW the results 
were between 1.11 and 1.81; averaging the 𝜂 calculated for different income levels and for each 
country, the results were between 1.1 and 2. This second result seems much less representative, 
once using income levels different of the APW. It is not clear if they used supernumerary income 
for the ATR calculation, and some values of 𝜂 related to specific levels of income and countries 
were considered out of line (it is, too different from the results obtained for other income levels 
in the same country) and then excluded from the average 𝜂 calculation. However, it is not clearly 
stated what values were excluded, and no rigorous criteria for exclusion is provided. 
In Evans (2005) the estimation of 𝜂 is carried out for 20 OECD countries, and the result is close 
to 1.4 (for average 𝜂) for developed countries which supports the argument that the UK 
Treasury's choice of 𝜂 (equal to 1) should be revised. The data utilized is for income tax rates on 
gross wage earning of single person with no dependants in 2002. Supernumerary income is used 
in the ATR calculation and its usage is justified in the same way as in Evans (2004). The author 
does not use all-in tax rates in this case, but tax-only data (does not include NICs). The reason 
given by the author is that the NICs reflect a different motivation in relation to income tax, so 
that the inclusion of the former could compromise the legitimacy of the model, once the EASA 
assumes the data reflects the EASP.26 Because of the small sample and the already commented 
upon opinions of the author concerning the EASA causality inaccuracy, the regression approach 
is put away, and 𝜂 is directly calculated for different levels of income (high, substantially above 
the APW in the manufacturing industries, and low, close to the APW) for each country. 
After obtaining values for high and low income, the average is calculated for all the countries, as 
well as the differences between the parameters obtained with the high and low incomes (and 
also the squared differences). With these results at hand the author tests (by t-test and non-
parametric Wilcoxon signed ranks test) if there is a significant statistical difference between the 
parameters calculated at low and high income. The tests support the constancy of 𝜂 across 
income level. 
                                                          
26 Although this justification is contradicted by the results obtained in Evans and Sezer (2004) and Evans 
and Sezer (2005) it seems it had some success in raising discussion about NICs inclusion. 
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The estimates obtained for the countries were also regressed in different ways, with two of them 
taken as preferred. In the first the regression was run as usual and in the second the parameter 
estimated was the reciprocal of 𝜂. As before, this second approach reveals a concern about the 
causality of the regression, which does not seem to be justified, given the regression should be 
seen just as a curve fitting procedure. The preferred specifications for both models give 
estimates close to 1.4. 
Sezer (2006) estimates 𝜂 by EASA to calculate welfare weights based on regional incomes for 
Turkey. He draws attention to the fact that sometimes EASA is the only method at hand to assess 
the parameter (which is the case for Turkey). It is a demonstration of the approach’s importance, 
since occasionally it is the only one which can be applied. The data is for the year 2004 and 𝜂 is 
derived by direct calculation. The ATR and MTR are obtained for the midpoint incomes of each 
taxable band, and supernumerary income is used. The result is an 𝜂 of approximately 1.25 
(excluding the first income group, for which the result is equal to unity, the parameter falls 
between 1.2 and 1.27). It is not clear if NICs were considered and if the data was collected for 
single persons. 
Lopez (2008) estimates SDR by STPR for nine Latin American countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Honduras, Nicaragua, Mexico, Peru), using EASA to derive 𝜂. There are two 
main difficulties to apply the approach in these countries. The first is that, for some cases, the 
tax evasion is high, something which implies that the ‘de jure’ statutory tax rates are different 
from the ‘de facto’ paid tax rates. He addresses this issue relying on the ‘de facto’ tax rates. The 
second is the choice of income level at which to calculate the 𝜂. For this case he divides the 
income distribution in five groups based on points corresponding to 20, 40, 60 and 80 percent 
of the distribution. After addressing these matters, two methods (both by direct calculation) are 
used to obtain the estimates. In the first he averages the MTR and ATR calculated as showed 
below across the quintiles (𝑖) and then calculates 𝜂 with these average values, and in the second 
he estimates an 𝜂 for each income level - for each country - at the income distribution 
percentages referred above and then averages the parameters derived for each corresponding 
income level. The MRT and ART for the first method are obtained by the following equations: 
𝑀𝑅𝑇𝑖 = 𝑇𝑖+1 −
𝑇𝑖
𝑌𝑖+1
− 𝑌𝑖 , 𝑖 = 1, 2, 3, 4,                    (1.24) 
and 
𝐴𝑅𝑇𝑖 = 𝑇𝑖+1 +
𝑇𝑖
𝑌𝑖+1
+ 𝑌𝑖 , 𝑖 = 1, 2, 3, 4,        (1.25) 
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where 𝑇𝑖 and Yi are the average taxes and average per capita income level, respectively, for the 
𝑖-th quintile. The averaged 𝜂 obtained with the first method is 1.5, whilst with the second it is 
1.6. He uses the parameters obtained with the first to derive the SDR of the countries 
considered, giving no clear explanation of why the first method was preferred. It is not clear if 
the tax rates are for single persons or families, if it was used supernumerary income and if NICs 
were included. 
Percoco (2008) also estimates 𝜂 by EASA to find an appropriate SDR for Italy (by the STPR 
approach). He used data for the year 2004, and claims to follow the methodology of Evans and 
Sezer (2004) and Evans (2004) regarding the EASA. By this we can infer that the data was also 
related to single person with no dependants and that supernumerary income was used. 
However, information concerning the data is not clearly stated. He utilizes direct calculation to 
estimate 𝜂, and it was done for different points of the income distribution [the same proportions 
of APW seen in Evans (2004)]. The average 𝜂 estimated was equal to 1.347. 
In Evans (2008) 𝜂 is estimated by EASA (and other methods), and a short literature review about 
the cited approach comprising the works of Stern (1977), Cowell and Gardiner (1999), Evans 
(2005) and Evans and Sezer (2005) is presented. The data utilized for the estimation of 𝜂 is for 
the year 2005/2006 and single person households (in the UK). The income level at which the 
parameter is obtained (by direct calculation) is the APW of adult, full-time workers. 
Supernumerary income is used based on the same rationale mentioned in Evans (2004), NICs 
are not included [the justification is the same one presented in Evans (2005)], and data is not 
weighted on grounds that when 𝜂 is calculated to be included in the STPR equation, “it is the 
circumstances of the average household that count" (Evans, 2008).27 The calculation result for 𝜂 
is 1.06. 
To provide aggregated measures of inequality in individual well-being considering other 
dimensions than just income (income, health and education, to be more precise) and EMU 
heterogeneity across country, Aristei and Perugini (2010) estimate the parameter for 26 
countries by the regression approach developed by Young (1990).28 It was done using data for 
the year 2006, and a median regression approach to prevent distortions caused by outliers. It is 
not clear if the tax rates considered include NICs and if standard allowances are considered. 
                                                          
27 It is interesting to note that it goes against the empirical support favouring weighting in Evans et al. 
(2005), and diminishes the validity of the interpretation advocated in Evans and Sezer (2004) that the 
across-income level average of the EMU is more valuable than the one obtained at the APW, once the 
representativeness of the parameters found out of the APW is smaller than for those at the APW. 
28 See footnote number 20. 
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Since ATR and MTR are not calculated, the income level at which they are derived is not an 
applicable concept in this context. The results for 𝜂 are between 1.04 and 1.77 (for Denmark 
and Ireland respectively), with an average of 1.35. 
In Evans and Kula (2011) 𝜂 is estimated by EASA (direct calculation) with the purpose to achieve 
appropriate SDR and regional welfare weights for Cyprus. They used data for the year 2007 and, 
although it is not clear, it seems that the rates were related to single persons with no 
dependants. The ATR and MTR were calculated for the midpoints of the taxable income bands. 
Supernumerary income is utilized, and it is not clear if NICs were included. The results obtained 
for each income level were weighted by the number of taxpayers in the brackets corresponding 
to the income level concerned, and an average 𝜂 of 1.33 and 1.08 were achieved for the Turkish 
(North) and Greek (South) regions of Cyprus respectively. Despite the different values, the 
author claims it is reasonable to use the same estimate of 𝜂 (between 1 and 1.3) for both parts 
of the island. 
With the purpose to “identify the appropriate value of a social discount rate to be used by the 
German Statutory Health Insurance for the economics evaluation of health technologies", 
Mareike and Jurgen (2012: 217) estimate 𝜂 by EASA. They use data for 2007 and direct 
calculation, checking the differences arising from the inclusion of NICs. The income level at 
which the derivations are undertaken are proportions of the average income (wage). No 
weighting is considered, and the results, considering together the data with and without NICs, 
are between 1.25 and 1.80. It must be noticed that in the model including NICs the highest 
income level is ignored because they claim that above a contribution ceiling “the redistribution 
mechanism in terms of social insurance contributions does not work completely" (Mareike and 
Jurgen, 2012: 135). It is not clear if supernumerary income was used. 
Groom and Maddison (2013) review the literature related to the 𝜂 estimates for UK and also 
produce new evidence (by EASA and other methods) concerning the parameter. They utilize the 
regression approach and the direct calculation to derive the results. The data analysed are 
earnings liable to income taxation for the years 2000-1 through 2009-10 (except 2008-09) for 
single person with no special circumstances (used in the regression approach and part of the 
direct calculation approach) and tax rates from 1948 to 2007 for single person household (used 
in the direct calculation approach). They use all-in tax data (include NICs) and tax-only data, but 
clearly favour the former procedure claiming that on their view “whilst historically NICs 
embodied a contributory principle, this linkage has now all but disappeared" (Groom and 
Maddison, 2013: 9). The use of supernumerary income is also criticized by a demonstration in 
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which the subsistence income, estimated by the tax allowance, is incorporated in the iso-elastic 
utility function, yielding an 𝜂 definition where the parameter explicitly depends on the 
subsistence wage and goes to infinity if the allowance approaches the income. Another concern 
expressed by the authors about supernumerary income is relative to the reliability of the 
underlying assumption that tax allowance is a good estimate of the subsistence income level. 
In the regression approach they develop models with and without NICs, with weighted (by 
number of tax payers in each earning category) and non-weighted data, and with year dummies 
to test the stability of the parameter over time. The ATR and MTR were calculated for the mean 
earning in each earning category, and the preferred model included NICs, used weighted data 
(thus representing, according to the authors, the population of income tax payers) and 
presented no dummies, since these were statistically insignificant, providing evidence in favour 
of the stability of 𝜂 over time. The preferred result obtained for 𝜂 is 1.515. 
In the direct approach they calculate 𝜂 for the APW in each year (with and without the NICs), 
but then the need to look at more historical data in order to derive a more reliable estimate is 
detected. At this point they use data reporting income tax rates since 1948 to 2007, calculating 
𝜂 (not weighting the data, but including NICs) at the APW for each year. The average 𝜂 obtained 
was 1.45. The parameter calculated at +/- 20% of the APW was significantly different from the 
one obtained for the APW level, providing then evidence against the constancy of 𝜂 across the 
income level. An AR (1) model was also run for 𝜂 at the APW, and a mean of 1.57 with a 95% 
confidence interval of 1.09-2.07 was derived. 
1.3.3. Comments on literature review and further classification 
The works presented in the last section can be classified in many different ways, but since this 
study intends to compare different methodologies inside the EASA, I present a classification 
which focuses on some technical aspects of the different 𝜂 estimation procedures undertaken 
throughout the studies considered. 
The technical elements which seem to vary most from work to work are the use of all-in or tax-
only data, the use of supernumerary income, the application of regression or direct calculation 
(or both), the utilization or not of weighted data, the income level and the tax years for which 𝜂 
is derived. Some issues related to some of these techniques and ways of assessing them will be 
further debated in the sections to come. Tables 1.3 and 1.4 below present a classification based 
on the aspects referred. 
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1.4. Brief discussion on literature review 
In this section I sum up briefly the main points of ambiguity in the literature just presented and 
consider some possible ways of advancing the debate. 
The two major issues which come up from reading studies using EASA to estimate 𝜂 – apart from 
the little dataset used, which is already tackled in this work by the usage of a larger dataset – 
are the usage or not of NICs and SI in the calculations. Cowell and Gardiner (1999) are the first 
to compare estimates derived with and without NICs. The core of this controversy seems to be 
on how much NICs are different from income tax, which seems not to be sufficiently solved yet 
to form a consensus in one or other direction. In Evans (2004), the discussion about including a 
subsistence wage (estimated by the tax free allowance) in the 𝜂 estimation procedure is posed, 
being based upon the claim it makes more sense to consider utility as a concave function of 
income just above a given subsistence income. Groom and Maddison (2013) further consider 
this issue, pointing out that in the derivation of 𝜂 described on section 1.2.3.4 the subsistence 
income should be taken into consideration in the iso-elastic utility function for the estimation 
procedure to be consistent with the argument justifying it. Also in this topic there seems to be 
no consensus. 
Table 1.3. Short literature categorization 
Study NICs SI IL Years 
Stern (1977) No No NC 1973/74 
Cowell and Gardiner (1999) 1 No NC NC 1998/99-1999/00 
Cowell and Gardiner (1999) 2 Yes NC NC 1998/99-1999/00 
Evans and Sezer (2004) 1 Yes NC APWmi 2001 
Evans and Sezer (2004) 2 Yes NC APWmi prop. 2001 
Evans (2004) NC Yes APWmi prop. 2001 
Evans et al. (2005) Yes No NC 2002/03 
Evans and Sezer (2005) 1 Yes No APWmi 2001 
Evans and Sezer (2005) 2 Yes No APWmi prop. 2001 
Evans (2005) No Yes APWmi prop. 2002 
Sezer (2006) NC Yes MTB 2004 
Lopez (2008) 1 NC NC QAI NC 
Lopez (2008) 2 NC NC IDP NC 
Percoco (2008) NC NC APW prop. 2004 
Evans (2008) No Yes AW 2005/06 
Aristei and Perugini (2010) NC NC NA 2006 
Evans and Kula (2011) NC Yes MTB 2011 
Mareike and Jrgen (2012) 1 Yes NC AW prop. 2007 
Mareike and Jrgen (2012) 2 No NC AW prop. 2007 
Groom and Maddison (2013) 1 Yes No NC 2000/01-2009/10 
Groom and Maddison (2013) 2 Yes No APW 1948-2007 
Groom and Maddison (2013) 3 Yes No APW 1948-2007 
Notes: (1) SI=supernumerary income; (2) IL=income level; (3) NC=Not clear; (4) APWmi=average production wage in 
manufacturing industries; (5) APWmi prop.=APWmi proportions; (6) MTB=midpoint of each taxable band; (7) 
QAI=quintile average income; (8) IDP=income distribution percentages (20,40,60,80 percent); (9) AW=average 
income; (10) NA=not applicable; (11) The years in Groom and Maddison (2013) 1 exclude the tax year 2008/09; (12) 
Some studies develop many different models, so due to space constraint just the preferred ones are presented. 
Source: see text. 
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To be able to establish a preferred way of estimation as far as NICs and SI are concerned I 
consider the best fit of four different estimation approaches inside the EASA: estimation 
considering income taxes and NICs (all in taxes) and not considering SI; considering all in taxes 
and SI; not considering NICs and SI and finally not considering NICs and considering SI. In other 
words, I gather across country and year the (dependent and independent) variables required to 
apply a regression of the type shown in equation 1.22. Comparing the R-squared of the different 
methods enables me to evaluate which of them fits better the EuroPTax data (which forms the 
basis for my empirical analysis and which I will go on to discuss in detail shortly). This is a simple 
and I think reasonable way to come out with a preferred approach (or at least to see whether 
the issue of NICS and SI makes an appreciable difference and is therefore worth worrying about), 
given the regression shown on equation 1.22 is to be seen just as a curve-fitting exercise, as 
Stern (1977) argues. 
Table 1.4. Continuing short literature categorization 
Study Regression/Calculation Weighting Result 
Stern (1977) Regression None 1.97 
Cowell and Gardiner (1999) 1 Regression None 1.43-1.41 
Cowell and Gardiner (1999) 2 Regression None 1.29-1.28 
Evans and Sezer (2004) 1 Calculation None 1.3-1.6 
Evans and Sezer (2004) 2 Calculation None 1.28-1.72 
Evans (2004) Calculation None 1.35 
Evans et al. (2005) Regression IA 1.57 
Evans and Sezer (2005) 1 Calculation None 1.11-1.81 
Evans and Sezer (2005) 2 Calculation None 1.1-2 
Evans (2005) Calculation None 1.4 
Sezer (2006) Calculation None 1.25 
Lopez (2008) 1 Calculation None 1.5 
Lopez (2008) 2 Calculation None 1.6 
Percoco (2008) Calculation None 1.347 
Evans (2008) Calculation None 1.06 
Aristei and Perugini (2010) Regression None 1.35 
Evans and Kula (2011) Calculation NTP 1-1.3 
Mareike and Jrgen (2012) 1 Calculation None 1.25-1.60 
Mareike and Jrgen (2012) 2 Calculation None 1.47-1.80 
Groom and Maddison (2013) 1 Regression NTP 1.515 
Groom and Maddison (2013) 2 Calculation None 1.45 
Groom and Maddison (2013) 3 AR(1) None 1.57 
Notes: (1) the information related to Cowell and Gardiner were inferred, not being clearly stated in the paper; (2) the 
results for Cowell and Gardiner are presented for the years 1998/99 and 1999/00 respectively; (3) 1.3- 1.6=between 
1.3 and 1.6; (4) IA=data is weighted by income amount; (5) the result for Evans et al. (2005) is relative to the 
preferred model that estimates  directly (not the reciprocal of ); (6) NTP=data weighted by number of tax payers in 
the band; (7) Some studies develop many different models, so due to space constraint just the preferred ones are 
presented. Source: see text. 
Anyone investigating the literature soon realizes there is some concern about the constancy of 
𝜂 over income levels, with the results regarding this issue ambiguous in the studies herein 
considered. Evans (2005), for example, tests the 𝜂 constancy over income by comparing the 𝜂 
of 20 countries at low and high income levels, finding evidence for the constancy of 𝜂, whilst 
Groom and Maddison (2013), using a long series of 𝜂 for the UK, test the same parameter 
property and find evidence supporting the variability of 𝜂 over the dimension concerned. 
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Since the iso-elastic utility function assumed in the EASA implies that income changes over time 
do not affect 𝜂 and that utility varies with income only, it seems sensible to expect the parameter 
is constant not just over income levels but also across time. If this expectation is not confirmed, 
the utility function underpinning the exercise would be proved to be not fully appropriate. If the 
parameter is found to vary over income and time, variation over time might be thought as a 
result of variation in income; on the other hand, if there is variation over time but no variation 
over income level, other variable(s) evolving trough time but income could be thought to affect 
the EMU. Groom and Maddison (2013) seem to be the only work in which the constancy of 𝜂 
across time is formally tested, but they do that observing just UK tax rates for some few years. 
Furthermore, to see if the 𝜂 obtained are consistent with the assumption that utility is 
dependent only on income, and therefore cultural factors, for example, may be left outside the 
analysis, I test the constancy of 𝜂 across countries. 
The issue related to the tax unit which data should be collected on seems to be fairly 
uncontested, since after Stern (1977), virtually all studies use single people as units instead of 
families. However, it must be noticed that no clear theoretical reason is found to justify this 
procedure, and since the EuroPTax offers the possibility to estimate 𝜂 for different tax units, 
estimates obtained considering families (using the four combinations regarding NICs and SI 
referred above) will below be compared with those derived using single persons. The criterion 
for the comparison in this case is also the goodness of fit. 
There is also some discussion in the literature relating to weighting the data used to derive 𝜂 in 
the EASA. I will not address this potentially important issue mainly because the EuroPTax 
provides unfortunately no information about the number of persons at any given tax bracket or 
income range, precluding any comparison between weighted and non-weighted data. 
1.5. Data description 
The dataset used in the estimation of 𝜂 is the result of a simulation model called EuroPTax, 
developed in a project undertaken by Lynch and Weingarten (2010). In the research report made 
by Lynch (2009) the objective of the project is stated as “to construct a history of the personal 
tax and social security contributions paid by individuals and households in Western European 
democracies, at all points on the income scale, since the 1950s". Moreover, it is declared that 
the interest is in studying the construction of tax systems and the changes to which they are 
subjected in order to finance public spending. The project, according to the report, could be 
used for four main reasons: to analyse the variation in the tax burden on individuals or 
households over time, to observe the differences in tax rates over the countries considered in 
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the research, to classify the tax systems according their different characteristics and to compare 
the tax rates applied to richer and poorer workers across time. In the case of the present study 
the possibility to access and compare tax rates since the 1950s to 2007 for different countries in 
Europe is of great interest, since it permits me to establish a more trustworthy basis for the 
estimation of EMU. 
The simulation was done basically by parameterizing tax rules found in the countries’ legislation 
for all the periods considered and then applying these rules to hypothetical tax units. The 
research from which the data is collected consists, therefore, essentially on reconstructing the 
tax rules (tax systems for all countries and years) of the countries considered with respect to 
specific tax units. The EuroPTax permits one to establish the income of the individual/household 
(the APW is given in the EuroPTax spreadsheet), the marital status and the number of dependent 
children. Given this information, the simulation provides the local tax percentage and its 
absolute value, national tax percentage and absolute value, national plus local tax percentages 
and the absolute value, social security contribution (SSC/NICs) percentages and their absolute 
value, all-in taxes (including SSC) percentages and their absolute value. The countries included 
in the database are Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Sweden and 
UK. 
Some caveats must attached to the model. In line with the OECD, the EuroPTax includes 
standard allowances in the calculations, so that the tax paid by people who derive a large 
proportion of their income from capital assets (usually this is the case for high income earners) 
are probably inflated, since taxation rules are different in this circumstance. It basically means 
that the higher the income investigated the more overestimated the correspondent tax rate 
retrieved by EuroPTax will probably be.29 Finally, one should notice that since the derivations 
are made based on tax rules, its reliability depends on whether the rules were in fact 
accomplished and people paid their taxes. 
1.6. Results 
In this section I estimate the EMU for the 9 countries considered in the EuroPTax using different 
methodologies associated with the EASA (as listed in section 1.4). In particular I am going to start 
by investigating the sensitivity of the EMU to the inclusion of NICS and SI. Then I am going to 
consider the constancy of the EMU over different portions of the income distribution, countries, 
periods of time and tax units. Finding that estimates of the EMU are sensitive to different 
                                                          
29 It should not be a concern for this study, once the income levels looked at are not very high. 
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assumptions and that they vary over income, countries, time or tax units would make it difficult 
without further arguments to use these results in a policy setting. 
1.6.1. Preferred approach concerning NICs and SI 
As observed before, an issue in the literature related to the estimation of 𝜂 by the EASA is the 
inclusion or not of NICs and SI in the calculations. To set a preferred approach I estimate the 
parameter in the four different combinations referred to in section 1.4, and look at the goodness 
of fit. In this study’s context the goodness of fit measure is how well the actual data fits the EASA 
prediction that log(1 −𝑀𝑇𝑅) = 𝜂 ∗ log⁡(1 − 𝐴𝑇𝑅). This gives evidence on what set of 
assumptions (each of which results in a different set of estimates) are better explained by the 
EASA. 
There are obviously other ways to carry out comparisons among the different assumptions 
regarding NICs and SI. An example would be to examine the NICs/SI combinations in terms of 
which provides results possessing properties which are more similar to those assumed by the 
EASA (e.g. constancy of 𝜂 across income). We find, however, that comparing the goodness of fit 
provides a simple way to carry out the referred comparison.  
The estimates obtained without considering SI are obtained as I previously described. To include 
SI in the estimation process, however, I consider Groom and Maddison’s (2013) remarks about 
the issue, in which they argue subsistence income should also be considered in the iso-elastic 
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such that the corresponding regression is 
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As in equation 1.22, there is no interpretation for the error term in this case, given the use of 
regression as a curve-fitting tool. 
Another issue related to the parameters obtained incorporating SI is the way one estimates the 
subsistence income to be used in the calculations. Given the EuroPTax directly returns the 
income tax rate at a given wage, I estimated the tax-free income by entering a guess for wages 
and looking at the tax rate retrieved. If this is equal or close to 0% (between 0% and 1% to be 
more precise), the corresponding income was considered tax free. The tax rate considered in 
the procedure did not include NICs. 
For some few years (and countries) the EuroPTax did not return reasonable rates to the income 
levels entered according to the procedure just described,30 such that the means of the previous 
and next years were taken to complement the data. For Denmark, France and Belgium, however, 
it happened for rather many years,31 such that I run a regression with income at the APW as the 
independent variable and the tax-free income available as the dependent variable for each 
country. This regression32 gives tax free income as a proportion of income at the APW, which is 
then used to complement the tax-free income data related to the three countries cited. To be 
more specific, the proportion referred to is applied to the APW of the years for which the 
subsistence income is missing, providing thus an estimation of the subsistence income for such 
years.33     
Table 1.5 shows the R2 and 𝜂 estimates for each of the NICs/SI combinations used. There is little 
difference amongst them in terms of R2, but the one considering NICs and not considering SI has 
a slight advantage in terms of curve-fitting.34 Figures in appendix 1.B show how the direct-
calculation estimates (as calculated by each approach) evolve through time, respectively. 
                                                          
30 Mainly because of missing information in the EuroPTax, which was complemented by the average of 
the rates obtained for neighbour years, and because in some cases the rates never reach 0% or reach it 
just when the corresponding income is very low, clearly underestimating the subsistence income. 
31 For Denmark and France for many years one had to pay income taxes no matter how much he earned 
according to the EuroPtax (the amount “payed” was probably compensated with transfers) and for 
Belgium the EuroPTax does not show the corresponding tax rate when income gets too low. 
32 Algebraically specified as 𝐴𝑃𝑊𝑖 = 𝑝𝑆𝐼𝑖 + 𝑖, where 𝑖 are the years for which the SI was obtained 
normally, and 𝑝 is the proportion of the APW understood as corresponding to the SI, which is applied to 
the APW of the remaining years in order to derive a subsistence income relative to them. 
33 Notice it is another case in which there is no concern with causality, being the regression a curve-fitting 
exercise only. The R2 for the referred regressions were high, being 0.88 the lowest one found (for 
Denmark). The APW proportions were 0.14, 0.6 and 0.27, for Denmark, France and Belgium, respectively. 
34 It is important to have in mind that since the regressions are concerned with curve-fitting only no 
assumptions need to be made regarding the errors and model specification.   
39 
 
Remember, however, that in the present analysis (comparing NICs/SI approaches within the 
EASA) I use the regression approach only. 
Table 1.5. R-squared for each approach applied for single persons 
Approach R-squared EMU 95% rob. C. I.  F-stat. N. Obs. 
All in/no SI 0.9551 1.515 
(0.016) 
[95.4]** 
1.48 - 1.55 
 
9108** 452 
All in/SI 0.9484 1.395 
(0.016) 
[89.4]** 
1.37 - 1.43 7996** 452 
No NICs/no SI 0.9424 1.653 
(0.022) 
[76.1]** 
1.61 – 1.7 5790** 452 
No NICs/SI 0.9433 1.589 
(0.021) 
[75.6]** 
1.55 – 1.63 5717** 452 
Source: author calculations. Notes: (1) Robust standard errors are used to derive the SEs; (2) Standard Errors are 
shown between parenthesis and t-statistics between brackets; (3) ** indicates the relevant coefficient is significant 
at 1%, * at 5% and ° at 10%. 
1.6.2. The constancy of the EMU across income level analysis 
As seen before, 𝜂 is assumed to be constant across income levels in the EASA. To test if the 
estimates obtained possess this property, I apply a chi-squared test of heterogeneity using the 
EMU estimates and variances derived from regressing ln⁡(1 − 𝑀𝑇𝑅) against ln⁡(1 − 𝐴𝑇𝑅), as 
shown in equation 1.22.  
I derive the MTR and ATR for all the nine countries at four different income levels (0.67XAPW, 
APW, 1.33xAPW and 1.67xAPW)35 and run one regression per income level with the data for all 
countries stacked. The All in/no SI combination is used given it is the most appropriate according 
to the previous analysis. Thus with an 𝜂 estimate per income level and their respective standard 
errors it is possible to test the parameter’s constancy across income level. 
The test (chi-squared test of heterogeneity) is based on Cochrans (1954) Q statistic, given by 
𝑄 = ∑𝑤𝑖(𝑇𝑖 − 𝑇)
2,          (1.29) 
where 𝑇𝑖 are the parameters whose homogeneity are being tested, 𝑤𝑖 are the reciprocal of their 




.           (1.30) 
Under the null hypothesis of homogeneity, which can be written as 
                                                          
35 Same proportions of the APW used by Evans and Sezer (2004), Evans (2004), Evans and Sezer (2005) 
and Percoco (2008). 
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𝜂𝑗 = 𝜂𝑘 , ∀𝑗 ≠ 𝑘,          (1.31) 
where 𝑗 and 𝑘 are different income levels, the statistic follows a chi-squared distribution with 
𝑘 − 1 degrees of freedom. 
In this case the null was rejected,36 providing evidence for the non-constancy of 𝜂 across income 
levels. However, the estimates obtained per each income level and the confidence intervals 
suggest that although the differences are statistically significant they are very small (see table 
1.6). 
Table 1.6. Constancy of 𝜼 across income levels 
















1.532 - 1.617 3521** 44737 
Source: author calculations. Notes: (1) Robust standard errors are used to derive the SEs; (2) Standard Errors are 
shown between parenthesis and t-statistics between brackets; (3) ** indicates the relevant coefficient is significant 
at 1%, * at 5% and ° at 10%. 
1.6.3. The constancy of the EMU across countries analysis 
By testing if 𝜂 varies across countries we can find evidence on whether societal inequality 
aversion changes according to cultural norms and whether it is reasonable to suggest the same 
parameter value applies to different Countries. The estimates being homogeneous over the set 
of nations considered gives rise to an argument for adopting just one 𝜂 value for all the referred 
countries, given it could facilitate international investment decisions amongst them. 
One can reasonably argue that differences from countries may result from differences in income 
levels, once the APW in different countries may actually correspond to different wage levels. 
Because the previous test indicates variation across income levels is small, however, it seems 
appropriate to disregard 𝜂 variation across income and assume potential differences across 
countries are mainly due to elements other than income level, such as culture. 
                                                          
36 Heterogeneity chi-squared =  32.65 (d.f. = 3) p = 0.000. 
37 The number of observations decreased for the 1.67xAPW income level due to the fact that the MTR 
obtained for 4 observations for Belgium and 1 observation for Germany were larger than 1, rendering 
negative values for ln⁡(1 − 𝑀𝑇𝑅).   
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Here the chi-squared test of heterogeneity was once more applied. The means and variances of 
the 𝜂 time series obtained via direct calculation at the APW for the nine countries and the EMU 
parameters and standard errors derived from running regression 1.22 were tested. The null can 
be written as 
?̅?𝑖 = ?̅?𝑗, ∀𝑖 ≠ 𝑗,                       (1.32) 
where 𝑖 and 𝑗 are countries, ?̅? is the mean value (or the EMU derived via regression 1.22) of 𝜂 
over 1950s to 2007.  
Table 1.7. Constancy across countries  
 ES (average) ES (reg) 
Country 𝜂 SE 𝜂 Robust SE 
UK 1.45 0.02 1.37 0.016 
Sweden 1.63 0.07 1.68 0.071 
Norway 1.45 0.03 1.47 0.037 
Italy 1.42 0.02 1.46 0.020 
Ireland 1.89 0.06 1.87 0.059 
Germany 1.44 0.02 1.45 0.017 
France 1.48 0.02 1.44 0.024 
Denmark 1.58 0.08 1.45 0.033 








Source: see text. Notes: (1) Standard errors in parenthesis; (2) ** indicates the relevant coefficient is significant at 
1%, * at 5% and ° at 10%. 
The result suggests 𝜂 varies across countries, which implies it would not be reasonable for all 
the nine countries considered to apply the same 𝜂 value. Whilst this procedure would arguably 
facilitate international joint investment decisions amongst governments, apparently the 
countries should adopt different EMU values to account for their particular characteristics. The 
results also suggest that societal evaluation of inequality varies with cultural factors. 
Nonetheless, here again the EMU differences across countries are, though statistically 
significant, actually quite small in absolute terms. The highest estimate is 1.89 for Ireland 
(average) and the lowest is 1.37 for the UK (regression).  
1.6.4. The constancy of the EMU across time analysis 
Another characteristic of the utility function assumed in the EASA is that is does not include time 
in its representation. To check if the results obtained are consistent with this assumption, I test 
the constancy of 𝜂 over time. 
To undertake this task I use the nonparametric test of trend across ordered groups proposed by 
Cuzick (1985). To apply the test, the 𝑘 groups 𝑛𝑖(𝑖 = 1, 2, … , 𝑘) in which the data is separated 
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must be given scores 𝑙𝑖, which usually correspond to the ordering (e.g. the first group receives 
score 1, the second 2 and so on). Then the data is ranked and the rank sum correspondent to 
each group (𝑅𝑖) is found. 
The test is then based on the statistic 𝑇 given by 
𝑇 = ∑ 𝑙𝑖𝑅𝑖
𝑘
𝑖=1 .             (1.33) 
Under the null hypothesis of no trend, the expectation of 𝑇 is given by  
𝐸(𝑇) = 0.5(𝑁 + 1)𝐿,          (1.34) 







𝑖=1 ),         (1.35) 
where 𝑁 = ∑𝑛𝑖 and 𝐿 = ∑ 𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑖
𝑘
𝑖=1 . 
In this case 𝑇 is asymptotically normal, such that the 𝑧 statistic given by 𝑇 − 𝐸(𝑇)/𝑠𝑒(𝑇) is also 
normal under the null.38 
For the present purposes the 𝜂 time series considered for each country and NICs/SI combination 
were calculated at the APW and were gathered per decade.39 The data corresponding to the first 
decade was scored as 1, the second decade as 2 and so on. 
Table 1.8 shows the results of the test applied. For the combinations “no NICs/no SI” and “no 
NICs/SI”, the no trend hypothesis was accepted for four countries, whilst for the other two 
combinations it was accepted only for two countries. Therefore, whilst the combination “all 
in/no SI” seems to be the best by the best fit criteria, the ones not considering NICs seem to 
result in estimates possessing the desirable property of being constant over time for a larger 
number of countries. 
In any case, the results suggest the EMU is not constant over time, and that it is important that 
future works develop a model capable of incorporating 𝜂’s time variation. 
                                                          
38 Which can be written as 𝜂𝑖 = 𝜂𝑗, ∀𝑖 ≠ 𝑗, where 𝑖 and 𝑗 are periods corresponding to different decades 
within a country. 
39 I also applied the test with the data gathered per approximately five and fifteen years, and the results 
did not change significantly (Appendix 1.C). 
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1.6.5. The constancy of the EMU across tax unit analysis 
It is reasonable to think the 𝜂 estimates derived by the EASA are sensitive to the tax unit chosen 
in the analysis, but there seems to be little discussion in the literature about which would be the 
best one to pick, although virtually all studies after Stern(1977) take single persons as the tax 
unit. To advance the debate in this area I calculate 𝜂 taking families with two dependent children 
as tax units for all the NICs/SI combinations (with 100% of income coming from the head of 
household, at the APW). I test whether the results derived with the two distinct tax units are 
statistically different, what is the preferred combination in terms of the best curve-fitting for the 
estimates obtained with families and compare the parameters derived with single and families 
tax units by the best curve-fitting criterion. 
Table 1.8. Test of the null hypothesis that 𝜼 is constant across time 
Country all in/no SI all in/SI no NICs/no SI no NICs/SI 
UK 0 0 0 0 
SWEEDEN 0 0 0 0 
NORWAY 0 0 0 0 
ITALY 0 0.025 0.39 0.94 
IRELAND 0 0 0.34 0.12 
GERMANY 0.99 0.25 0.9 0.72 
FRANCE 0 0 0 0 
DENMARK 0 0 0.02 0 
BELGIUM 0.24 0.43 0.4 0.58 
Note: The numbers shown in the table correspond to the p-values. 
Before presenting the results, I note that the number of observations dropped considerably for 
the combinations taking families as tax units and SI into account,40 since for many years the 
subsistence wage was too close to or larger than the APW.41 
A paired t-test was applied to compare the average of the time series related to each country 
and combination (at the APW) for single and families tax units. For the “all in/no SI” combination, 
only for Sweden was the null hypothesis of homogeneity not rejected.42 For the “all in/SI” 
combination the null was not rejected for the UK, Sweden, Germany, Denmark and Belgium. For 
the “no NICs/no SI” combination the null was rejected for all countries and for the “no NICs/SI” 
combination the null was not rejected for all countries except for the UK. The results seem to 
indicate that the “no NICs/SI” combination is the most robust one regarding variation over tax 
units (See table 1.9). 
                                                          
40 France was not considered in the concerned combination because just one observation was left. 
41 The subsistence wage of a family was roughly estimated as three times the one of a single person. It is 
assumed one partner spends as much as the other and a child spend half as much as an adult. This is 
obviously not intended to be exact, but just to give an idea of a family’s SI. Notice also that this procedure 
makes it difficult to derive 𝜂 at income levels lower than the APW. 
42 All tests were applied at 5% significance level. 
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Table 1.10 shows the R-squared obtained by running regressions of the type shown in equations 
1.22 and 1.28 using families as tax units. The combination “all in/no SI” once again fits better 
than the others. Comparing the r-squared for this preferred method over single persons and 
families tax units it can be seen that in terms of best fitting the usage of single persons is slightly 
superior. 
Table 1.9. T-test comparison between mean 𝜼 obtained with single and family tax units by 
country and NICs/SI combination (null hypothesis of homogeneity) 
Country all in/no SI all in/SI no NICs/no SI no NICs/SI 
 (t-statistics) (t-statistics) (t-statistics) (t-statistics) 
UK 6.83** -1 3.06** -2.44* 
SWEEDEN 1.93° -0.3 2.52* -1.5 
NORWAY 3.82** 2.6* 5.06** -1.67 
ITALY 7.82** 2.95** 7** 0.8 
IRELAND 2.12* 2.23* 2.45* 1.11 
GERMANY 2.09* 0.02 2.03* -1.93° 
FRANCE -9.11** - 5.21** - 
DENMARK 7.14** 1.63 7.86** -1.05 
BELGIUM 7.79** 2.47° 7.68** -1.06 
Source: see text. Notes: (1) For the combination “all in/SI” there is very few data for France and Belgium; mainly for 
France, for which the test was not carried out once just one 𝜂 observations was valid. The basic problem in the case 
of France was that for families the subsistence incomes calculated were in general larger than the APW. In the case 
of Belgium the problem was that in many cases the tax to be paid were larger than the difference between the SI 
and the APW, resulting on a 𝑇(𝑌)/(𝑌 − 𝛾) larger than 1, making it impossible to calculate 𝑙𝑛⁡(
1−𝑇(𝑌)
𝑌−𝛾
);(2) Also for the 
combination no NICs/SI just one observation for France, considering families, was valid; (3) Degrees of freedom vary 
across country and combination; (4) ** indicates the relevant coefficient is significant at 1%, * at 5% and ° at 10%. 
Table 1.10. R-squared for each approach applied for single persons and families 
Approach R2 for single R2 for families EMU (single) EMU (fam.) N. Obs. (fam) 
































Source: author calculations. Notes: (1) Robust standard errors are used to derive the SEs; (2) Standard Errors are 
shown between parenthesis and t-statistics between brackets; (3) F-statistics for families are between {}; (4) F-
statistics and N. Obs. for single people are presented in table 1.5; (5) ** indicates the relevant coefficient is 
significant at 1%, * at 5% and ° at 10%. 
1.6.6. Suggestion of which estimate of 𝜼 is to be used in Ramsey equation 
Considering the graphs showing the 𝜂 estimates in the different NICs/SI combinations, it is 
possible to see that there is a concentration around 1.5 (see figures on Appendix 1.B). The 𝜂 
estimated in the regressions run to test the best fitting combination (with single persons as tax 
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units) fell in the interval 1.39 - 1.65. The value of 1.51 (with standard error of 0.016) was 
obtained by the preferred combination (considering NICs and not considering SI). 
Using families as tax units, the estimates obtained in the regressions run to test the best fitting 
combination fell between 1.045 and 1.85, being the one derived by the preferred combination 
(again the “all in/no SI” combination, see table 1.10) equal to 1.65 (standard deviation of 0.022). 
Given the estimates obtained using single persons as tax units fitted better the actual data and 
are largely used in the literature, I give more weight to the results derived from such tax units, 
pointing thus to an 𝜂 of 1.5 as the preferred value. 
Table 1.11. 𝜼 value for the different countries considered 
Countries 𝜼 for single 
(average) 
𝜼 for single 
(regression) 
UK 1.45 1.37 
Sweden 1.63 1.68 
Norway 1.45 1.47 
Italy 1.42 1.46 
Ireland 1.9 1.87 
Germany 1.44 1.45 
France 1.48 1.44 
Denmark 1.58 1.45 
Belgium 1.45 1.48 
Source: see text. Notes: (1) The term ‘average’ in the table corresponds to the average EMU obtained by direct 
calculation across the years considered for the individual countries. 
It is quite remarkable that the results cluster so tightly around 1.5. It strongly substantiates such 
a value as the preferred one. Given different values of 𝜂 were found for each country under 
scrutiny, however, I present table 1.11 with all the resulting parameters obtained per country 
with the best NICs/SI combination (all in and no SI) with regards to single persons as tax units 
and measured at the APW. The estimates presented are obtained both by averaging the 
individual parameters estimated via direct calculation for each country across all years and by 
running the kind of regression shown on equation 1.22, in which the 𝑀𝑇𝑅 and the 𝐴𝑇𝑅 are 
clustered across years for each country. 
It is also worthwhile noticing that considering a heterogeneity test, the EMU value of 1.5 
proposed (obtained with the “all in/no SI” combination and single people as tax units) is not 
heterogeneous to the EMU value derived from averaging the series of EMU estimates found in 
the works listed in the literature review (see table 1.4) – i.e. other EMU values dominating the 
literature the last 30 years.43 Nonetheless, considering a simple t-test (and thus not accounting 
for the variance regarding the EMU series in the literature review), the EMU value proposed is 
                                                          
43 Heterogeneity chi-squared (H0 = homogeneity) = 2.63 (d.f. = 1), p = 0.105 (the average for the EMU 
series estimated by works listed in the literature review is 1,446 and the correspondent SEM is 0,039). 
The midpoint EMU value was considered for works that estimated EMU value ranges.  
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significantly different from the average obtained from the literature review series (t-stat.=4.341, 
p<0.01). These results show the parameters cannot be regarded as heterogeneous because of 
the variance of the EMU values across works, and suggest that although the proposed value is 
somewhat different from the one found in the literature regarding the estimation of the EMU 
via EASA, it mostly endorses the value indicated by such literature.    
1.7. Comparing EASA estimates with estimates obtained from other methodologies based on 
revealed preferences  
In this section, in an attempt to validate them, I compare the EMU estimates obtained with the 
EASA with EMU estimates obtained with two other methods: in the first the parameters are 
drawn from insurance data and in the second from consumption data. After giving more details 
about the relevance of the exercise carried out herein I explain in more depth the two 
methodologies employed. Following that I describe the dataset used in both the insurance and 
the consumption based approaches, and then finally present and compare the estimates.  
It is quite uncommon to find works comparing the estimates of the EMU provided by different 
techniques. It is also the case that the three different methodologies used herein (EASA, 
insurance and consumption) refer to the estimation of the EMU in the three different contexts 
it can be estimated in (each corresponding to a different interpretation of the EMU, as discussed 
earlier) – intra-temporal aversion to inequality (EASA), intertemporal aversion to inequality 
(method using consumption growth rates) and risk (method using insurance data).  
It is important to note that Atkinson et al. (2009) suggested, in a stated preference/survey based 
setting, that EMU estimates obtained within the three different contexts referred produce 
different results, while Groom and Maddison (2013), in a revealed preference based setting, 
derive results suggesting that EMU estimates derived in the three different contexts do not differ 
significantly. Given that I test for the constancy of the EMU estimates across such contexts (in a 
revealed preference setting), the evidence obtained herein can help to shed light on this puzzle. 
Moreover, the tests undertaken in this section mirror to some extent the exercise carried out in 
the final chapter, in which I compare EMU estimates derived from the three referred contexts 
in a stated preference setting and relate the obtained values with psychological traits.  
If the three different methodologies give similar results, I will conclude it suggests the EMU value 
obtained via EASA is strongly substantiated and that estimating the parameter as intratemporal 
inequality aversion is not significantly different from estimating it as risk aversion or as 
intertemporal inequality aversion. On the other hand, if the methodologies produce different 
results two possible conclusions can be taken. Or it weakens the legitimacy of the EASA as a 
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technique to estimate the EMU, or estimating the parameter as intratemporal inequality 
aversion is too different from estimating it as risk aversion or intertemporal inequality aversion.    
Importantly, the comparison across different methodologies is made for the same countries 
rather than for different countries (in order to exclude the possibility that differences are due to 
country-specific cultural factors). 
1.7.1. Method of estimating EMU based on insurance data 
Szpiro (1986) derives relative risk aversion (RRA) estimates (equivalent to EMU) for the United 
States using data on wealth (wealth of households, non-profit organisations, the Government 
and the net foreign balance) and property and liability insurance. Below we present his 
methodology. Notice the ubiquity of insurance makes this a natural opportunity to calculate the 
EMU (or as it is known in this context relative risk aversion).   
Consider an individual with wealth 𝑊 which is at risk of being lost with probability 𝑞. He can 
insure part 𝐼 of 𝑊 against such risk by paying a premium 𝜋, which includes expected claims and 
proportional loading fee. Thus 𝜋 = 𝑞𝐼(1 + 𝜆), where 𝜆 represents the loading factor. In this case 
the individual’s expected utility function is given by: 
𝐸𝑈 = (1 − 𝑞)𝑈(𝑊 − 𝜋) + 𝑞𝑈(𝑊 − 𝜋 − 𝐷),       (1.36) 
where 𝐷 is the non-insured part of 𝑊. Expanding the right hand side of the equation using a two 
term Taylor series around 𝑊 gives 
𝐸𝑈 = 𝑈 − 𝜋𝑈′ + (
𝜋2
2
)𝑈′′ − 𝐷𝑞𝑈′ + 𝜋𝐷𝑞𝑈′′ + (
𝐷2
2
)𝑞𝑈′′.     (1.37) 
To find the optimal amount insured he differentiates the equation with respect to 𝑊, sets the 
result equal to 0 and divide both sides by −1/𝑈′. Rearranging the terms of the resulting equation 






− 𝑞𝑊(1 + 𝜆)
𝜆
1−𝑞(1−𝜆2)
,       (1.38) 
where 𝑎(𝑊) denotes the Pratt-Arrow measure of Absolute Risk Aversion (ARA). If we assume 𝑞 
is small the equation can be written as 
𝐷 = 𝜆/𝑟,           (1.39) 
such that we can write the insured amount 𝐼 as 
𝐼 = 𝑊 − 𝜆/𝑟.           (1.40) 
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Given that  
𝑎(𝑊) = 𝑟/𝑊,            (1.41) 
where 𝑟 represents a constant RRA, we can describe 𝐼 as 
𝐼 = 𝑊 − 𝜆𝑊/𝑟.          (1.42) 
Since 𝐼 is not observable, Szpiro (1986) assumes 𝐼 = 𝑄/𝑞, where 𝑄 represents total claims and 
𝑞 (loss probability) is constant. Incorporating these assumptions in the equation above yields 
𝑄 = 𝑞𝑊 + 𝑛𝑊𝜆.          (1.43) 
Both 𝑞 and 𝑛 can be thus estimated, and 𝑟 is given by 
𝑟 = −𝑞/𝑛.           (1.44) 
Using this methodology Szpiro (1986) obtain EMU estimates between 1 and 2 for the United 
States, and concludes the RRA is constant with respect to wealth.       
1.7.2. Method based on lifetime consumption behaviour 
To use consumption data to derive the EMU behaviour regarding lifetime consumption is taken 
into consideration and the estimation process is based on the Euler equation, with the elasticity 
of inter-temporal substitution taken as the reciprocal of 𝜂. This last equality is based on 
assumptions about the equation transforming within-period to period-specific (iso-elastic) 
utility function. 
To illustrate the procedure, consider an inter-temporal utility function of the form  
𝑈 = ∑ 𝛽𝑡𝑢(𝑐𝑡)
𝑡=∞
𝑡=0 ,                       (1.45) 
where 𝛽 is the discount factor specified by (1 + 𝛿)−𝑡 and 𝑢(𝑐𝑡) is utility at time 𝑡. 
Maximizing this welfare equation assuming an iso-elastic utility function (𝑢(𝑐𝑡) = (𝑐𝑡
1−𝜂
−
1)/(1 − 𝜂)) and a riskless inter-temporal wealth constraint of the form 
𝐴𝑡+1𝐴𝑡 = 𝑟𝑡𝐴𝑡 + 𝑌𝑡𝐶𝑡                       (1.46) 
(where 𝐴𝑡  indicates the amount of assets in period 𝑡 and 𝑟𝑡 is the interest rate at 𝑡), it is possible 
to derive an Euler equation of the form  
𝑙𝑛(𝑐𝑡) − 𝑙𝑛(𝑐𝑡−1) = 𝜂
−1 𝑙𝑛(1 + 𝛿) + 𝜂−1𝑙𝑛⁡(1 + 𝑟𝑡),      (1.47) 
which, using a Taylor approximation for (1 + 𝑟𝑡), can be reduced to an empirical specification of  
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𝛿 𝑙𝑛(𝑐𝑡) = 𝑎 + 𝑏𝑟𝑡 + 𝑣𝑡,         (1.48) 
where 𝑏 is the reciprocal of 𝜂, 𝑎 is a constant and 𝑣𝑡 is an error term. More detail on this 
methodology and its derivation can be found on Hall (1978), Altonji (1986) and Blundell et al. 
(1994). 
1.7.3. Data 
As explained above, the method to obtain the EMU using the consumption data consists on 
running a simple linear regression on per capita consumption growth rates against real interest 
rates. The EMU is given by the reciprocal of the estimated coefficient. Table 1.12 presents 
summary statistics for per capita consumption growth rates for non-durable goods, and table 
1.13 presents summary statistics for real interest rates. 
The two variables are derived from information on annual (at current and previous year prices) 
consumption of non-durable goods (including services), on population and on short-interest 
rates.44 The period span observed varies across countries; for per capita consumption growth 
rates the oldest observation is for 1960 and the newest for 2014. For real interest rates the 
oldest observation is for 1970 and the newest is for 2015.  
Table 1.12. Summary statistics for per capita consumption growth rates for non-durable 
goods 
 Mean Sdev Median Max Min NbObs 
All countries 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.06 -0.04 261 
UK 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.03 -0.04 19 
Sweden 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0 20 
Norway 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.05 -0.02 44 
Italy 0 0.02 0 0.03 -0.03 18 
Ireland 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.06 -0.04 19 
Germany 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.01 22 
France 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.05 -0.01 55 
Denmark 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.06 -0.03 47 
Belgium 0.01 0.01 0 0.03 -0.01 17 
Source: see text. 
Table 1.13. Summary statistics real interest rates 
 Mean Sdev Median Max Min NbObs 
All countries 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.1 -0.03 238 
UK 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.04 -0.03 20 
Sweden 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.06 -0.02 22 
Norway 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.09 -0.01 37 
Italy 0.01 0.02 0 0.05 -0.02 19 
Ireland 0 0.03 0 0.08 -0.03 20 
Germany 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.05 -0.01 24 
France 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.07 -0.03 46 
                                                          
44 This data was obtained from OECD database. The derived non-durable consumption growth accounts 
for population growth.  
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Denmark 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.1 -0.02 30 
Belgium 0 0.01 0.01 0.03 -0.02 20 
Source: see text. 
Szpiro’s (1986) method to obtain the EMU using insurance data, on the other hand, consists of 
regressing total claims against wealth and wealth times the loading factor. The EMU is given by 
minus the coefficient regarding wealth divided by the coefficient regarding wealth times the 
loading factor. In this study wealth is represented by the GDP; we consider premiums and claims 
for all forms of insurance (including health) but not life insurance.45 Table 1.14, 1.15 and 1.16 
present the summary statistics for the GDP, total claims and loading factor,46 respectively.   
Table 1.14. Summary statistics for GDP (in millions) 
 Mean Sdev Median Max Min NbObs 
All countries 1794851 1021994 1791726 4181103 156144 108 
UK 1588589 169758.2 1568346 1870693 1304874 12 
Sweden 3461161 411419.9 3453797 4181103 2805115 12 
Norway 2587282 450477.1 2597735 3140371 1781981 12 
Italy 1585317 60992.3 1607075 1642444 1448363 12 
Ireland 184269 25385.82 177980.9 255815.1 156144 12 
Germany 2610368 242613.1 2570900 3032820 2270620 12 
France 1983127 146841.7 1997166 2181064 1710760 12 
Denmark 1793632 155680.4 1806198 2027171 1506001 12 
Belgium 359915 35636.77 359583.5 410351 298711 12 
Source: see text. 
Table 1.15. Summary statistics for total claims 
 Mean Sdev Median Max Min NbObs 
All countries 34788.5 22570.45 33091 91347 1585 97 
UK 33009.9 4520.46 32098.68 43179.23 27145.2 10 
Sweden 54779.6 7727.51 54616 63840 36141 11 
Norway 28745.4 5122.74 29392 35784.13 21235 11 
Italy 27482.1 2744.85 27214 33645 22882 11 
Ireland 2095.6 401.91 2049 2750 1585 10 
Germany 78672.1 7521.49 77088.45 91347 67952.32 11 
France 39736.1 4262.28 40653 46570 34301 11 
Denmark 39166.7 5626.1 40750.06 46193 29732 11 
Belgium 6275.49 958.23 6163.25 8732.11 5146.79 11 
Source: see text. 
Table 1.16. Summary statistics for loading factor 
 Mean Sdev Median Max Min NbObs 
All countries 0.39 0.24 0.42 0.97 -0.34 97 
UK 0.55 0.19 0.54 0.97 0.22 10 
Sweden 0.14 0.32 0.11 0.94 -0.34 11 
Norway 0.49 0.11 0.51 0.66 0.31 11 
Italy 0.28 0.12 0.3 0.46 0.04 11 
Ireland 0.61 0.28 0.65 0.94 0.14 10 
Germany 0.13 0.04 0.12 0.2 0.06 11 
                                                          
45 The data is from the European insurance industry database. 
46 The loading factor is given by the premium amount not claimed divided by the total claims amount.  
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France 0.52 0.05 0.51 0.6 0.43 11 
Denmark 0.34 0.14 0.34 0.6 0 11 
Belgium 0.52 0.17 0.56 0.64 0.06 11 
Source: see text. 
1.7.4. Results 
Table 1.17 presents the EMU(𝜂) estimates and standard errors for all the methods considered 
in this section.  Notice the standard errors (SE) for the estimates derived with the Euler equation 
and insurance data [Szpiro’s (1986) approach] are obtained using the delta method and using 
bootstrapping. Once again the EMU obtained with the EASA are derived both by averaging the 
estimates obtained with direct calculation across years per country and by regressing ln⁡(1 −
𝑀𝑇𝑅) against ln⁡(1 − 𝐴𝑇𝑅) per country. 
Table 1.17. EMU estimates and standard errors obtained with Equal Sacrifice, Euler equation 
and Szpiro’s (1986) approaches 
 ES (average) ES (reg) Euler equation (cons.) Insurance 










UK 1.45 0.02 1.37 0.02 2.22 0.77 0.6 2.02 0.19 3.69 
Sweden 1.63 0.07 1.68 0.07 9.69 8.72 188 3.67 1.77 77.7 
Norway 1.45 0.03 1.47 0.04 4.98 1.74 47 3.28 1.24 44.4 
Italy 1.42 0.02 1.46 0.02 2.35 0.96 9 1.63 0.22 13.0 
Ireland 1.89 0.06 1.87 0.06 -2.6 1.82 113 2.37 0.67 28.2 
Germany 1.44 0.02 1.45 0.02 6.12 4.35 198 2.05 0.64 58.5 
France 1.48 0.02 1.44 0.02 47.6 153 522 1.63 0.20 0.35 
Denmark 1.58 0.08 1.45 0.03 16.7 20.8 338 4.15 2.52 74.8 
Belgium 1.45 0.04 1.48 0.03 2.68 1.14 15 1.79 0.08 0.37 
Source: see text. Notes: 1) ES stands for Equal Sacrifice; 2) (d) and (bs) indicate whether the standard error was 
derived using the delta method or bootstrapping. 
To compare the estimates we use Meta-Analysis (MA). The purpose of the MA is to produce an 
overall best estimate from different estimates of the same parameter whilst having some regard 
to the fact that competing estimates may have differing degrees of precision so that some 
should carry more weight. A distinction can also be drawn between those studies that assume 
that the only possible difference between estimates is due to random sampling rather than 
differences due to the nature of the methodology employed. The latter are known as random 
effects estimates. MA has seen significant use in economics in recent years (e.g Groom and 
Maddison, 2013; Smith and Pattanayak, 2002). Table 1.18, 1.19 and 1.20 present the meta-
value, chi-square statistics for homogeneity test and 95% confidence intervals across country 
and methodology for the EMU estimates.  
Note that the Euler equation and the Szpiro (1986) methods do not provide standard errors for 
the estimates, such that we derive them using both the delta method and bootstrapping.    
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In table 1.18 the standard errors regarding the estimates obtained with the Euler equation and 
insurance data are derived by bootstrapping. In table 1.19 the standard errors regarding the 
estimates obtained with the two referred-to methodologies are derived with the delta method. 
In both tables the EASA estimates (and standard errors) presented are the ones obtained via 
regression. Table 1.20 shows the same type of results considering bootstrapping standard errors 
for the estimates derived with all methodologies. 
Table 1.18. EMU meta-values, 95% confidence interval and homogeneity tests across countries 
and methodologies (bootstrapping SEs for estimates from Euler equation and insurance data) 








































Germany 1.4542  
 






































   
Source: see text. Notes: 1) The number in parenthesis correspond to p-values; 2) ** indicates the relevant coefficient 
is significant at 1%, * at 5% and ° at 10%. 
Table 1.19. EMU meta-values, 95% confidence interval and homogeneity tests across countries 
and methodologies (delta SEs for estimates from Euler equation and insurance data) 








































Germany 1.4542  
 








































   
Source: see text. Notes: 1) The number in parenthesis correspond to p-values; 2) ** indicates the relevant coefficient 
is significant at 1%, * at 5% and ° at 10%. 
Table 1.20. EMU meta-values, 95% confidence interval and homogeneity tests across countries 
and methodologies (bootstrapping SEs for all estimation techniques) 
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Meta-value 1.448 2.287 1.810    















   
Source: see text. Notes: 1) The number in parenthesis correspond to p-values; 2) ** indicates the relevant coefficient 
is significant at 1%, * at 5% and ° at 10%. 
In all the tables the EMU estimates obtained with the Euler equation and insurance data are 
homogeneous across countries and the EASA estimates vary across countries. For tables 1.18 
and 1.20, there is no variation across estimation technique considering all countries. In table 
1.19 the estimates for the UK, Norway, Ireland and Belgium vary across technique. 
No definitive conclusion about variation across countries and methodology can be derived from 
these results. They show different conclusions about EMU variation across countries are reached 
depending on what methodology is used and different conclusions about variation across 
methodologies are reached depending on what countries are considered. 
However, it is striking that for virtually all countries the meta-values across techniques is close 
to 1.5, which is the overall EMU value suggested in section 1.6.6, which considers EMU estimates 
obtained by the EASA. It strongly suggests the EASA-derived value is sound. It also makes one 
wonder why others (e.g. Atkinson et al., 2009) using survey techniques have reached such 
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different conclusions about the value of EMU estimates derived in different contexts (this is a 
question we will visit in the final chapter). 
The fact the meta-values do not differ significantly across methodologies suggests that the 
standard welfare economics account of the nature of the EMU as a general inequality aversion 
parameter – i.e. as an intra-temporal, inter-temporal and across-states-of-nature (risk) 
inequality aversion parameter – is reasonably accurate. Put simply, the basic intuition why the 
different methods result in non-significantly different estimated values is that people in general 
tend to treat the three types of inequality aversion similarly. Yet in other words, the same 
individual in different points of time or different states of nature is modelled as many persons 
by the decision-taker when redistributive choices are considered. In chapter 4 I go back to this 
topic. 
1.8. Conclusion 
In this chapter I estimate the Elasticity of Marginal Utility parameter (EMU or 𝜂) using the Equal 
Absolute Sacrifice Approach (EASA) for 9 European countries from the 50s to 2007 (one estimate 
per year). This methodology assumes Governments set income tax schedules based on the Equal 
Absolute Sacrifice Principle (EASP), which in short determines all individuals paying income tax 
should have the same loss of utility. Given this assumption the EMU can be obtained from the 
Average Tax Rate (ATR) and the Marginal Tax Rates (MTR) relative to the income tax schedule 
set by the Government.   
The ATR and MTR for each country and year is obtained from the EroPTax dataset. It simulates 
the tax rate and social contributions paid by individuals or families given their income, based on 
the income tax legislation in force.  
I use 4 main variations of the income tax data obtained to calculate the parameter. The first 
regards National Insurance Contributions (NICs) as income tax and the Average Production Wage 
(APW) as the income level at which the ATR and MTR are calculated (all in/no SI). The second 
also regards NICs as income tax, but does not consider the APW as it is for the calculation basis; 
instead it includes an estimated Supernumerary Income (SI) in the basic income level (all in/SI). 
The third and fourth only differ from the first two in that they do not regard NICs as income tax 
(no NICs/no SI and no NICs/SI). 
After calculating the parameters I perform a series of tests intended to reveal which of the 4 
data combination is the most appropriate and whether the estimates are constant across 
income levels, countries, time and tax unity definition (single and families). The first test consists 
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of comparing the R2 of regressions run with the different income tax data considering all 
countries and years. Each regression reveals an EMU as the slope coefficient. There is no 
econometric interpretations for these regressions, instead they are just a best-fit exercise, which 
justifies comparing the R2 to decide what combination is the best. The results indicate the “all 
in/no SI” combination is the most appropriate. 
To test both the constancy of the EMU across income and the EMU constancy across countries 
I use the chi-squared test of heterogeneity. To test for EMU variation across time I use Cuzick’s 
(1985) nonparametric test of trend across ordered groups, and to test for variation across tax 
unity definition (single and families) I use paired t-tests. We also compare the R2 of regressions 
using family and single people as tax units to determine the most appropriate tax unit to be 
used. Parameters estimated with single people rendered a better R2, thus leading to the 
conclusion that considering such a tax unit is more appropriate.    
In so doing I analyse the literature regarding the estimation of the EMU via EASA and approach 
it systematically, in a way which has not been done before. In other words, although there are 
many works using the EASA approach to derive the EMU, I am the first to identify what are the 
key aspects of the estimation procedure differing across previous works and compare them in 
order to reveal whether different assumptions have a significant impact on the value of the 
parameter.         
The results generally show that the parameter is statistically speaking not constant across 
income, countries, time and tax unit definition. However, the fact the parameters differ very 
little across income levels in absolute terms suggest the assumption of iso-elastic utility function 
is reasonable for the analysis. Moreover, the minor differences of the parameters estimates 
across countries also suggests national idiosyncrasies (at least with regards to the 9 countries 
considered) have little importance in shaping the EMU’s value. 
We suggest a value of 1.5 for the EMU. This value is obtained by the EASA regression method 
using the ATR and MTR of all countries for all years, the most appropriate combination (all in/no 
SI) and the most appropriate tax units (single people).  
Finally, we compare the EMU estimated by EASA with EMU estimates obtained with different 
methodologies, namely the Euler equation and Szpiro’s (1986) technique. The first uses data on 
consumption growth rate for non-durable goods and derives the parameter as an intertemporal 
inequality aversion index. The second uses data on insurance and derive the parameter as a risk 
aversion parameter. The results show the EMU estimates are consistent across estimation 
methods, which substantiates the EMU’s suggested value of 1.5.  
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Moreover, the fact the three methods implemented derive the parameter in different contexts 
makes it even more interesting. It seems to confirm the findings of Groom and Maddison (2013) 
who also suggest a EMU value close to 1.5 and present results suggesting that estimates of the 
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Appendix 1.A – Examples of survey questionnaires 
 
Leaky bucket type question in Pirttila and Uusitalo (2008) for 𝜼 = 1:47 
What is your opinion of the following reform proposal? 
The taxation of all high-income earners, whose disposable income exceeds 3300 per month, is 
increased. The money is spent for the benefit of those low-income earners whose disposable 
income is less than 800 per month. 
The high-income earners can, however, react to the tax increase by reducing their work effort, 
and part of the money goes to administrative expenses. Therefore, for each 100 paid by the 
high-income earners, only 25 can be spent for the benefit of low-income earners. 
Are you, nevertheless, in favour of this proposal? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
3. Cannot say 
Income distribution comparison type of question in Pirttila and Uusitalo (2008) for 𝜼 = 1:48 
Let us imagine that in wage negotiations two different alternatives are considered. Which of the 
following do you prefer? 
 
1. If all employees are ordered from the lowest-income earner to the highest-income earner, 
someone belonging to the lowest decile earns £1570 in a month, a person with average income 
earns £2340 and a person belonging to the highest decile earns £3480. 
2. Income differences rise and the average income is increased, so that the low income earner 
gets £1280 per month, the person with average income gets £2580 and the high-income earner 
£5190. 





                                                          
47 For other 𝜂 values the amount paid by high earners which is lost (which in this case is 75) is different. 
48 For other values of 𝜂 the lowest decile, the average and the highest decile change. 
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Appendix 1.B – EMU estimates Graph  
 
Figure 1B.1. Estimates obtained considering all in taxes and not considering SI 
 
Source: see text 
 
Figure 1B.2. Estimates obtained considering NICs and SI 
 




Figure 1B.3. Estimates obtained not considering NICs and SI 
 
Source: see text 
 
Figure 1B.4. Estimates obtained not considering NICs and considering SI 
 





Appendix 1.C – EMU constancy across time (tables) 
 
Table 1C.1. Constancy of 𝜼 across time (data separated per 5 years) 
Country all in/no SI all in/SI no NICs/no SI no NICs/SI 
UK 0 0 0 0 
SWEEDEN 0 0 0 0 
NORWAY 0 0 0 0 
ITALY 0 0.015 0.3 0.9 
IRELAND 0 0 0.34 0.13 
GERMANY 0.8 0.375 0.87 0.95 
FRANCE 0 0 0 0 
DENMARK 0 0 0.01 0 
BELGIUM 0.26 0.5 0.46 0.66 
Note: The numbers shown in the table correspond to the p-values of the trend z test. 
 
Table 1C.2. Constancy of 𝜼 across time (data separated per 15 years) 
Country all in/no SI all in/SI no NICs/no SI no NICs/SI 
UK 0 0 0 0 
SWEEDEN 0 0 0 0 
NORWAY 0 0 0 0 
ITALY 0 0 0.12 0.45 
IRELAND 0 0 0.22 0.06 
GERMANY 0.85 0.23 0.92 0.76 
FRANCE 0 0 0 0 
DENMARK 0 0 0 0 
BELGIUM 0.22 0.47 0.37 0.53 





Chapter 2: The Determinants of the Elasticity of Marginal Utility as 
Estimated by the Equal Absolute Sacrifice Approach  
 
2.1. Introduction 
In this chapter I provide the first analysis (to the best of my knowledge) on the determinants of 
the EMU as estimated by the EASA. In the EASA context the parameter is seen as a measure of 
societal inequality aversion through the progressivity of the income tax schedule. It is implied 
that the Governments’ inequality aversion represents the general population’s inequality 
aversion (in a democratic country). 
However, as others have notice (e.g. Spackman , 2004), there are other aspects that affect 
Governments’ decisions to set income tax schedules apart from representing its population’s 
aversion to inequality.  
Herein I allow for a more realistic look at the EMU – one in which it is formed not merely through 
society’s aversion to intratemporal inequality but which also takes account of other factors that 
might impinge on the Government’s desire or ability to set tax rates in order to reflect societal 
aversion to inequality. These might include features of the democratic process and certain 
economic constraints e.g. tax competition and concerns about the impact of high taxes on labour 
market incentives. These were pushed into the background of the analysis performed in chapter 
1. To the extent that certain factors influence the value of the EMU it may be less appropriate 
to view it as reflecting solely societal aversion to inequality. At the same time, the influence of 
the general public on governmental decision-taking concerning taxes is not disregarded, but 
seen as one of the factors driving tax policies.  
In other words, I attempt to determine to some degree the extent to which other factors besides 
the Government’s presumed desire to democratically address society’s aversion to 
intratemporal inequality impinge on the setting of income tax rates. In fact, there is already a 
literature on the determinants of income tax progressivity (although there aren’t many papers), 
and the estimate of EMU from the EASA can be interpreted as another measure of income tax 
progressivity. So, I try to explain my series for the EMU as revealed by the EASA using the same 
variables that a handful of others have used to explain tax progressivity. 
The research is best interpreted as an attempt to validate the EASA approach to estimating EMU 
rather than another analysis of the determinants of income tax progressivity. I am interested in 
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investigating the susceptibility of the estimates of EMU to factors having nothing to do with the 
underlying aversion to inequality of society. 
The empirical analysis includes variables describing the population of a country e.g. its 
demographic composition. The statistical significance of these variables could simply reflect that 
a society with a different demographic composition wants different things. The statistical 
significance of other variables is however harder to explain except for saying that Governments 
do indeed face constraints or have goals of their own quite apart from reflecting society’s 
aversion to inequality. To the extent that these variables are significant I might be less inclined 
to believe that the results obtained in chapter 1 really are measures of EMU.   
Notice I am the first to investigate whether estimates of EMU from the EASA can actually be 
explained by political constraints and institutional features. In so doing I hope to be less naive 
than others who popularised the EASA technique and have simply accepted these estimates of 
EMU at face value. 
I use the EMU estimates obtained via direct calculation in the previous chapter (per country and 
year) and carry out an empirical analysis by implementing a standard fixed effects model. 
Although the explanatory variables hypothesized to be associated with the EMU are drawn from 
those expected to be related to tax progressivity, as mentioned above, I am not going to limit 
myself necessarily to including just these variables. 
The results show the dependency ratio, governmental stability, openness, population and 
governmental expenditure with education are associated with measured EMU. 
The structure of this chapter goes as follows: firstly I make explicit why the EMU estimated by 
the EASA can be interpreted as a measure of income tax progressivity. Next I turn to the 
literature review regarding the main variables affecting income tax progressivity. Then I give 
more details about the data used and the empirical strategy. In section 5 I present the results 
and discuss them and in section I 6 conclude the chapter. 
2.2. The EMU (𝜼) as an index of tax progressivity 
The EMU estimated via EASA is a measure of the progressivity of the income tax schedule. To 




> 0, where ATR (at 𝑦) stands for the Average Tax Rate, given by 𝑇(𝑦)/𝑦, where 𝑇(𝑦) 
is the tax burden at 𝑦.  
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By the definition of local income tax progression given above it can be shown that the EMU 
estimates obtained via EASA are indices of income tax progression at the APW, as demonstrated 














> 0⟺ 𝑀𝑇𝑅(𝑦) > 𝐴𝑇𝑅(𝑦) ⟺
ln(1−𝑀𝑇𝑅(𝑦))
ln(1−𝐴𝑇𝑅(𝑦))
= 𝜂 > 1,            (2.1) 
where MTR (at 𝑦) stands for Marginal Tax Rate which can be expressed as 𝑇′(𝑦). 
Once we have established the relationship between EMU estimates obtained by the EASA and 
indices of income tax progressivity, we can search among variables determining income tax 
progressivity in order to increase our understanding on the determinants of the measured EMU. 
That is done in the next section.    
2.3. Literature review on determinants of income tax progressivity 
In order to locate relevant studies related to the topic under investigation (the determinants of 
income tax progressivity) I used boolean operators and different databases. First I searched in 
EconLit with following search terms: “determinant* AND income tax (schedule* OR system* OR 
structure* OR progress*).”49 In this occasion 37 works were retrieved, but just one work was 
selected to further investigation. Another search was undertaken on Google using variants of 
the phrase “determinants of income tax schedule" and “determinants of tax progressivity". In 
that case 10 works were kept for further investigation. Also, the references of works related to 
the application of the EASA were analysed, and 4 works were selected from further 
investigation. More than three other searches were undertaken in EconLit, using the words: 
“income tax* AND progress* AND measure*", “determinant* AND tax* AND progress" and “tax 
progress* measurement". In total 329 works were retrieved and 32 were kept for further 
investigation. 
ProQuest was also used along with the search words: “determinant* AND income tax AND 
progress*" and “tax progress* measurement". Just five new works were kept for further 
investigation. The references of the works selected were also examined and more 23 works were 
separated for further investigation. From all works kept for further analysis, 10 were relevant 
and thus used in the following literature review (which is surprisingly few given the topicality of 
                                                          
49 Remember the asterisk means that the form of the word from the asterisk on can change. So the 
command progress* would cause the dataset to search for words like progressiveness, progression and 
so on. The operator OR indicates words that must be tracked interchangeably and the operator AND 
indicates words to be tracked in conjunction. 
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the subject). Moreover, I examined the bibliography of the works selected to see whether 
additional works were left out.50 
Amongst the works retrieved and analysed, two resemble closely the analysis undertaken – 
given the way they measure Personal Income Tax (PIT) progressivity, as discussed later on. They 
are Egger et al. (n.d.) and Fletcher and Murray (2008) (hereafter FM). The first considers 209 
countries in the period of 1980 to 2009 and examines the determinants of income tax 
progressivity considering six different indicators of progressivity, but focussing on two of them: 
the difference in average tax rates between ten times the average wage and a wage of zero and 
the difference in marginal tax rates between ten times the average wage and a wage of zero. 
For these indices they employ generalized linear models for non-negative data (Poisson pseudo-
maximum likelihood model and a negative binomial model), since the data generated by the 
indices is non-negative.                
FM consider US states in 2003. Aspects of the PIT which can indicate progressivity are used such 
as the top bracket rate, the number of brackets, and the income threshold for the first bracket. 
Tobit regression analysis is used to investigate the issue given all indices are said to be subject 
to some censoring.  
Table 2.1 shows the variables considered as possible determinants of to the PIT progressivity 
indexes and their expected signs in the aforementioned studies. I list all variables considered, 
even the non-significant ones.51  
Table 2.1. Factors affecting PIT progressivity in Egger et al. (n.d.) and Fletcher and Murray 
(2008) 
Variables Works Expected signs 
Labour supply elasticity E* Negative 
Marginal social utility of income* E Positive 
Population E Positive 
Unemployment rates E Negative 
Inflation E Positive 
Dependent ratio* E Positive 
Openness* E Positive 
Income inequality* E Positive 
Ratio of pop with sec. educ.* E Negative 
Political orientation: right E Negative 
Political orientation: left E Negative 
Political stability E Positive 
Political process participation E Positive 
Unitary or federalist structure E Positive 
Average gross wage E Positive 
Clothing exemption FM* Positive 
                                                          
50 Many studies investigating tax progressivity focus on Governments’ tax mix choice instead of 
determinants of income tax progressivity. Since such topic does not contribute to the one investigated 
here these works are not considered. 
51 I focus on Egger et al. (n.d.) results table and concluding section to present the expected signs relative 
to such work and on the results regarding top bracket rate to present the expected signs regarding FM. 
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Welfare benefits FM Positive 
Sales tax share of revenue FM Positive 
PIT share of revenue FM Positive 
Years since PIT adoption FM Positive 
Democrat governor FM Negative 
Same party dominates state government FM Positive 
Federal aid FM Positive 
County income ratio FM Negative 
Percentage deducting state and/or local taxes FM Positive 
Population density FM Positive 
Median income FM Negative 
Percentage black FM Negative 
Percentage older than 65 FM Negative 
Percentage in poverty FM Negative 
Percentage younger than 18 FM Positive 
Percentage homeowner FM Negative 
Source: see text. *See notes. Notes: (1) E stands for Egger et al. (n.d.); (2) The marginal social utility of income is 
measured by “the share of unemployment insurance benefits a worker receives relative to her last gross earnings” 
(Egger et al. n.d.); (3) Dependent ratio is the sum of the shares of the population over 64 and below 14 in the overall 
population; (4) The level of openness is measured by the sum of exports and imports divided by the GDP; (5) The 
inequality aversion is given by the gross Gini indices; (6) “Ratio of pop with sec. educ.” stands for ratio of population 
with secondary education; (7) The variables shown for Fletcher and Murray (2008) are just those found to be 
significantly related to one of the PIT aspects considered as indicator of the degree of progressivity. 
Since FM investigate the PIT progressivity for US states, some variables [“Federal aid” (to capture 
the effect of decreasing the cost to provide assistance for poor households), “Percentage 
deducting state and/or local taxes” (to capture the effect of decreasing the collection cost) 
“Democrat governors” (to capture government preference for redistribution), “Same party 
dominates state government” (to capture degree of political stability) and “County income 
ratio” (to capture income distribution)] are not directly applicable to this study, but nevertheless 
address aspects that can be considered in a multi-country analysis, as the present case, through 
different indices.  
There is some overlap between the variables chosen by the two studies, such that just those 
which are expected to best capture the factors concerned should be used. I give preference to 
the variables used in Egger et al., n.d..52 This is particularly the case for the variables intended to 
capture income inequality. For example Egger et al. (n.d.) uses the Gini and average gross wage53 
as indicators of inequality whilst FM uses both the “County income ratio”54 and the median 
income for each state. In my case the Gini index is more appropriate, since it is usually calculated 
for countries. By contrast, the variables “Dependent ratio”55 in Egger et al. (n.d.), and 
                                                          
52 Due to the fact they use countries as the analysis unit. 
53 To justify average gross wages as an index of income inequality Egger et al. (n.d.) cite evidence (Piketty 
and Saez, 2006) suggesting that in the last decades in developed economies, increases in income are 
accompanied by increases in (pre-tax) inequality.  
54 It refers to the ratio between the highest- and lowest-county per capita income in each state. 




“Percentage older than 65” and “Percentage younger than 18” in FM are almost identical in 
terms of capturing the effect of population age structure on progressivity. 
I classify the variables used in the different works considered with the intention to select those 
which were significantly related to progressivity at least twice56. But whilst I am including 
variables used in these and other studies examining PIT progressivity, I am open to using other 
variables too because my index is not viewed merely as a measure of progressivity, but also a 
measure of societal aversion to inequality. Egger et al. (n.d.), FM and the other studies included 
in the review all have a more narrow view of the work they were doing. 
Egger et al.’s (n.d.) criteria to choose variables potentially affecting PIT progressivity is based on 
the modern theory of optimal taxation and on positive theories of Government behaviour.57 
From the first follows two basic predictions (see Appendix 2.A): 1) the optimal MTR is smaller 
the larger the average (compensated) labour supply elasticity with respect to tax of the overall 
population, and 2) the optimal MTR is larger the greater is the covariance between the marginal 
social benefit of income to a worker and his gross income. The inclusion of the variables “Labour 
supply elasticity”58 and “Marginal social utility of income”59 come directly from theory.  
Other variables, such as the Gini coefficients, average gross wage, unemployment, openness, 
inflation, secondary education level and “Dependent ratio”, are included due their hypothetical 
relation to income inequality, which was expected in Egger et al. (n.d.) to influence the 
progressivity for the same reasons the “Marginal social utility of income” would do (i.e. because 
of Governments or people redistribution preferences).  
Based on positive (as opposed to normative) views of Government behaviour Egger et al. (n.d.) 
pick two political variables. “Political orientation”, which is chosen based on the general 
perception that left-wing parties would be prone to increase the progressivity of a given PIT 
schedule [although they recognize that earlier empirical evidence is ambiguous about the 
subject (e.g. Alt and Lassen, 2006)] and “Political process participation”, which is selected based 
on the median voter hypothesis, according to which when inequality causes average income to 
                                                          
56 The fact a variable is found to be significantly related to progressivity by (at least) two different studies 
substantiates the importance of the variable via replication. 
57 This is, theories regarding how Governments actually behaves, as opposed to theories on how 
Government should behave (normative theories). 




59 Given by “the share of unemployment insurance benefits a worker receives relative to her last gross 
earnings (Egger et al., n.d.). 
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be larger than the median voter’s income, the latter prefer a more progressive tax (Meltzer and 
Richard, 1981).  
The basic point of Meltzer and Richard (1981) is that if there is enough participation in the 
political process, the median voter will bear inequality up to the point where his income is not 
below the average income. After that point, a rational median voter votes in favour of a more 
progressive income tax schedule, given it benefits him directly. The other political variables 
(“Political stability”, and “Unitary or federalist structure) are picked with no explicit priors. The 
first seeks to capture concentration of power and the second political stability. 
FM’s approach to selectíng variables possibly determining PIT progressivity is different from 
Egger et al. (n.d.), and more similar to most of the other works considered in the remainder of 
this literature review. The theoretical basis for the empirical model in this case is found in the 
work of Hettich and Winer (1999) (who present what is also known as the probabilistic voting 
model), where the tax system is modelled as a result of government rational action towards the 
maximization of expected support in terms of votes. The basic prediction of the model is that 
Governments will tax less those who are more likely to participate in the electoral process (see 
Appendix 2.B for more details about the probabilistic voting model). Notice that this presents a 
very different view of the Government: trying to maximise its support rather than reflect societal 
preferences for inequality aversion.  
The variables “Percentage black”, “Percentage in poverty” and “Percentage older than 65” are 
chosen based on the fact that in the US black, poorer and younger people are expected to be 
less prone to vote than elders, white and richer individuals. It causes the political costs of levying 
tax from elders, white and wealthy to be higher than the political cost related to taxing black, 
poor and young people.60  
The collection of data on “Clothing exemption” and “Welfare benefits” aims to test if 
redistribution policies act as substitutes or complements to tax progressivity. More specifically, 
they are used to test whether States in which these exemptions and benefits are largely 
implemented tend to have less progressive income taxes (in this case suggesting the programs 
serve as substitutes) or more progressive income taxes (in this case suggesting the programs 
serve as complements).  
                                                          
60 Assuming the groups have the same tax base elasticity (i.e. the change in their taxable base given a 
change in the tax rate applicable to them is the same). However, the difference in tax rate is even larger 




“Sales tax share of revenue” and “PIT share of revenue” capture the State´s reliance on one of 
the two referred fiscal tools. Hettich and Winer (1999) argue that larger reliance on any given 
tax increases the opposition towards it, thus increasing the political costs related to making it 
regressive. Therefore, larger reliance on PIT is hypothesized to be related to more progressive 
income tax schedules, while larger reliance on sales tax is hypothesized to be related to more 
regressive income tax schedules.    
”Years since PIT adoption” is intended to capture the influence of the historical sentiments 
related to PIT schedules when they were first formulated. The hypothesis underpinning it is that 
States which adopted a more progressive (regressive) PIT at the beginning may have more 
progressive (regressive) taxes currently, indicating people become accustomed to particular tax 
schedules [they follow Morgan (1994) in this respect].  
“Democrat governor” and “Same party dominates state government” are intended to reflect 
the political composition of the State. Although it is not clearly stated how these variables would 
influence tax structure, they can be claimed to express the governments ideology and the 
degree of political competition (how influential a party is in the State, and therefore how 
unpopular the measures it takes can be without diminishing significantly its power), 
respectively. “Population density” is reported as a simple control. No further explanation on 
how it could affect tax structure is given. Also, no direct explanation is given for the inclusion of 
“Percentage homeowner”.  
The literature review undertaken identified many other works investigating the determinants of 
tax progressivity, but these others considered the general tax system, unlike the two presented 
before, which took into account just PIT progressivity. It is important to note however, that given 
some studies choose indicators of progressivity associated with PIT (e.g. top income tax rates) 
to measure the progressivity of the whole tax system (including sales taxes, property taxes, etc.), 
one can regard them as measuring PIT progressivity directly – although their intention was 
broader. This is the case for Galli (2002) and Scheve and Stasavage (2010). In my description of 
these works just the most important (statistically significant)61 variables affecting tax structure 
are considered. 
Galli (2002) finds that per capita income, government expenditures on transfers and subsidies, 
the degree of openness, EU membership, the coalition variable (measuring the power dispersion 
in the government) and government instability are related to tax progressivity, which is 
                                                          
61 At 5% confidence level. 
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measured by the statutory top marginal tax rates on personal income. The author applied fixed 
effects regressions on a panel of 16 OECD countries between 1965 to 1995.62  
In Galli (2002) the variables of interest were divided in three groups, the economic, the interest 
groups and the politico-institutional variables. According to the author, the first set would 
mainly measure the need for redistribution of income, the second would measure the impact of 
different voter groups on progressivity and the last would reflect governmental and political 
aspects which can increase or decrease tax progressivity.  
Per capita income, government expenditures on transfers and subsidies, the degree of openness 
and EU membership are economic variables. The first is included more as an indirect driver, since 
it is assumed to impact governmental spending; the second is thus justified on grounds of 
complementarity / substitutability between government expenditure and tax policy. Openness 
and EU membership are variables included to control for the impact economic integration may 
have on PIT progressivity.63 Both openness and integration increase the cost of progressivity, 
given they increase people’s flexibility regarding their country of residence. In other words, they 
are expected to increase the elasticity of taxable activities (Slemrod, 2000).  
The variables “coalition” (political competition) and “government instability” are institutional-
political. The hypothesis as to how the first relates to progressivity is that if power is dispersed 
in the government (coalition government), there will be probably more debts and spending, 
given the difficulty to balance the different interests of the coalition (Roubini and Sachs, 1989). 
The author then argues that since it is politically easier to raise funds by augmenting tax burden 
than by diminishing expenditures, it can potentially influence progressivity. For government 
instability the prior is similar. It is argued that since a strong Government is needed to cut public 
spending, unstable Governments are more likely to present a deficit bias (Haan and Sturm, 
1994). Thus, in case austerity measures are needed such Governments would be prone to raise 
taxes to finance spending. Notice an income tax system intended to raise more revenue may be 
more or less progressive in character, but progressivity is likely to be impacted.64  
                                                          
62 The regressions were weighed least square models with White heteroscedastic consistent variance and 
covariance matrix. 
63 The study makes no reference to the possible influence of the EU on income tax rates. The variable just 
serves as an indicator of the degree of economics integration.   
64 Although these arguments are more directly related to the whole tax system, they are indirectly linked 
to income tax progressivity.  
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Scheve and Stasavage (2010)65 analyse how war mobilization may affect tax progressivity using 
a diff-in-diff approach. They compare countries which entered in World War I (WWI) and those 
which did not. They find that war mobilization, GDP per capita, male universal suffrage and 
revenue to GDP affect tax progressivity. The latter is measured by the highest marginal income 
tax rate in the income tax schedule.  
The study’s main hypothesis is that mobilization for war creates an atmosphere where a new 
social pact is established, according to which the population in general agrees to fight whilst the 
rich agree to bear a larger tax burden. To test the hypothesis, they use a dummy variable 
indicating countries participating and not participating in WWI. Also included are a variable 
indicating the percentage of seats in the legislature occupied by leftist parties (left seat share; 
which was not significant), country fixed effects and time trends or year fixed effects. In all 
specifications only the “left seat share” variable was not significant. 
The dummy indicating countries and years in which there was male universal suffrage is 
intended to address the hypothesis that progressivity depends on the degree of political rights 
possessed by the population. Revenue to GDP (ratio of central government revenue to GDP), on 
the other hand, indicates whether Governments altered progressivity due to revenue needs – 
again it is not clear whether this requires greater or lesser degrees of progressivity. No clear 
prior is given as to why GDP per capita is included.  
Foster (2013) finds that ideology, ethnic congruence between poor and non-poor, degree of 
tension between ethnic groups, poverty, sales activity and neighbours’ progressivity influence 
tax progressivity. The tax progressivity indices used in the work are the ratio between the ATR 
faced by the top income quintile and the bottom income quintile, the ratio between the ATR in 
the top and in the middle quintile, and the ratio between the ATR in the middle quintile and in 
the bottom quintile. His analysis is confined to US states. 
It must be noticed that the measures of progressivity appear to refer to the whole tax burden,66 
such that the variables thought to affect progressivity in the study may not apply to PIT 
progressivity in the same manner. In any case, it seems there is no reason to expect all the 
factors considered to influence just tax systems as a whole and not PIT progressivity.  
                                                          
65 This paper is further developed by the authors in their book Scheve and Stasavage (2016), which is the 
main reference for the next chapter.  
66 The work is not clear about whether the ATR refers to income tax or tax burden as a whole, but the 
overall context of the study reveals they refer to the tax system as a whole. 
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His explanation for hypothesizing that ideology affects tax progressivity comes from the studies 
of Fong (2001) and Alesina and La Ferrara (2005), where the preference for redistribution is said 
to be related to conceptions of fairness, which are, according to the author, based upon 
established ideologies. The choice of the variable “ethnic congruence between poor and non-
poor” is based on studies undertaken by social psychologists and political scientists which 
indicate that people tend to be more generous to those more similar to them ethnically, racially, 
linguistically, etc. (Fong and Luttmer, 2011, give a literature review on the subject). Notice this 
one again drives a wedge between the EMU of individuals and the EMU as revealed by social 
choices. The degree of tension between ethnic groups, in turn, is measured based on Roch and 
Rushton (2008), where there is also evidence that the this variable affects support for 
redistributive fiscal policies.  
The sales activity index (the ratio between a state’s per-capita retail sales and the national 
average) variable is intended to capture the importance of tourism in the different states, given 
it is an important way to export consumption taxes. The neighbour State’s progressivity is 
measured by their weighted average progressivity.67 It may influence progressivity due to the 
possibility for individuals to move to other States in order to flee high tax rates (which is similar 
to the opportunities created by greater integration in the EU considered by Galli, 2002). No 
theoretical priors are given to justify the inclusion of the poverty variable. It is included solely 
based on the fact it is included on other studies investigating the “political economy of 
subnational tax and spending policies”. Finally, they use Generalized Methods of Moments 
(GMM) model to perform the analysis.    
In a forerunner to their 2008 paper Fletcher and Murray (2006) argue that time since income 
tax adoption is related to tax progressivity, which is measured as the ratio of the tax burden 
share for those in the bottom 75 percent of the top quintile relative to the burden share of those 
in the bottom quintile. Chernick (2005), based on Hettich and Winer (1988), hypothesize that 
variables which affect the political costs of taxation and/or the elasticity of the tax base for 
different income groups should be considered as potentially affecting tax structure. Based on 
that he shows the existence of correlation between tax exportability, Republican (or Democrat) 
Party dominance, neighbour state progressivity, income inequality and tax progressivity. In this 
case progressivity is measured by the ratio of the tax burden in the top quintile to the tax burden 
in the lowest one. Both studies are relative to US states.  
                                                          
67 They use two different weighing matrixes: in one the population of the neighbour states is considered 
and in the other it is not. 
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Note that in both Fletcher and Murray (2006) and Chernick (2005), as well as in other works 
related to the determinants of tax progressivity in the US, the question of neighbouring States’ 
tax schedules affecting tax progressivity is raised. The literature is not conclusive about this 
point, but Fletcher and Murray (2006) and Fletcher and Murray (2008), who study this issue 
more closely, did not find evidence supporting this possibility. Chernick (2005) uses instrumental 
variables68 to obtain his results, while Fletcher and Murray (2006) use OLS and OLS with State 
fixed effects.69 
Morgan (1994) points that newspaper circulation (as a measure of how informed population is) 
and level of conservatism affect tax progressivity. Jacobs and Waldman (1983) find that small 
business percent, income inequality and percent of blacks in the population are related to tax 
progressiveness. They argue the results suggest that states are hostile to the interests of the less 
well-off specially if they are part of a discriminated-against minority, that small businessman are 
more likely to condemn redistributive policies, and that in States where there is more income 
inequality the tax system does less redistributive damage.70  
Both Morgan (1994) and Waldman (1983) use the progressivity measure given by Phares (1973), 
which is basically the coefficient 𝑏 of the regression expressed by 
𝐸𝑇𝐷𝑖 = 𝑎 + 𝑏𝑋𝑖,            (2.2) 
where 𝐸𝑇𝐷𝑖 is the effective tax rate in the ith income class and 𝑋𝑖  is the average income in the 
ith income class. The analysis units are US states for both papers, and both use multiple 
regression techniques to obtain their results.  
2.4. Data and empirical strategy 
In this section I provide details on the variables used in my study into the determinants of 
aversion to inequality as measured by the EASA and present the empirical strategy followed. 
The variables identified as being used (and being statistically significant)71 more than once are 
shown in table 2.2. From the 12 variables displayed in it, only 7 are used in my investigation. 
                                                          
68 He argues that tax exportability is endogenous to tax structure. The author refers to Feldstein and 
Metcalf (1987) for the identification strategy utilized. 
69 Fletcher and Murray (2006) use different techniques (standard spatial autoregressive models and 
geographically weighed regression models) to test correlation between a state tax progressivity and its 
neighbours’. 
70 They add that their results do not allow them to infer that states use tax progressivity to decrease 
income inequality, for the overall structure of the state taxes is in general regressive. 
71 The statistical significance gives evidence on the relevance of the variable to the topic. Just for Egger et 
al. (n.d.) and FM I do not look at statistical significance, but to all variables chosen. I do that due to the 
fact their works are more similar to the present analysis (mainly Egger et al., n.d.).  
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Below I provide more details on why I do not include 5 of them and instead include others which 
are not in the table (as noted I view the analysis as not merely dealing with the determinants of 
tax progressivity but primarily societal inequality aversion).   
Although we have an index of “political process participation” for all the countries considered,72 
it does not vary significantly between countries, such that it is not included.73 We only possess 
data on “poverty” for a few years (and not for all countries considered),74 so such a variable is 
not included in the analysis. Moreover, there are other factors (such as GDP per capita, inflation, 
unemployment) included which can to some extent indicate a country’s poverty level. The 
“Neighbour progressivity” variable is not included since Fletcher and Murray (2006) find weak 
evidence in support of it.75 If there is little evidence to support such a relation in the US, where 
there is high mobility, it can be assumed the variable is of little importance in an international 
context. In addition, my data is not for contiguous countries. The variable “time since PIT 
adoption” is not included because all countries had already adopted PIT at the start of the period 
under consideration. We also do not include the variable “percentage black” because it is more 
related to the US context.  
Given the importance of income inequality in the analysis (used 3 times in the works retrieved), 
we in the same fashion as in Egger et al. (n.d.) include indirect measures. They are 
unemployment, average gross wage, the population size, inflation and Government’s 
expenditure with education (a proxy for the population educational level). We also include a 
direct measure (in this case GINI coefficients). The first 4, the GINI, the dependency ratio and 
openness are hypothesized to be positively correlated with inequality, while the expenditure 
with education is hypothesized to be negatively correlated with it. These expectations are based 
on Egger et al. (n.d.).  
Another reason for including governmental expenditure on education is that the level of state 
funded education in society is closely related to societal fairness in that it can be argued that a 
similar level of education across individuals provides them with similar initial opportunities. In 
                                                          
72 It consists of the political rights ratings obtained from Freedom House. 
73 The highest ratings are given to all countries and all years, except for Italy, between 1976 and 1979 
(then it is given the second best ratings) and Ireland in 1975 (it is given the second highest rating). 
74 From 2004, to be more specific. We looked at the World Bank database and the Eurostat database. All 
works including this variable collect data on US states. 
75 They mainly use spatial regression techniques to check Chernick (2005) results, but also analyse this 
issue more deeply than Foster (2013), which besides using techniques which are similar to Chernick (2005) 
regarding this topic, does not mention their evidence contradicting the latter. 
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other words, since expenditure in education can be thought as a means to achieve fairness in 
the same way as tax progressivity, these two policies can be understood as substitutes.     
To summarise, the variables to be included in the analysis are: GDP per capita, openness, 
centralization of power, government stability, ideology, income inequality, dependency ratio, 
unemployment, average gross wage, population size, inflation and governmental expenditure 
with education. Table 2.3 presents the definitions and sources of the variables considered, and 
table 2.4 presents the summary statistics regarding the same variables.  
Table 2.2. Variables used more than once (regarding works included in the literature review) 
Variables Times used Works   
GDP per capita  
(used)* 




2 Galli (2002); 
Egger et al. (n.d.) 
Centralization of power 
(used) 
3 Galli (2002); 
FM (2008); 
Egger et al. (n.d.) 76 
Government stability 
(used) 
2 Galli (2002); 
Egger (n.d.) 
Political process participation 2 SS (2010); 
Egger et al. (n.d.)77 
Ideology 
(used) 
4 Foster (2013); 
Chernick (2005); 
Egger et al. (n.d.); 
FM (2008) 
Poverty 2 Foster (2013); 
FM (2008) 
Neighbour progressivity 2 Foster (2013); 
Chernick (2005) 




3 Egger et al. (n.d.); 
FM (2008); 
Chernick (2005); 




2 Egger et al. (n.d.); 
FM (2008) 
Source: see text. *See notes. Notes: (1) SS (2010) stands for Scheve and Stasavage (2010); (2) JW (1983) stands for 
Jacobs and Waldman (1983); (3) (used) indicates the variables was used in the analysis. 
Table 2.3. Acronym, definition and source of the (independent) variables considered  
Acronym Definition Source 
GDPPERCAP GDP per capita  
(constant 2005 US$) 
World Bank Indicators 
DEPRATIO Dependency ratio=(Population >  
65 + pop. < 14)/(total pop.) 
World Bank Indicators 
                                                          
76 Galli (2002) captures it by the coalition variable; FM (2008) captures it by the “same party dominates 
state government” variable and Egger et al. (n.d.) captures it by the “unitary of federalist” variable.  
77 SS (2010) captures it by the “male universal suffrage”. 
78 Which in this work (as in Egger et al., n.d.) is associated to GINI coefficients, unemployment rate, 
average gross wage, population size, dependency ratio, openness, inflation and education. 
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GINI_gross Ginni coefficients before taxes WIDER79 
GOVSTAB Government stability: Percent of 
veto players80 who   drop from  
the government in any given year 
WBDPI81 




(Exports + Imports)/(GDP) 
World Bank Indicators 
LNPOP Log of population World Bank Indicators 
EDUCEXPEND Govern expenditure with         
education (% of GDP) 
World Bank Indicators 
GOVDISP Does party of executive control 
all relevant houses? (yes=1;    
no=0) 
WBDPI 
UNEMP Unemployment (% of total labour  
force) 
World Bank Indicators 
LNAPW Average gross wage: log of APW EuroPTax 
INFL GDP deflator (annual %) World Bank Indicators 
Source: see text. 
Table 2.4. Summary statistics of the independent variables 
Variables Mean Std. dev Median Min Max NbObs 
GDPPERCAP 28285 11111.22 26796 9010 69095 409 
DEPRATIO 0.3530 0.02389205 0.3520 0.3022 0.4237 429 
GINI_gross 41.47 6.31671 41.60 19.90 54.70 407 
GOVSTAB 0.1592 0.2734169 0 0 1 284 
IDEOL 1.898 0.916495 2 1 3 295 
OPENESS 66.08 29.74537 59.44 24.95 178.25 419 
LNPOP 16.49 1.192187 16.08 14.85  18.23 402 
EDUCEXPEND 5.361 1.106591 5.287 2.907 8.215 301 
GOVDISP 0.2068 0.4056843 0 0 1 295 
UNEMP 7.763 2.84584 7.773 2.493 15.775 153 
LNAPW 10.914 2.364954 10.676 5.858 17.501 459 
INFL 5.514 4.397078 4.307 -1.695 25.789 403 
Source: see text. 
First we apply a standard fixed effects model with time trend. It can thus be represented by  
𝜂𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆𝑇 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡,           (2.3) 
where 𝜂𝑖𝑡 represents the EMU estimates for country 𝑖 at period 𝑡 as revealed by the EASA using 
the all in / no SI series for a single person, 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is the time-variant regressor matrix consisting of 
                                                          
79 World Income Inequality Database (UNU-WIDER). 
80 In presidential systems, veto players are defined as the president and the largest party in the legislature. 
In parliamentary systems, the veto players are defined as the PM and the three largest government 
parties. 
81 World Bank Database of Political Institutions. 
82 “Parties that are defined as conservative, Christian democratic, or right-wing.” (WBDPI guide) 
83 “Parties that are defined as communist, socialist, social democratic, or left-wing.” (WBDPI guide) 
84 “Parties that are defined as centrist or when party position can best be described as centrist (e.g. party 
advocates strengthening private enterprise in a social-liberal context). Not described as centrist if 
competing factions “average out” to a centrist position (e.g. a party of “right-wing Muslims and Beijing-
oriented Marxists”).” (WBDPI guide) 
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the explanatory variables presented above, 𝜆 is the coefficient regarding the time trend 𝑇, 𝛽 is 
the coefficient vector of interest, and 𝑢 is the error term. 
The fixed effect model is justified given the results of an F test for individual effects, which tests 
whether a fixed effects model is more appropriate than a OLS pooled model, and a Hausman 
test, which tests whether a fixed effects or random effects model is more appropriate. In both 
cases the fixed effects model was found the more appropriate model.85 
After running this regression we remove a non-significant variable which caused the number of 
observations in the regression to increase (the variable removed is UNEMP) and run it again. 
After that it was not necessary to exclude any further non-significant variables to increase the 
number of observations considered, so that this is the specification I focus on in the section 
below. We also run the F test for individual effects and Hausman test for this specification, and 
again the results indicate the fixed effects model is the most appropriate.86    
Notice the works considered in the literature review interpret the variables discussed above as 
determinants of the degree of progressivity of income tax schedules, such that there is a 
causality direction underlying the analyses. Following them I interpret the variables considered 
as causes of the EMU, once the latter is a measure of the degree of progressivity. 
Although to investigate such causality assumption among the variables would be another 
research in itself, endogeneity tests for all statistically significant variables are presented on 
Appendix 2.C. 
In the next section then, I make hypotheses explaining the correlations (interpreted as 
causalities) between the significant variables referred to above and the EMU. In the conclusion 
I discuss the implications of such correlations to the reliability of the EMU as estimated by the 
EASA.  
2.5. Results and discussion 
The results of the regression analysis described in the last section are presented in table 2.5. 
According to the results there are 5 variables that are significantly correlated with the EMU (as 
measured by EASA): DEPRATIO, GOVSTAB, OPENESS, LNPOP, EDUCEXPEND. The dependent 
                                                          
85 F test for individual effects: F = 6.4237, p-value = 5.156e-07 (alternative hypothesis: significant effects); 
Hausman Test: chisq = 39.626, p-value = 0.0001587 (alternative hypothesis: random effects model is 
inconsistent). 
86 F test for individual effects: F = 10.287, p-value = 2.223e-12 (alternative hypothesis: significant effects); 




variable is interpreted as an index of governmental inequality aversion (as reflected by the 
progressivity of the income tax schedule) and is not seen as necessarily reflecting people’s 
inequality aversion.  
 To have a better understanding of why DEPRATIO affects the EMU negatively, we run the same 
regression substituting it by the percentage of people with more than 65 years (ABOVE65) and 
the percentage of people with less than 14 years (UPTO14) in the population.87 Both variables 
are significant and affect the EMU negatively.88  
One way to explain the result concerning the ABOVE65 variable is by the Hettich and Winer 
(1988) probabilistic voting model. Specifically it is known that older people are usually both more 
likely to vote and more likely to be richer, which increases the political cost to fight inequality, 
leading Governments to appear less inequality averse.  
It is more difficult to interpret the UPTO14 variable because the extent to which people vote 
based on how proposed policies affect children is unclear. However, we can hypothesize that 
parents (the share of which is assumed to grow with the percentage of those under 14 years) 
behave similarly to the elders, which would explain the negative correlation between UPTO14 
and the EMU.   
An alternative interpretation is that older people and parents (again assuming a larger share of 
people under 14 in the population entails a larger number of parents) tend to be less inequality 
averse themselves, and therefore would favour less inequality averse Governments. Notice that 
in this case governmental policies would reflect people’s preferences. Moreover, the 
explanation given in the previous paragraph is not inconsistent with the one discussed in this 
paragraph. This is, it is possible that DEPRATIO affects Governments’ tax policies through a 
desire to maintain political support and also a wish to reflect the preferences of the populace.   
The GOVSTAB variable affects the EMU positively. To explain this correlation we can again refer 
to Hettich and Winer’s (1988) theory. If for a Government, being inequality averse implies a 
higher political cost (due to the larger political influence of wealthy people), as suggested by the 
mentioned theory, the result is compatible with the idea that stable Governments are in better 
condition to pay such cost without being dismantled.  
                                                          
87 Notice DEPRATIO=ABOVE65+UPTO14. 
88 The coefficient regarding the variable ABOVE65 was -9.0002e-02 (standard error of 2.8384e-02 and 
significant at 1%). The coefficient regarding the variable UPTO14 was -6.9308e-02 (standard error of 
1.7836e-02 and significant at 0.1%). For the referred regression, the Hausman test and the F test for 
individual effects also point the fixed effects model as the most appropriate.  
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On the other hand, it is also possible to conjecture that political stability per se causes people to 
become more inequality averse, which is reflected in the kind of administration elected. It is 
reasonable to assume in times of instability people become more selfish. Again, the two 
different explanations regarding GOVSTAB are not incompatible. 
Openness is positively related to the EMU, which is consistent with the Egger et al. (n.d.) finding 
that openness is positively correlated with income tax progressivity. They explain this correlation 
basically by resorting to the idea that openness is related to income inequality and thus would 
indirectly reveal the effect of income inequality on progressivity. This is, it suggests inequality 
aversion increases with actual inequality.89 It is also important to notice this result is at odds 
with Galli’s (2002) finding that openness is negatively correlated with progressivity (which 
supports the hypothesis openness increases the cost of setting progressive taxes by encouraging 
workers mobility; workers can escape high taxes by changing the country of residence).  
Therefore, there is a tension between two possible effects of openness on progressivity. In one 
hand it can increase income inequality and so inequality aversion, which leads people to vote 
for more progressive schedules. On the other hand, it can increase the cost of progressivity due 
to higher workers mobility, which may drive administrations to reduce the level of progressivity. 
In the present study the results suggest the first effect is stronger. Moreover, notice the 
interpretation based on Egger et al. (n.d.) seems to imply Governments reflect people’s 
preferences, while the interpretations based on Galli (2002) does not make such an assumption. 
Yet another explanation is that by increasing workers mobility openness may cause some 
countries to become less sensitive to tax competition (which decreases the cost of implementing 
egalitarian-driven policies) instead of more sensitive to it as hypothesized by Galli (2002). For at 
the same time workers can flee high taxes by changing countries, they can enter a country for 
reasons not related to taxes (e.g. political liberty, safety, jobs opportunities, etc.) irrespective of 
paying higher taxes. 
In the same way as for openness, Egger et al. (n.d.) justify the inclusion of the LNPOP variable by 
referring to its probable positive relationship with income inequality. The nature of this linkage 
is however completely unexplained. In their case they find progressivity rises with LNPOP, which 
is consistent with the understanding that inequality raises progressivity. In the present study I 
instead find a negative correlation between LNPOP and the EMU.  
                                                          
89 Notice the GINI is also positively correlated with the EMU, although it is not statistically significant. 
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It can be hypothesized that to live in a populous country have an effect on individuals’ inequality 
aversion by, for example, decreasing their ‘sense of community’ (McMillan and Chavis, 1986).90 
Also, it is possible that population size affects progressivity because it promotes remoteness of 
the central Government from the people, and more remote Governments care less about 
inequality. Only the first argument (based on McMillan and Chavis, 1986) assumes Governments 
reflect people’s preferences. The second argument suggests that this does not happen, at least 
in large countries.  
Finally, the variable EDUCEXPEND is negatively correlated with the EMU. If we assume, as Egger 
et al. (n.d.) do that education affects negatively income inequality, then we can explain the result 
above by referring to this indirect association. This is, an increase in EDUCEXPEND affects the 
EMU negatively given its negative effect on income inequality.  
Another possibility is that a better educated population is simply less inequality averse. 
A third argument is to say that state spending on education and progressive PIT are substitutes. 
The idea of spending on substitutes or complements to tax progressivity is particularly discussed 
in FM. If spending on education is high this therefore guarantees a certain level of fairness within 
society, making the kind of compensation brought by progressivity unnecessary. It is here also 
possible to draw a parallel between the results concerning expenditure on education and the 
Scheve and Stasavage (2010) results regarding military conscription. They suggest progressivity 
increased during WWI to compensate for conscription to the military from poorer households 
and restore a certain level of fairness to society.  
Table 2.5. Determinants of the EMU (estimated by the EASA) 
Variables EMU 
TT (time trend) 3.7391e-04 
(6.3416e-03) 
GDPPERCAP 1.9686e-06 
(7.5405e-06)   
DEPRATIO -7.0998 **    
(1.7717)  
GINI_gross   1.2355e-03 
(5.3087e-03)   
GOVSTAB 1.0577e-01 *  
(5.2950e-02)    
IDEOL 1.0615e-02  
(1.8062e-02)  
OPENESS 7.4046e-03 **  
(1.6494e-03)  
LNPOP -2.4927 *     
(9.6494e-01) 
                                                          
90 McMillan and Chavis (1986) define it as "a feeling that members have of belonging, a feeling that 
members matter to one another and to the group, and a shared faith that members' needs will be met 
through their commitment to be together." 
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EDUCEXPEND -9.4362e-02 ** 
(2.6701e-02)  
GOVDISP 6.5051e-03   
(2.6701e-02) 
LNAPW -2.0328e-02  
(1.4447e-02)  
INFL 6.7081e-03   
(6.4790e-03) 
  
R2 (within)/(between)/(overall) 0.3363/0.2901/0.1114  
F-statistic 10.2607 ** 
Nb. Obs. 264 
Source: see text. Notes: (1) Standard errors in parenthesis; (2) ** indicates the relevant coefficient is significant at 
1%, * at 5% and ° at 10%. 
2.6. Conclusion 
In this chapter I investigated the determinants of the EMU as estimated by the EASA. In such 
context the estimates are supposed to reflect societal intratemporal inequality aversion by the 
progressivity of the income tax schedule. In the study carried out I took a more realistic point of 
view regarding the parameter in that I considered the possibility that there are factors other 
than societal inequality aversion that affect Governments’ willingness and capacity to set 
income taxes schedules. Discovering that estimates of the EMU derived from the EASA are 
largely explained by macroeconomic circumstances and institutional features rather than the 
characteristics of the populace would undermine the validity of the estimates of EMU in chapter 
1.  
To get insight into variables affecting the EMU I reviewed the literature regarding the 
determinants of tax progressivity and selected variables which were significantly correlated to 
tax progressivity more than once. Then I ran a standard fixed effects model regression with time 
trend to detect those within this group associated with the EMU. The results show the 
dependency ratio, governmental stability, openness, population and governmental expenditure 
with education are associated with the EMU. 
Two possible interpretations were provided to explain each variable’s correlation with the EMU. 
One focuses on aspects that are not related to societal inequality aversion and other which focus 
on aspects that affect societal inequality aversion and may through some channel affect the 
parameter. In other words, some interpretations see the EMU as indicating governmental 
inequality aversion (as expressed by the degree of progressivity of income tax schedules) as 
something separated from societal inequality aversion, and others see the EMU as indicating 
governmental inequality aversion as a reflection of societal inequality aversion. Notice the 
interpretations are mutually non-excluding and only well-established democracies are included 
in the analysis. Also notice that, although I think it is important to show the influence of the 
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considered variables on EMU can be explained differently, I do not assume both explanations 
are equally convincing. 
The dependency ratio (as well as the percentage of those above 65 and under 14 years in the 
population) was found to be negatively correlated with the EMU. The first possible 
interpretation (which takes governmental inequality aversion as distinct from societal inequality 
aversion) is that since elder people are more likely to vote and more likely to be richer, the 
political cost of being more inequality averse for the Government (i.e. setting more progressive 
income tax schedules) is higher. We can make the same hypothesis for parents (i.e. that parents 
are more likely to vote and to be richer), which can explain why the percentage of those below 
14 years (which is assumed to grow with the percentage of parents) is also negatively correlated 
with the EMU. Another explanation (which regards governmental inequality as an expression of 
societal inequality) is that elder and parents are less inequality averse, which would increase the 
probability that a less inequality averse Government is chosen. 
Government stability was found to be positively correlated with the EMU. A possible explanation 
is that it is more costly for less stable Governments to oppose inequality. Yet another hypothesis 
is that stability itself causes people to be more inequality averse. Openness was found to be 
positively correlated with the EMU. An explanation is that it affects the parameter indirectly by 
increasing income inequality (Egger et al., n.d.), which would then impact inequality aversion 
positively. Another possible explanation is that by increasing workers mobility openness makes 
some countries less sensible to tax competition, which decreases the cost of adopting 
egalitarian-driven policies.    
Population size was negatively correlated to the EMU. One possible explanation for this result is 
that living in a populous country may have some effect on one’s inequality aversion via, for 
example, their ‘sense of community’ (McMillan and Chavis, 1986), which would impact 
governmental policies. The alternative explanation is that the governments of large countries 
are too remote to implement societal preferences for intratemporal equality.  
Finally, governmental expenditure with education was also found to be negatively correlated to 
the EMU. One explanation for such result is that there tends to be less inequality among more 
educated populations, such that assuming more inequality leads to more aversion to inequality 
and Governments reflect people’s preferences it is possible to say that more education spending 
leads to less egalitarian policies. It is also possible to interpret this result by saying education 
and tax progressivity are substitutes in the pursuit of societal fairness. This is, education 
spending can be seen as an alternative way in which the Government achieves distributional 
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goals – an alternative (substitute) to more progressive taxes. This is the same argument used by 
Scheve and Stasavage (2010) – a key paper underpinning the next chapter – albeit concerning 
military conscription rather than education.   
Although it is possible to explain – without contradicting the EASA tenets – how the measured 
EMU might change in accordance with demographic factors (i.e. dependency ratio), it is harder 
to explain – in the same way – why the EMU estimates should be affected by political and 
economic factors. To the extent that they are affected by these factors (i.e. Government 
stability, openness, population size91 and expenditure with education) the estimates of EMU 
provided by the EASA are compromised.  
The results regarding GDP per capita and the APW confirm the hypothesis expressed by the iso-
elastic utility function assumed in the EASA that the EMU (as societal inequality aversion) is 
constant across income level. The Government stability, openness and education spending 
variables have little (although significant) influence on the EMU, which also in a sense 
substantiates the EASA estimates – since these factors’ effect on the EMU are more easily 
explained by their influence on governmental decision-taking. On the other hand, the size of the 
population variable (LNPOP) is notably significant in terms of its influence on the EMU (one 
standard deviation in the LNPOP variable causes the EMU to vary about seven times its standard 
deviation). 92  
The influence of population size on EMU weakens my belief in the EASA technique somewhat 
but not much, given that the little influence of the other statistically significant variables 
capturing political and economic factors and the statistical insignificance of GDP per capita and 
wages (APW) attest the validity of the technique. Moreover, the estimates of EMU from the 
EASA do not vary much and they did seem to match estimates of EMU obtained using other 
quite different techniques even if these estimates refer to other contexts (as shown in chapter 
1).93  
                                                          
91 Here such variable is understood more as a political than a demographic aspect, given it is viewed as 
more likely to affect how Governments approach inequality than to affect how inequality averse people 
are. 
92 In what follows I describe how much (in terms of standard deviations) the variables considered in my 
study cause the EMU to vary: 1sdDEPRATIO – 0.42sd(i.e. 0.168)EMU; 1sdGOVSTAB – 0.0675sd(i.e. 
0.027)EMU; 1sdOPENNESS – 0.5sd(i.e. 0.2)EMU; 1sdLNPOP – 7sd(i.e. 2.8)EMU; 1sdEDUCEXP – 0.25sd(i.e. 
0.1)EMU. 
93 It also must be noticed that when robust SEs are used just OPENESS and EDUCEXPEND are statistically 
significant, and their influence on the EMU is not significant in terms of magnitude. It is also the case when 
robust SEs are used with time dummies instead of time trend. These results reinforce the conclusion that 
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Appendix 2.A – Optimal taxation theory (brief review) 
 
In the usual literature about optimal taxation, the individual utility depends both on (post-tax) 
income and labour supplied [𝑈(𝑌, 𝐿)]. Sheshinski (1972) works within such framework and 
assumes a linear tax system.94 This is represented by 
𝑇(𝑍) = 𝑡𝑍 − 𝐺,         (2A.1) 
where 𝑍 corresponds to income earned and is given by 𝑍 = 𝑤𝐿 (𝑤 being the wage rate), 𝑡 
represents the tax rate and 𝐺 a guaranteed minimum income. 𝑌 is given by 
𝑌 = 𝑍 − 𝑇 = (1 − 𝑡)𝑤𝐿 + 𝐺.         (2A.2) 
The revenue constraint is given by 
𝐺 + 𝑅0 = 𝑡 ∫ 𝑤𝐿𝑑𝐹
∞
𝑙
,         (2A.3) 
where 𝑙 is a critical wage rate in the sense that 𝐿(𝑤) > 0 for 𝑤 > 𝑙, 𝑅0 is governmental net 
revenue, 𝐹(𝑤) represents the cumulative ability distribution and the government maximizes a 




,                        (2A.4) 
where Ψ(𝑈) is concave and increasing with 𝑈.95 The resulting Lagrangean can be written as 
𝐿 = ∫ [Ψ + 𝜆(𝑡𝑤𝐿 − 𝐺 − 𝑅0)]𝑑𝐹
∞
𝑙
.       (2A.5) 





















= 0       (2A.7) 
with respect to t. 
                                                          
94 Sheshinski (1972) treats utility as a function of consumption and labour supply. I follow Atkinson and 
Stiglitzs (1980) presentation where utility is shown as a function of income and labour. 
95 The concavity degree of Ψ in this context indicates the governmental inequality aversion, or 
governmental attitude toward redistribution. 
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By working on these conditions Dixit and Sandmo (1977) put the optimal tax rate problem in a 






,          (2A.8) 
where 𝑏 is the net social marginal valuation of income in terms of revenue, i.e., a measure of 
the social benefit of transferring 1 currency unit (CU) (in terms of government revenue) allowing 
for the marginal tax paid on receiving this extra 1 CU (Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980)96 and 𝜖𝐿𝐿 is 
the compensated labour supply elasticity.97 
Then in the case considered the optimal tax depends on the (compensated) elasticity of labour 
supply and on the covariance between marginal social valuation of income and income.  
 
  
                                                          






), where 𝛼 is the individual marginal utility of income and 
𝑀 is income (Atkinson and Stiglitzs, 1980). 
97 Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980) also present a conclusion regarding the lump-sum amount 𝐺 given by 𝑏 =
1, meaning that 𝐺 must be adjusted up to the point where the average 𝑏 is 1. 
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Appendix 2.B – The probabilistic voting model (brief review) 
 
Hettich and Winer (1988 and 1999) are concerned with a theory capable of explaining the actual 
choices of governments towards a given tax structure. For this they propose an objective 
function of the form 
𝐸𝑉 = ∑ 𝜋ℎ
𝐻
ℎ=1 = ∑ 𝑓ℎ(𝐼ℎ)
𝐻
ℎ=1 ,                                                                            (2B.1) 
where 𝐸𝑉 stands for Expected Vote and is relative to a specific political party, 𝐻 is the total 
number of individuals and the subscript ℎ refers to one individual; 𝜋ℎ is the probability of an 
individual ℎ to vote for the party concerned and is equal to a function of the difference (𝐼ℎ) 
between the benefits of taxation for individual ℎ [𝑏ℎ(𝐺)], which depend on the services received 
by a pure public good 𝐺, and the opposition to taxation [𝑐ℎ(𝑣ℎ)], which depends on the loss in 
full income 𝑣ℎ,
98 such that 
𝜋ℎ = 𝑓ℎ(𝑏ℎ(𝐺), 𝑐ℎ(𝑣ℎ)) = 𝑏ℎ(𝐺) − 𝑐ℎ(𝑣ℎ) = 𝐼ℎ.                                 (2B.2) 
The tax applied to a given individual (𝑇ℎ) is given by a tax rate (𝑡ℎ) multiplied by the individuals 
taxable activity (𝐵ℎ). Assuming there is no administrative cost for the government to know 
voters response to taxation, that individuals see no relation between 𝐺 and their tax burden and 
that they do not care about how others are affected by taxes and benefits, the governments 
problem is to choose a tax rate to each voter in order to maximize equation 2B.1 subject to the 
following budget constraint 
𝐺 = ∑ 𝑡ℎ𝐵ℎ
𝐻
ℎ=1 .          (2B.3) 
The first order conditions include 
𝜕𝑓ℎ/𝜕𝐼ℎ.𝜕𝑐ℎ/𝜕𝑡ℎ
𝐵ℎ(1+𝜀ℎ)
= 𝜆,         (2B.4) 
where ℎ is the elasticity of 𝐵ℎ with respect to 𝑡ℎ and 𝜆 is the Lagrange multiplier relative to 




− 𝜆𝐻ℎ=1 = 0.          (2B.5) 
The interpretation of equation 2B.4 is basically that the marginal political cost (numerator) of 
raising one currency unit of revenue by increasing tax burden (denominator) must be equal 
                                                          
98 The loss in full income (𝑣ℎ) is given by 𝑣ℎ = 𝑇ℎ + 𝑑ℎ  where 𝑑ℎ is the welfare cost of taxation for the hth 
voter. 
99 Notice that 𝐵ℎ(1 + ℎ) = 𝜕𝑇ℎ/𝜕𝑡ℎ. 
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across the taxpayers, or that the optimum tax structure is the one which minimizes the total 
political costs for a certain revenue required. Equation 2B.5 complements 2B.4 basically pointing 
that the size of government (revenue collected and spent) will be adjusted up to the point where 
the marginal political benefit of spending one more currency unit on public services equals the 
common marginal political cost (Hettich and Winer, 1999).100  
By equation 2B.4 one can conclude that if two groups or persons present the same political cost 
(tax base elasticity) related to increasing marginally their tax burden but different tax base 
elasticity (political cost), the Government would adjust the latter by varying tax rates up to the 
point where both equal to 𝜆. Assume marginal revenue levied is decreasing in tax burden. Then, 
if a group presents higher marginal political cost (and same base elasticity) than the other, its 
tax burden would be lowered (raising thus the marginal revenue to be obtained by increasing 
tax rate) in order for its marginal revenue to reach the point where equation 2B.4 is satisfied. In 
the case where both group present the same political cost but one of them has higher base 






                                                          
100 The model can be extended to encompass different activities, to consider the choice of the number of 
tax brackets and special provisions, but once we are dealing just with taxes levied on income and the 
relation between number of brackets and progressivity is ambiguous, we do not go further. 
93 
 
Appendix 2.C – Endogeneity tests for statistically significant variables 
 
I test endogeneity for the statistically significant variables (i.e. the variables shown to be 
significant on table 2.5) in two ways. In the first I run 5 IV fixed-effects panel regressions using 
all the variables presented on table 2.5. For each regression I test endogeneity101 for one 
significant variable [using the lagged (1) variable of the variable under investigation as an 
instrument]. The results are shown on table 2C.1. In the second I run one IV fixed-effects panel 
regression using the same variables shown on table 2.5 and test endogeneity for all 5 significant 
variables as a group (again using lagged variables as instruments). The results are also shown on 
table 2C.2.   
Table 2C.1. Endogeneity test for each significant variable and for all significant variables as a 
group 






Grouped variables Chi-squared (5) stat. (H0=exogenous) 
- 10.412° 
Source: see text. Notes: (1) Robust covariance matrices are used throughout theanalysis ; (2) ** indicates the 
relevant coefficient is significant at 1%, * at 5% and ° at 10%. 
The overall conclusion to be taken from table 2C.1 results is that although LNPOP is endogenous, 
the significant variables are exogenous as a group. However, it must be noticed that despite 






                                                          
101 More specifically, I apply the “difference-in-Sargan” test for endogeneity.  
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Chapter 3: The Causality Relationship Between Income Inequality and the 
Income Tax Progressivity 
 
3.1. Introduction 
There have been many works investigating the redistributive effects of taxes (e.g. Echevarria, 
2012; Stanovnik and Verbic, 2014; Cooper et al., 2015; Joumard et al., 2012; Verbist and Figari, 
2013; Kakwani, 1977; Musgrave et al., 1948).102 In general, these studies imply one of the uses 
of tax progressivity, and more specifically income tax progressivity, can or should be to tackle 
pre-tax income inequality, confining themselves to the examination of how well the mechanism 
works, or would work.  
This view on how PIT and income inequality relate to one another is currently the subject of 
much political rhetoric. Sanders, Corbyn and Melenchon (candidates in the US, UK and French 
most recent presidential elections, respectively), for example, have both called for highly 
progressive income taxes as a central plank of their campaigns. In Sanders’ campaign website103 
it is stated that “the issue of wealth and income inequality is the great moral issue of our time, 
it is the great economic issue of our time, and it is the great political issue of our time.” The first 
topic proposed to solve the ‘issue’ is “demanding that the wealthy and large corporations pay 
their fair share in taxes.” In context, it means more progressive taxes.  
Despite all of the rhetoric (and the fact that all of the above political campaigns were narrowly 
unsuccessful), few works have examined what factors cause administrations to propose the tax 
schedules that they do and thus whether income inequality is even an issue considered by tax 
policy proposers. As far back as 1980, Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980: 293) declared in their classic 
textbook “redistributive impact … has been analysed in terms of the effect of a specified set of 
tax and expenditures, but no attempt has been made to examine how particular types of policy 
came to be adopted.” A review of the literature reveals that little has changed since then in 
terms of studies concerning the determinants of income taxes.   
Despite the lack of empirical evidence, some recent works (Scheve and Stasavage, 2016; Zolt, 
2009; Piketty, 2014) suggest that if ever the mechanism whereby increases in inequality were 
met by a more progressive income tax schedule worked it has now stopped working. Not 
                                                          
102 These works can be loosely classified in two groups: empirical studies measuring the phenomenon (e.g. 
by examining inequality in post- and pre-tax income distributions) and theoretical works presenting 





because income tax progressivity has no redistributive power, but because Governments do not 
seem to take it into consideration to set income tax schedules (or have for some reason stopped 
doing so). The only statistical evidence we have on causality (Scheve and Stasavage, 2016) 
suggests that indeed Governments do not react to growing inequality by using PIT progressivity. 
At the same time the tendency towards greater income inequality (figure 3.1, taken from 
Piketty, 2014, illustrates this point) has raised much concern, which brings up questions 
regarding the best and feasible instruments to deal with it.   
Figure 3.1. The top decile income share 
Source: Piketty (2014). 
An interesting example of how income tax is often seen as a means to tackle inequality can be 
found in Piketty’s (2014) celebrated book. In a section dedicated to the analysis of income tax 
he uses historical data on top income tax rates104 to demonstrate how the UK and the US were 
the first countries to use income tax to prevent high levels of income inequality, but stopped 
using it in such way in the 1980s, possibly (he argues) due to the sensation other countries were 
catching-up with them economically. The argument is basically that when a Government sets 
income tax rates at 70% or 80% (and the US and UK Governments were the first to do that in a 
sustained way until about the 80s; see figures 3.2 also taken from Piketty, 2014) its primary 
intention cannot be to increase revenue, and thus the objective must be to decrease inequality. 
He goes on to describe progressive taxes as a “relatively liberal method for reducing inequality” 
(Piketty, 2014: 505), given they do not involve “absolute prohibition or expropriation”. He 
argues the US should go back to use income taxes to address inequality. 
                                                          














Piketty sees with worry that income taxes are no longer being used to fight inequality in the US, 
arguing democracy itself is at risk of being captured by a few due to such inaction. As he puts it 
“the history of the progressive tax over the twentieth century suggests that the risk of a drift 
toward oligarchy is real and gives little reason for optimism about where the United States is 
headed” (Piketty, 2014: 514). In other words, he fears large inequality levels because, among 
other things, it is becoming possible for the very rich to acquire enough power to impose their 
will over the majority’s. Therefore, the issue investigated in this work can be of great importance 
not just economically, but also politically. 
Figure 3.2. Top income tax rates, 1900-2013 
Source: Piketty (2014). 
Piketty (2014) argues that, taxation is “perhaps the most important of all political issues”, and 
“at the heart of every major political upheaval lies a fiscal revolution”, such that it is crucial to 
understand its determinants, among which are the determinants of income tax schedules. 
However, there are remarkably few empirical works in this respect and just one (to the best of 
my knowledge) formally investigating causality between PITP and inequality, which stresses the 
relevance of the present analysis in the debate regarding not just the determinants of income 
taxation, but also regarding the determination of taxations systems in general.    
Given the recent importance attached to this issue it is no surprise that two prominent US 
academics have recently taken up the challenge to investigate causality between income 
inequality and tax progressivity. Scheve and Stasavage (2016) (henceforth SS) deepen the 
analysis done in Scheve and Stasavage (2010) (which is reviewed in chapter 2) and statistically 
test causality between inequality and tax progressivity. They are to my knowledge the only ones 



















be mentioned that my research was already underway when SS published their book, which is 
testimony to the interest in this area).  
SS’s main objective is to establish whether Governments do in fact consider pre-tax income 
inequality in order to define income tax schedules, and although this is the issue that concerns 
us most, there are also reasons to believe PITP systematically affects pre-tax income inequality 
too. To see this notice there are many possible reactions to income taxation, such as substituting 
work hours for leisure, evading taxes, reclassifying earnings or exerting less effort in work (which 
can be seen as a form to exercise the work-for-leisure substitution), all of which can potentially 
affect pre-tax income inequality as a result of income taxes. 
As income taxes decrease disposable income from work, the cost of leisure also decreases. Then 
by the ‘substitution effect’ one can anticipate an increase on demand for leisure. By the ‘income 
effect’, on the other hand, one can predict demand for leisure decreases (assuming leisure is a 
normal good) (Ehrenberg and Smith, 2012). Given there is no reason to believe these two effects 
balance each other and that the strength of the effects can vary across individuals at different 
points of the income distribution, it is reasonable to expect changes in income taxes to affect 
labour supply and therefore pre-tax income inequality. Tax evasion and avoidance (which 
includes reclassification of earnings) have been much studied mainly due to the fact they are 
widely practised (Fisher, 2014; House of Lords, 2013; Sikka and Willmott, 2013; degl’Innocenti 
and Rablen, 2016; Alm and Finlay, 2012). Since there is no reason to believe these practices (by 
which people pay less tax than they should according to the law) are used equally across people 
with different income levels, it is also reasonable to expect they also affect pre-income 
inequality.    
In their investigation of factors causing tax progressivity, SS give 3 main reasons as to why 
democracies would resort to progressivity to stop inequality. The first is that the more inequality 
increases the more voters would find it is in their interest to tax more heavily the rich given their 
higher ability to pay. The second stems from the idea inequality of income reflects inequality of 
opportunity, such that more progressive taxation (among other things like public spending on 
education, health, etc.) would serve as a way to compensate for such inequalities. The third is 
related to the possibility an elite would disproportionately influence the political system.  
Given these hypotheses as to why there could be a causal relationship between the two 
variables, they test it by using top marginal rates of income taxation to measure progressivity 
and top gross income shares to measure income inequality. Their yearly data covers 20 countries 
(all democracies) and goes from 1900 to 2010. They obtain their progressivity index from 
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consulting the countries’ legislations and their income inequality indices are based on income 
tax returns.105  
They use Granger non-causality tests with country fixed effects and time effects (period fixed 
effects or common time trends) in their analysis.106 For both dependent and independent 
variables they use running five-year average values throughout their study. Their investigation 
is restricted to a one-lag analysis and there is no consideration given to the variables’ 
stationarity. 107 
They conclude top marginal rates Granger cause gross income inequality, but surprisingly find 
little evidence to support the reverse causality. It suggests progressivity has indeed effects on 
the pre-tax income distribution, but the pre-tax income distribution does not drive progressivity. 
This is, although PITP can impact gross inequality, that is not why it exists. Such a conclusion is 
consistent with their hypothesis that compensation for luck and privileges (mainly those granted 
by Governments), like the ones that influenced mass war mobilization for the first and second 
World Wars, and not income inequality, is the main factor causing progressivity to vary.  
To be more specific, SS make the point that although it is largely agreed income taxes should be 
designed based on the principle of ‘treating citizens as equals’, the meaning of equality in such 
context is far from consensual. Nonetheless, they present the ‘ability to pay’ doctrine and the 
‘compensatory theory’ as the main criteria through which an income tax schedule can be 
defined as treating citizens equally or not. The first criterion basically defines a tax schedule is 
treating citizens as equals when people subjected to it are taxed according to their ability to pay, 
which results in progressive schedules. However, it is clear that if income earned is proportional 
to productivity and effort, it is not fair to tax the rich more heavily. 
The second criterion implies income tax schedules treat citizens as equals when they 
compensate for privileges that caused some to accrue more wealth than others. Thus, if it is 
assumed luck and having good contacts, for instance, play an important role in accumulating 
riches, progressive taxes would be justified. SS argue throughout their book that this principle is 
                                                          
105 The top income shares are from The World Top Incomes Database, a work led by Tony Atkinson, 
Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez. The top marginal rates are obtained by SS and assistants.    
106 They also make another analysis related to testing correlation between PITP and income inequality. 
Since it does not address causality between top income shares and top rates we do not consider it herein. 
Moreover, although they find no correlation between the variables, other works (e.g. Roine et al., 2009; 
Galli, 2002; Egger et al., n.d.) find it, which further justifies an analysis of causality. 
107 However, they notice the results of the tests are qualitatively similar when they “use the first value of 
the five-year period for the dependent and independent variables”, when they “use the first value of the 
dependent variable and its lag and the mean value of the independent variable”, and when they “estimate 
the models using annual data with two-period lags”.  
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the most effective to impel administrations to set progressive schedules. If that is the case, 
however, the primarily goal of imposing more progressive income taxes cannot be to react to 
inequality, but to compensate for privileges. Their argument in favour of the ‘compensatory 
theory’ receives support from testing the causality between the degree of tax progression of the 
income schedule and income inequality. 
I assert that my work improves SS’ causality analysis in many different ways. In first place, we 
use the liability progression (LP) and residual progression (RP) (both first presented in Musgrave 
and Thin, 1948) measures of progressivity at the Average Production Wage (APW). Both are 
traditional measures of progressivity, which are calculated at the APW108 and give a much more 
accurate account of progressivity than the top marginal rates used by SS.  
Secondly, my data includes local tax and Social Security Contributions (SSC) in addition to just 
national taxes, as in SS. Although they claimed to have included local taxes (which is discussed 
in more detail below), they do not consider SSC in their published analysis. Given SSCs can be 
regarded as very similar, if not essentially the same, as income taxes (Reed and Dixon, 2005; 
Adam and Loutzenhiser, 2007), it is arguably very important to include them in taxation.109  
Thirdly, I use the GINI index to measure inequality, which is also more considerate of the whole 
income distribution than the top income shares used by SS.   
Fourthly, given that I use time series to perform the causality tests, I address standard 
stationarity issues (which SS do not do despite the fact their analysis involves time series). I also 
carry out the tests for many lags (not just for one as in SS). Although they add time effects 
(common time trend or year dummies) to their analysis, which may alleviate or eliminate 
spurious correlation, they do not test the effectiveness of this measure, such that it is not certain 
whether their variables are stationary. Needless to say, stationarity is central in a Granger non-
causality analysis, which is the base of my (and their) statistical testing. 
Fifthly, and perhaps most importantly of all besides the Granger non-causality test, we use the 
Granger non-causality in heterogeneous panels test (Dumitrescu and Hurlin, 2012; henceforth 
DH test), whose alternative hypothesis identifies causality for a subgroup of the panels (the null 
                                                          
108 One of the best approximations for most people’s income, since labour income is usually the main 
component of income and other elements of income are harder to observe. 
109 To illustrate the point consider taxation in the UK in 2007 at the APW (single people) according to our 
dataset (EuroPtax). More than 30% of the total income taxes paid are due to NICs (SSC). In France, it is 
almost 50%. In Norway the communal tax rate (11.71%) for the APW (2007 and single people) is higher 
than the national tax rate (10.03%), and in Denmark the difference between local and national income 




hypothesis of non-causality refers to all panels) and allows for the testing parameters (the 
autoregressive parameters and the regression coefficients slopes) to vary across them. More 
details are given in the sections to come, but the basic advantages just outlined render this test 
far more general than the usual Granger non-causality test, which makes it more relevant when 
one wishes to make wider assertions of the type made by SS. 
Using the conventional Granger non-causality test we find evidence suggesting causality from 
income tax progressivity to pre-tax income inequality only, similarly to SS’s results. However, 
when we use DH test we find evidence suggesting causality in both directions. This shows two 
things: there is a behavioural response from workers because tax progressivity alters gross 
earnings, and Governments do indeed change tax progressivity as a result of gross earnings 
inequality. The fact that the conventional causality tests do not show causality from inequality 
to progressivity but the DH tests do is most plausibly because different countries have different 
decision-making processes regarding income inequality. 
It is also valuable to notice that besides being a measure of inequality aversion, the Elasticity of 
Marginal Utility (EMU or 𝜂) estimated in chapter 1 (by the EASA) can be regarded as a measure 
of progressivity (as discussed in chapter 2). It implies the level of progression in the income tax 
reflects the Government’s and society’s degree of inequality aversion, which in turn suggests 
causality from pre-tax income inequality to PITP. This is, implies that Governments 
systematically react to inequality in pre-tax incomes when setting income tax schedules. Thus, 
the causality pattern found confirms the intuition of the EMU estimates derived in chapter 1.  
Notice to test the causal relation referred above it makes more sense (like in SS) to examine 
gross instead of net income distributions; net income is by definition being affected by 
progressivity. In other words, if Governments are to react to income inequality with more 
progressive income tax schedules, then it is necessary that the inequality be in the pre-tax 
income distribution, once the post-tax income distribution will reflect the progressivity of the 
income tax implemented.  
In the next section I review the literature regarding causality between the two variables of 
interest. In section 3 I give more details on the measures used to describe income inequality and 
tax progressivity, underlining their advantages and disadvantages compared with those used in 
SS. In section 4 I describe my dataset and contrast it with that of SS. In the fifth section I present 
the results and discuss them. The sixth section concludes. 
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3.2. Literature review 
For the literature review I made two searches on EconLit and also examined the relevant 
references cited by SS. I look for works that, as in SS and the present study, aim to formally 
investigate (i.e. by using statistical causality tests) causality between gross income inequality 
and income tax progressivity.110 To begin with however I present more details on SS’ study and 
then turn to the papers identified by the reviews carried out with EconLit and the SS references.  
The overall objective in SS’s work is to investigate the main factor driving income tax 
progressivity. The first thing they do is to present some common ideas about its determinants 
(among which is the one that “democracies tax the rich when inequality is high”). Then they 
focus on the most common and persuasive arguments to obtain political support to implement 
more progressive income tax schedules: the ability to pay doctrine and the compensatory 
theory. Both of them are criteria based on which a given income tax schedule can be regarded 
as ‘treating citizens as equals’ or not. They are key matters to be considered when deciding the 
tax system to be implemented. 
The ability to pay doctrine basically claims it is fair that those who possess more, being thus able 
to pay more, be subject to a higher tax burden. The idea that Governments should react to 
income inequality with more progressive income tax follows directly from it. The compensatory 
theory, on the other hand, is based upon the opinion that progressive tax is fair when used to 
compensate privileges obtained by a class, specially privileges provided by the Government.        
A possible argument opposing progressivity when based on the ability to pay doctrine is that it 
is not plausible to oblige someone to pay more based only on the fact he earns more, especially 
if earnings are understood as proportional to effort or contribution to society. Moreover, one 
can argue it is not certain that transferring income from rich to poor increases overall happiness 
as stated by standard utilitarian theory, for it is not possible to know how much utility is lost or 
earned by the different agents.  
Regarding the compensatory argument, it is often claimed the imbalance caused by the 
Government in favour of or to the detriment of different groups in society should be solved 
instead of compensated with income taxes. It is also worth mentioning that perhaps the most 
salient argument in economics against tax progressivity, which states it degenerates the 
mechanism of incentives in the economy rendering it inefficient, is applicable to any increase in 
                                                          
110 Notice works presented at chapter 2, which show correlation between income inequality and 
progressivity (see table 2.2) can also be regarded as contributing to this analysis. Mainly Egger et al. (n.d.), 
which explicitly consider pre-tax income inequality. 
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progressivity, no matter whether it is based on the ability to pay doctrine or on the 
compensatory argument.111      
The main hypothesis empirically tested in SS’ study is that mass war mobilizations as occurred 
in World War I (WWI) was the leading driver of income tax progressivity. The rich agreed to pay 
higher taxes whilst the sons of the poor went to war. They believe it is also a way to empirically 
test the efficiency of compensatory arguments in comparison with ability-to-pay arguments in 
pushing income tax progressivity since general conscription gave raise to very powerful 
compensatory arguments.  
Their results suggest that indeed compensatory arguments are more effective. They argue rich 
people were less likely to be conscripted,112 and were in many cases earning more than usual 
due to the war, such that the situation was clearly propitious to the use of compensatory 
arguments, which indeed led Governments to tax the wealthy much more heavily than before. 
Moreover, general conscription referred only to the need for labour, such that the necessity for 
capital in the war effort was unattended. It again gave room for compensatory arguments 
demanding for the ‘conscription of capital’ in order to compensate for the ‘conscription of 
labour’ already taking place. 
They also include in their study analyses in which they examine whether democracy or worries 
about growth (economic efficiency) can be regarded as the main driver of income tax 
progressivity. According to their results none can. Concerning their analysis examining the 
association between the institution of democratic states (identified with the establishment of 
male universal suffrage) and progressivity, they compare the periods at which countries 
established universal suffrage and adopted progressive taxes to see whether those 
democratizing first are also the first to set progressive income tax schedules. They find it is not 
the case, concluding democratization is not the central factor leading to more progressive 
taxation. It is important to notice that in this analysis they give more weight to progressivity in 
inheritance tax, given it takes less administrative capacity (which can vary much across countries 
                                                          
111 Taxes (including income taxes) generate distortions in the economy by changing the way prices are 
perceived by agents (consumers and producers). It precludes Pareto optimum equilibria and generates 
social welfare loss. The only kind of taxes causing no distortions and social welfare loss are lump-sum 
transfers, but their application is politically and financially unfeasible. They are highly unpopular and since 
there is no proportion between the amount to pay and ability to pay it would be difficult to raise as much 
revenue as usual tax systems do. 
112 To be more specific, they claim rich were probably more apt to get service exemption. One of the 
reasons for that, they argue, has to do with the fact that the possibility of getting the referred service 
exemption was related with being aged, which is associated with higher wealth levels.   
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and influence the results) to tax inheritance than to tax income. Their conclusion, however, 
refers to progressiveness in general and therefore includes income taxation.   
Concerning their analysis of whether worries about economic growth affect tax policies, they 
examined if Governments experiencing economic recession or slow down cut taxes in order to 
reverse the situation. They found no evidence of that, concluding it also does not play a central 
role in determining the degree of progressivity of tax systems. They also point out their goal is 
not to assess the soundness of the theories asserting there is a relationship between taxes and 
economic efficiency, but just to evaluate their influence on actual tax policies.  
They also approach the issue of whether the movements in progressivity are related to elites 
capturing the states. They once again conclude there is not enough evidence to establish 
whether this factor is the main driver of progressivity. In the analysis concerning the topic they 
observe tax schedules in countries in which political campaigns are financed privately and 
countries where private financing is limited. Given they fail to find a relationship between how 
campaigns are financed and progressivity they conclude it is also not a central factor for the 
topic under scrutiny. 
The part of SS’s work which interests us most is the one in which they test causality between 
pre-tax income inequality and tax progressivity with the intention to check whether the idea 
that progressivity is caused by pre-tax income inequality is sound. They make use of the standard 
Granger non-causality test in order to examine the issue. Progressivity is captured by top 
marginal income tax rates and income inequality is captured by top pre-tax income shares (i.e. 
the income share of the 1% and 0.01% most rich individuals).  
To be more specific about the methodology, they implement the following model: 
𝑇𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑡         (3.1) 
𝐼𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑡,         (3.2) 
where 𝑇 represents top marginal rates and 𝐼 represents top income shares.113 Notice besides 
individual fixed effect parameters (𝜂𝑖) they include period fixed effect parameters (𝜃𝑡) (or 
common time trends, although it is not shown in the equation)114 and a constant (𝛼) which 
despite being included in SS is necessarily omitted in a model with fixed effects.  
                                                          
113 As noted in the introduction they use 5-years means.  
114 They include two specifications regarding time effects in the analysis: one with time trend and the 
other with period fixed effects parameters. 
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The 𝜂𝑖  and 𝜃𝑡 (or common time trends) have the objective to capture effects of potential causal 
variables not included in the model. Although they may help to alleviate such problems there is 
no analysis of the variables’ stationarity, which raises concerns regarding spurious correlation 
between them. Also notice their analysis, for the most part, includes just 1 lag order.115    
Their results suggest there is causality from progressivity to pre-tax income inequality, but not 
from inequality to progressivity. It is consistent with their hypothesis that income inequality is 
not central to explain movements on the income tax progressivity level, and thus arguments 
relying on the first are not likely to affect the latter. The findings suggest debates organized 
around income inequality are politically too weak to affect Governments’ decisions regarding 
income tax schedules.  
Below we argue, among other things that considering more appropriate progressivity and 
inequality measures and using a more general causality test that allows for parameters to vary 
across panels yields results suggesting there is causality in both directions (i.e. from progressivity 
to inequality and the reverse). It supports the idea that the “inequality argument” is more 
effective than portrayed by SS.       
SS cite three works which also analyse association between the concerned variables. None of 
them however, use statistical causality tests to approach the issue. Two of them (Sokoloff and 
Zolt, 2006 and Zolt, 2009) investigate possible effects of income inequality on tax schedules and 
the other (Roine et al., 2009) focus on the determinants of income inequality, being top tax rates 
one of the explicative variables included in the analysis. Below I give more details and comment 
on the works referred. After I proceed to my independent literature review undertaken using 
EconLit.116 
Sokoloff and Zolt (2006) compare tax systems (but in general, not just income tax) in Latin 
America and North America (United States and Canada) in order to get insight into whether 
gross income inequality (which is very high in Latin America) influences how tax systems are 
built.  
They find there is not much difference between North and South American countries’ tax 
regimes at the national level, but at the local level they find more regressive tax schedules in 
Latin America. Such findings suggest it is important to consider local taxes in addition to just 
                                                          
115 They run other regressions and obtain the same qualitative result (see introduction). The model 
presented corresponds to their main specification.  
116 They are presented in chronological order and then commented on. I must note Sokoloff and Zolt 




national taxes when investigating the relation between inequality and progressivity: something 
that SS did not do. This is, tax systems might look very different in terms of regressivity 
depending on whether local taxes are included in the investigation or not. This substantiates my 
decision to use a dataset which includes not only income taxes but quasi-income taxes. 
Zolt (2009) use long run data on United States local and state taxes to investigate, among other 
things, the link between the level of taxation and income inequality. They do that mainly by 
examining correlation between income inequality (measured by GINI coefficients and top 
income shares) and property taxes in the different periods considered (from the Colonial Period 
to the Civil War, from Civil War to World War II and Post World War II). The relation under 
consideration changed considerably along the years, being noticeable at the beginning of the 
analysis (from about the American Civil War), but non-existent at the end of the 20th century.   
One of the possible explanations the author gives for the noted change in the relation between 
taxing patterns and inequality over the years has to do with empirical evidence (he refers to 
Rhode and Strumpf, 2003) supporting the view that higher heterogeneity (of individual public 
good preferences and public good provisions) within communities leads to convergence in their 
taxing and spending policies (irrespective of the inequality level). This understanding suggests 
(to the extent we can transpose the view from communities to countries) the degree of 
heterogeneity in a country’s population may affect how inequality and taxes relate in a country. 
The analysis is consistent with Piketty’s (2014) description of how the US and the UK used 
income taxes to address inequality from the period between World Wars to the 1980s referred 
in the introduction.  
Finally, Roine et al. (2009) investigate determinants of gross income inequality by running 
dynamic first differences and first differenced GLS models with a panel of 16 countries over the 
twentieth century. The tax progressivity and income inequality indices used are reminiscent of 
those considered in SS’s (top marginal statutory tax rates and top income shares). They 
admittedly do not empirically test causality, but assume progressivity is one of the factors driving 
income inequality. 
The difference between their inequality index and that of SS is that they examine shares of 
different top income percentiles117. Regarding progressivity they use two measures. The first is 
a combination of top rates and rates paid by those with income equal to five times the GDP per 
                                                          
117 They investigate shares at three different income distribution percentiles: the top 1%, the top 10% to 




capita; the second consists of the full set of statutory rates (it is not available for all countries). 
The reason to use the combination referred in the first measure instead of just top rates is that 
top statutory marginal rates have been, in practice, applied in varying degrees on top incomes 
both across countries and across years within a country. They find that progressivity reduces top 
income shares. 
Both Sokoloff and Zolt (2006) and Roine et al. (2009) highlight some drawbacks of SS’s tax 
progressivity index (national top marginal statutory tax rates). The first suggests that local taxes 
are an important factor to examine when studying the relationship addressed herein and the 
second unveils the problem that top marginal rates are often not binding at high income levels 
(i.e. high earners have more means to pay less than it is stipulated by the referred rates).  
The two issues regarding SS’s tax progressivity index raised below are addressed in the present 
research, given we include local taxes in our analysis and also calculate the two progressivity 
indexes at the APW, a much lower income level than the ones referring to the top marginal rates 
but one of relevance to many more people.  
Now I turn to the literature review undertaken in EconLit. In the first research (done last time 
on February of 2017) the following search terms were used: TX118 “tax progressivity” AND TX 
“income inequality” AND TX causality. Since no works were retrieved I searched again using just 
the first two terms: TX "tax progressivity" AND TX "income inequality". Fourteen articles in 
English were retrieved. None of them use statistical tests to examine causality between 
inequality and progressivity, but 2119 investigate the relationship under investigation herein, 
such that they are kept and reviewed. 
The works retrieved but not used in the literature review were excluded due to the following: 
assuming the relationship under investigation without further analysing it; examining variables 
which both inequality and progressivity are hypothesized to affect; just comparing methods to 
measure the distributional effects of tax schedules without addressing the issue considered 
herein; comparing progressivity across countries using different measures of progressivity and 
inequality (which are needed to derive the progressivity measures used) again without 
addressing the issue of how the variables relate; restricting their analysis to the correlation 
between tax progressivity and net income inequality.       
                                                          
118 TX indicates the term was searched through the works whole text.  
119 Roine et al. (2009), one of the works cited by SS (the only one published in an economics journal), was 
retrieved but has already been presented. 
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Now I give more detail on each of the 2 works found to be of some relevance and then comment 
on them. 
Sarte (1997) assumes a Ramsey model which admits heterogeneity across individuals’ constant 
rate of impatience. It allows for a non-degenerated income distribution when agents are faced 
with progressive income tax schedules (which is not possible in the standard Ramsey context).120 
They assume a tax schedule based on the Equal Absolute Sacrifice Principle (EASP)121 and 
perform numerical simulations to investigate the effects of tax policies on income distribution. 
Their results suggest two main conclusions regarding the relationship between inequality and 
progressivity. The first is that in the model progressivity, as measured by the relative tax burden 
borne by the different income classes, is positively correlated with income inequality due to 
behavioural responses of wealthy agents and the increase of interest rates, which affect those 
at the bottom of the income distribution that borrow. The second refers to the long time it takes 
to tax policies to affect income distribution; it occurs mainly to the heterogeneous responses to 
such policies.  
It is important to notice in Sarte (1997) the results showing tax schedule changes may take a 
long time to affect income inequality underlines the importance of including many lags in an 
investigation into causality between progressivity and inequality.     
Thoresen (2004) analyses the reasons that led the Norwegian tax schedules to become less 
progressive in the 90s (between 1991 and 1999), focusing on the potential influence of tax 
reforms that took place in the period. In doing so they test the hypothesis that the referred 
reforms led to behavioural responses that caused pre-tax distributions to become more unequal 
thus rendering the tax system less progressive.122  
The referred test is based on the elasticity of gross income with respect to net-of-tax rate (one 
minus the marginal tax rate), which are estimated by two-stage least square regressions with 
panel data.123 Their dataset consists of income tax returns of 1,500 individuals for the period 
                                                          
120 As claimed by Ramsey (1928) and confirmed by Becker (1980), such variability across individuals in the 
standard Ramsey environment leads to all resources to be possessed by a single household (the most 
patient) due to the agents’ inability to adjust their rates of impatience to the interest rate. 
121 See chapter 1 for more details on the EASP. 
122 Since they use global measures of progressivity, which compare post and pre-tax income inequality in 
order to assess tax progression, it is not surprising that they associate larger pre-tax inequality to less 
progressivity. Nonetheless they continue to analyse such relation by testing whether changes in tax 
policies induced behavioural responses that affected pre-tax inequality, and in doing that they shed light 
on one of the main effect transmission mechanisms from tax progressivity to income inequality. 
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considered (9 years). They find the elasticity estimated ranges from 0 to 0.2, which suggests tax 
progressivity has some influence on pre-tax inequality due to behavioural responses to fiscal 
policy, though the magnitude is small.  
Both works find a relationship between inequality and progressivity, which supports their 
hypothesis of causality from the second to the first based on the idea that behavioural responses 
to tax policies affect pre-tax income distribution. In the present study we also hypothesize there 
is indeed such a behavioural response, but instead of just examining the correlation we test 
temporal causality between the variables. Moreover, we also hypothesize (and test) 
Governments reaction to pre-tax income inequality by increasing tax progressivity.  
3.3. Methodology  
In this section I contrast mine and SS’s methods to measure gross income inequality and 
progressivity and give more details on the causality tests used in both works, also contrasting 
them in order to underline how the present study adds to SS’s work. I also explain the procedure 
employed to test stationarity and finally give details on the implementation of the causality 
tests. 
3.3.1. Measurements 
SS make two analyses in order to verify whether the use of top rates is adequate to represent 
progressivity in general. In both they rely on the full schedules of statutory income tax rates for 
6 of the 20 countries (France, Germany, New Zealand, Sweden, UK and US) for 7 or 5 years (at 
25-years interval).124  
In the first analysis they examine whether top rates are non-decreasing with income. For all 
countries and years (with the exception of New Zealand in 1925) that is the case, which is 
interpreted as indicating higher top rates in general represent higher progressivity. In the second 
they examine how top rates relate to a more general index of progressivity which consists of 
subtracting the marginal tax rate relative to low incomes and the marginal tax rate relative to 
high incomes. They find a high correlation 0.93 between the two variables. Therefore, both 
analyses, it is claimed, suggest the use of top rates is satisfactory. 
                                                          
where 1 and 2 represent subsequent periods, 𝑋 stands for pre-tax income, 𝜏 stands for marginal tax rate, 
𝑅 represents other explanatory variables and 𝜂 the elasticity of pre-tax income with respect to net-of-tax 
rate. 
124 It is seven years (1875, 1900, 1925, 1950, 1975, 2000 and 2010) for the UK and Sweden, 6 years (1900 
to 2010) for New Zealand and 5 years (1925 to 2010) for the US, Germany and France.   
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However, the fact that the marginal rates grow with income does not mean an increase in the 
top rate would represent higher progressivity, given a schedule can become flatter at the same 
time top marginal rates increase (or stagnate). As an example, take the UK in 2010 and 1925. 
Although the top rates are virtually the same, the 2010 schedule is much flatter. As the authors 
themselves notice “there is important variation in the rate of increase of the statutory marginal 
rates among cases with similar top marginal income taxes”, which “can matter for how the 
income tax system influences the income distribution, and it is not captured by the top statutory 
rate measure” (SS, 2016, n.8 of chapter 3). 
Moreover, although the difference between marginal rates at the top and bottom of the income 
distribution are more representative of the general progressivity than top marginal rates, it is 
quite inexact in many instances, given two tax schedules can be very similar in the extremes, but 
very different in the middle. A good example is France in 1950 and 1925. Both schedules have 
virtually the same top and bottom marginal tax rate, but the schedule in 1925 was visibly more 
progressive. 
In order to obtain a PITP index more representative of that experienced by taxpayers in general, 
we calculate the Residual Progression (RP) and Liability Progression (LP) progressivity indexes 
(Musgrave and Thin, 1948) at the APW. At such a point the indexes reflect how progressive the 
income tax schedule is for most people. Thus, although both are local progressivity measures 
(i.e. do not give information on the whole tax schedule) when calculated at a representative 
point as the APW they become representative themselves.125  
Top marginal income tax rates indicate progressivity not because it shows the average tax rate 
increases with income, but because in general an increase in the top marginal rate is not 
succeeded by a proportional (or higher) increase in the lower marginal tax rates. The LP and RP 
progression measure, on the other hand, show (for a given income level) whether the average 
income tax rate grows with income, which is the standard definition of progressivity.  
Now we briefly consider how the two measures are defined and how they relate to the stated 
progressivity definition. According to the LP measure of PITP (Musgrave and Thin, 1948) an 
income tax schedule can be defined as progressive if 
(𝑑𝑇(𝑦)/𝑇(𝑦))/(𝑑𝑦/𝑦) > 1,           (3.3) 
                                                          
125 See Appendix 3.E for a brief discussion of global progressivity measures. 
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where (𝑑𝑇(𝑦)/𝑇(𝑦))/(𝑑𝑦/𝑦) is the elasticity of the tax raised with respect to income (𝑦 




> 1,            (3.4) 
where MTR is the marginal tax rate and ATR is the average tax rate. Notice that the higher the 
MTR is with respect to the ATR, the more progressive the income tax schedule is considered (at 
the income level concerned) according to the index.126 
Another well known progressivity index is the RP measure, also proposed by Musgrave and Thin 
(1948), which is given by the elasticity of the post-tax income with respect to pre-tax income. In 




< 1,                       (3.5) 
Which after simple manipulation yields 
(1 − 𝑀𝑇𝑅(𝑦))/(1 − 𝐴𝑇𝑅(𝑦)) < 1.          (3.6) 
To see that both indexes stem from the progressivity definition that a tax function can be 
regarded as progressive when the ATR increases with income (𝑑𝐴𝑇𝑅(𝑦)/𝑑𝑦 > 0), we present 


















𝐿𝑃(𝑦) > 1 ⇔ 1 −𝑀𝑇𝑅(𝑦) < 1 − 𝐴𝑇𝑅(𝑦) ⇔
1−𝑀𝑇𝑅(𝑦)
1−𝐴𝑇𝑅(𝑦)
= 𝑅𝑃(𝑦) < 1.      (3.7) 
Notice thus that progressivity in the RP and LP measure imply 𝑑𝐴𝑇𝑅/𝑑𝑦 > 0. 
Another important addition regarding the progressivity measures is that we include national and 
local statutory tax rates, besides the Social Security Contributions (SSC),127 in the calculations 
relative to the indexes. SS examine the issue of whether it makes much difference to include 
local taxes and find it does not, although they do not give much detail on the tests performed 
with tax data including local taxes.128 I, however, find (as pointed in the introduction) that the 
SSC has considerable importance in income taxation and include it in the analysis, which adds to 
                                                          
126 Notice the LP is very similar to the EMU (𝜂) calculated in chapter 1, where we have that 𝜂 =
ln(1 − 𝑀𝑇𝑅) /ln⁡(1 − 𝐴𝑇𝑅). It shows clearly that the 𝜂 can also be interpreted as a measure of income 
tax progressivity.  
127 Referred as National Insurance Contributions (NIC) in the UK and in chapter 1. 
128 They collect local taxes assuming the subject lives in the largest city of the country, and then including 
the local taxes relative to such place.   
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the accuracy of the progressivity measures calculated. Moreover, our dataset considers tax 
systems subtleties related to marital status and number of dependent children.129   
Concerning gross income inequality, SS use top income shares, more specifically the shares of 
the top 1% and 0.01%, while we use the GINI index. They do not analyse how their income 
inequality index relate to other indices, probably leaning on the fact the famous analysis by 
Piketty (2014) relies on top income shares (both works use the same database regarding top 1% 
and top 0.01% income shares). 
Piketty (2014) dedicates a short section explaining why he uses top income shares instead of 
indices like GINI, which claim to indicate in one number all inequality information contained in 
the whole income distribution. He basically argues that the GINI is an over simplification, given 
that inequality at different income levels have difference economic and political meanings, 
which should be analysed separately. Two other aspects he points to are that the GINI does not 
differentiate between income coming from labour and capital and give an abstract view of 
inequality, not allowing people to realize its meaning in their own experience. 
Although these are legitimate criticisms, the fact remains that indexes like the GINI give (at least 
theoretically, given it is a global measure) a better description of inequality in the whole income 
distribution. To be sure they are simplifications, but nonetheless able in my opinion to convey 
more information about inequality than top income shares. 
Regarding the issue of not dividing income between earned by labour or capital, although that 
is an important issue in Piketty’s (2014) analysis it is not relevant in the present study. We want 
to know whether the relation between PITP and gross income inequality irrespective of whether 
taxation and inequality refer to income earned by labour or capital. 








𝑖=1 ,           (3.8) 
where 𝑥𝑖 is individual’s income, 𝑛 is the number of people and ?̅? is the mean value of incomes. 
The index is better understood with reference to the Lorenz curve, which plots the cumulative 
percentage of income against the cumulative percentage of population. For any given income 
distribution, the index is equal to twice the area between the diagonal (which represents perfect 
equality) and its Lorenz curve. It is scale independent, so a proportional change in all individual’s 
                                                          
129 We examine tax rates assuming single individuals. 
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income does not change the coefficient value and it satisfies the Pigou-Dalton principle of 
transfers, according to which any transfer from a poor to a rich person increases inequality.130        
3.3.2. Causality testing  
In the present study the term causality refers to the concept of ‘Granger causality’, which 
basically means there is causality between two variables when past values of one significantly 
affect the current values of the other. There are two basic assumptions upon which the concept 
of Granger causality is predicated: that past or present cause the future, but the reverse is not 
possible and that the causing variable has unique information regarding the caused variable 
(Granger, 1980). If a candidate causing variable contains redundant information, then it is not 
clear it is causing, giving there is another variable providing the same information regarding the 
dependent variable.     
Bi-variate Granger non-causality tests in panel data context are computed by using regressions 
of the following kind: 
𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾𝑘
𝑘
𝑘=1 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−𝑘 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘
𝑘
𝑘=1 𝑥𝑖,𝑡−𝑘 + 𝑖,𝑡,        (3.9)  
where 𝑖 represents the panel, 𝑡 represents time period, 𝑘 represents lag order, 𝛾 and 𝛽 are 
parameters to be estimated (auto-regressive and slope parameters, respectivelly), and  
represents the error. In the case of the equation above causality from 𝑥 to 𝑦 is being tested.  
To implement the test both variables must be stationary. Once the regression is run, the null 
hypothesis of non-causality is not rejected if and only if the joint lagged variables of the 
independent variable is not significant. The test has been applied to several contexts. Foresti 
(2006) and Mahdavi and Sohrabian (1991), for example, use it to examine causality between 
economic growth and stock prices. Shyamal and Rabindra (2004) investigate causality between 
energy consumption and economic growth; Kónya (2006) analyse causality between exports and 
growth and Lin and Ali (2009) investigate causality between economic inequality and military 
spending. All use the causality testing technique described above.   
Dumitrescu and Hurlin (2012) develop a panel causality test based on the panel Granger non-
causality test referred above (the Granger non-causality in heterogeneous panels, referred here 
as DH) which has two important features to the present study: a) it allows the testing parameters 
to vary across panels, which makes for a more general causality test; b) the alternative 
                                                          
130 Yet another reason for us to use the GINI is that for this index we have data covering all the countries 
considered, while we have no data for Belgium concerning top income shares. 
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hypothesis divides the panels in two groups, for one of which there is causality between the 
panels.  
Notice the first feature of the DH test makes it possible to detect causality even if the regression 
specification is different for the countries, and the second allows us to test whether non-
causality is general or valid just for a subgroup of countries. Unfortunately, if the alternative 
hypothesis is not rejected the test does not give information on the panels in which causality is 
present. Although quite new the test has already been applied in various contexts. Liddle and 
Messinis (2015), for example, use it to investigate causality between urbanization and economic 
growth, whereas Paramati et al. (2016) apply it to examine the effect of foreign direct 
investment and stock market growth on clean energy use and Salahuddin et al. (2016) utilize it 
to analyse the effects of Internet usage and economic growth on CO2 emissions.131 
The test is based on the following model 
𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾𝑖
𝑘𝑘
𝑘=1 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−𝑘 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖
𝑘𝑘
𝑘=1 𝑥𝑖,𝑡−𝑘 + 𝑖,𝑡,      (3.10)      
which is importantly different to the one assumed in the Granger non-causality test in that it 
allows the testing and autoregressive parameters to vary across the panels. Assuming the two 
variables132 are stationary and that the cross-sections are independent the following statistic 




(𝑊 − 𝐾),          (3.11) 
where 𝑁 is the number of panels, 𝐾 is the lag order and 𝑊 is the average of the usual Granger 
non-causality test calculated for each panel. Weighing the statistics for unbalanced panels 
renders  
?̅? = √𝑁 [𝑊 − 𝐾 ×
(𝑇𝑖−2𝑘−1)
(𝑇𝑖−2𝐾−3)





],     (3.12) 
where 𝑇𝑖 represents the periods specific to each country.  
                                                          
131 Many of these works (e.g. Paramati et al., 2016 and Salahuddin et al., 2016), as the present study, use 
Eviews to implement the test. A version of Lopez and Weber (2017) working paper presenting the STATA 
command xtgcause to run the test reported there is an error on the Eviews code, but after some further 
investigation it was shown there is no error in the Eviews code 
(http://forums.eviews.com/viewtopic.php?t=18349).   
132 It is designed for bivariate models. 
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The standard DH test assumes that the lag length is the same across all the panels. If different 
lag lengths are used across panels there is an adjustment for 𝑍. However, there is no guidance 
regarding the optimal lag length in Dumitrescu and Hurlin (2012).  
Finally, we can state the null hypothesis for the DH test as indicating no Granger causality from 
the independent to the dependent variables for all panels considered. The alternative 
hypothesis, on the other hand, indicates the existence of Granger causality from the 
independent to the dependent variable for at least one of the panels considered. 
The null can thus be algebraically represented as 𝑥𝑖¬→ 𝑦𝑖, where 𝑥 represents the independent 
variable, 𝑦 the dependent variable, 𝑖 = 1, 2, … ,𝑁 the panels under investigation and the arrow 
stands for Granger causality from 𝑥 to 𝑦. On the other hand, the alternative hypothesis can be 
represented by 𝑥𝑡 → 𝑦𝑡, where 𝑡 stands for a non-empty subset of 𝑖. 
3.4. Data description 
In this section I present the summary statistics concerning the three variables considered in the 
research and give details on their sources. 
Table 3.1 shows the summary statistics for the GINI, the RP and the LP variables. Both the LP and 
RP were calculated using income tax data obtained from the EuroPTax dataset. The GINI 
coefficients were obtained from the UNU-WIDER World Income Inequality Database (WIDER).   
Table 3.1. Summary statistics for the GINI, the RP and the LP 
Var Mean Stdev Median Max Min NbObs133 
GINI 41.47 6.32 41.6 54.7 19.9 407 
RP 0.84 0.11 0.87 1.23 0.43 453 
LP 1.3830 0.28 1.34 2.78 0.52 453 
Source: see text. 
With the EuroPTax database it is possible to obtain the national and local income tax rate plus 
the SSC rate for any income level;134 moreover it gives the APW for each country and year 
considered. With such information it is simple to calculate the RP and the LP. The EuroPTax 
provides data from 9 European countries from the 50s or 60s (varies across countries) to 2007. 
The countries are: UK, Sweden, Norway, Ireland, Italy, Germany, France, Denmark and 
Belgium.135 
                                                          
133 Therefore for a lag order of 1 the causality tests count with 398 observations. 
134 However, the higher the income level entered the less trustworthy the income tax returned is. 
135 See chapter 1 for more details on the EuroPTax. 
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The WIDER dataset provides GINI coefficients from many studies for all the nine countries 
covered by the EuroPTax dataset and many others. The period covered varies across countries, 
being 1974 to 2007 the shortest coverage (for Italy). In several years there was more than one 
GINI value available so an average of them was used in the study.  
Moreover, although we just used the GINI coefficients derived from studies using pre-tax 
income, there is some variation in the income definition used by these studies; for example, 
some use gross income and others gross monetary income, the difference being regarding the 
inclusion or not of in-kind incomes.136 Once the dataset does not provide observations for all 
years we use linear interpolation to complete the series. 
In order to provide an easy way to visualize the data we present below the GINI and the LP and 
the RP (in augmented scales in order to improve visualization) as averaged across countries 
(figures 3.3 and 3.4) and including the series for all countries together (figures 3.5 and 3.6) 
(charts considering only one country are shown in Appendix 3.B). 
Figure 3.3. The GINI coefficients and the LP index 
Source: see text. Notes: 1) The GINI coefficients from years 1949 to 1956 are regarding the UK alone; for 1957 it 
corresponds to the average between the UK and Norway; for 1958 onwards it corresponds to the average across the 
UK, Sweden and Norway; in 1960 Germany enters the series; in 1962 France enters the series; in 1963 Denmark enters 
the series; in 1969 Belgium enters the series; in 1973 Ireland enters the series and finally on 1974 Italy enters the series. 
2)  The LP index, from 1949 to 1956 it concerns to the UK alone; in 1957 Norway enters the series; in 1958 Sweden, 
Ireland, Germany and France enter the series; in 1959 Denmark enters the series; in 1960 Italy enters the series and 
                                                          
136 The income definitions included in the study are the following (they go as in the WIDER guide version 
3.0b; see the guide for details regarding each definition): gross income; monetary gross income; market 
income, factor income and primary income; taxable income; ‘income…’ In cases where the definition is 
given as ‘income…’ there is no information about whether the income is pre or post-tax. However, given 
that it occurs just 27 times from 240 and in many cases (14 times) the coefficient is complemented by 
other estimates (obtained with pre-tax income) for the same year and country, we decided to include 











finally in 1963 Belgium enters the series. 3) We multiply the LP index by 12 in order to make it easier to visualize how 
the two variables behave.  
Figure 3.4. The GINI coefficients and the RP index 
Source: see text. Notes: 1) The GINI coefficients from years 1949 to 1956 are regarding the UK alone; for 1957 it 
corresponds to the average between the UK and Norway; for 1958 onwards it corresponds to the average across the 
UK, Sweden and Norway; in 1960 Germany enters the series; in 1962 France enters the series; in 1963 Denmark enters 
the series; in 1969 Belgium enters the series; in 1973 Ireland enters the series and finally on 1974 Italy enters the series. 
2)  The RP index, from 1949 to 1956 it concerns to the UK alone; in 1957 Norway enters the series; in 1958 Sweden, 
Ireland, Germany and France enter the series; in 1959 Denmark enters the series; in 1960 Italy enters the series and 
finally in 1963 Belgium enters the series. 3) We multiply the RP index by 14 in order to make it easier to visualize how 
the two variables behave.  
In charts (figures) 3.3 and 3.4 we see all the three series tend to fall for a period and then resume 
growth. In the cases of the RP and the LP the series stabilizes after rising and in the case of the 
GINI coefficients it continues to grow. Both the LP and GINI variables stop falling around the 
middle 70s; since then the GINI coefficients keep on an upward trend, whilst the LP grows up 
until to the early 80s and then stabilizes. On the other hand the LP index retakes growth very 
timidly around the middle 80s, stabilizing in the middle 90s. 
Although no conclusion can be taken from such chart analysis, the progressivity indexes and the 
GINI seem to be related mainly before the middle to late 80s, which is reminiscent of Zolt’s 












Figure 3.5. The GINI and the LP for the countries separately 
Source: see text. Note: The LP is multiplied by 10 in order to facilitate visualization  
Figure 3.6. The GINI and the LP for the countries separately 
Source: see text. Note: The RP is multiplied by 12 in order to facilitate visualization. 
In charts (figures) 3.5 and 3.6, on the other hand, we see that although the overall tendency of 
the GINI showed in figures 3.3 and 3.4 is confirmed, the pattern displayed by the LP and RP is 
different. In both cases the variables vary around a central value (10 for the RP and just over 10 
for the LP). However, there are countries that clearly stand out from the general pattern in 
certain periods (in the case of the LP, see Denmark in the middle 60s, Belgium in the middle 70s 
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Finally, the analysis of the individual charts (see Appendix 3.B) shows there are significant ways 
in which the GINI (e.g. Sweden and Germany) and the progressivity indices (e.g. in the UK and 
Ireland) vary, which stresses the importance of allowing the countries to have different 
functional forms in order to capture causality, as the DH test does.  
3.5. Results and discussion 
In this section I present the results for the stationarity tests and causality tests.  
3.5.1. Stationarity tests 
We investigate whether the LP, RP and GINI variables are stationary by using 5 panel unit root 
tests: Levin, Lin and Chu (2002); Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003); Fisher-type tests using ADF and PP 
tests (Maddala and Wu, 1999 and Choi, 2001), and Hadri (2000). 
The first two and Hadri’s (2000) test make use of common unit root process, i.e. assume the 
persistence parameter does not vary across cross-sections. The others allow for such variability. 
For all tests the null hypothesis is of non-stationarity, with the exception of Hadri’s (2000), which 
could not be used due to the variables being highly autocorrelated. Below I give more details on 
how the two groups of tests differ and on why the results from the Hadri test were not 
considered. 
Consider the following Auto-Regressive (AR) panel process: 
𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜌𝑖𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑋𝑖,𝑡𝛿𝑖 + 𝑖,𝑡,         (3.13) 
where 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 represents exogenous variables, 𝜌𝑖 the persistence parameters and the errors 𝑖,𝑡 are 
independent. If |𝜌𝑖| < 1, 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 is stationary; if |𝜌𝑖| = 1, on the other hand, it contains a unit root 
and cannot be regarded as stationary.   
Some tests (those assuming common unit root process) assume the persistence parameters are 
the same across panels, so 𝜌𝑖 = 𝜌, while others allow the parameter to vary across the 
countries.   
Regarding the Hadri test simulations have shown the test is subject to size distortion when the 
variable concerned is highly autocorrelated. To be more specific, the simulations show it over-
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rejects the null hypothesis of stationarity. Given all three variables considered in the study 
present this characteristic,137 we conclude the Hadri test is not appropriate.138  
Finally, we use the Akaike criterion to obtain the optimal lag orders required to implement all 
the stationarity tests. Table 12 presents the stationarity results regarding the LP, RP and GINI. 
Given almost all of the tests (the only exception is the PP test, regarding the GINI coefficient) 
confirm the variables are stationary, we can proceed to implementing both the Granger non-
causality and the DH tests with the variables in levels. 
Table 3.2. Stationarity tests for the GINI, RP and LP (H0=not stationary) 

























Source: see text. Notes: The numbers in parenthesis are probability values. ** indicates the relevant coefficient is 
significant at 1%; * at 5%. 
3.5.2. Causality tests 
For the analysis done with the standard Granger non-causality test we included up to 10 lag 
orders. The optimal lag length is 1 for both the analysis considering the LP and RP.139 Table 3.3 
shows the results for causality between the LP and the GINI variables.  
The results strongly suggest there is no causality from income inequality to tax progressivity, but 
on the other hand present weak evidence (see 5, 6 and 7 lag orders) of reverse causality. Such 
conclusion is essentially the same as SS’s. Table 3.4 presents the results regarding causality 
between the RP and the GINI coefficients. They are very similar to the results displayed in table 
3.3 thus suggesting the same conclusion stated previously.   
Table 3.3. Results for causality between the LP and the GINI using standard Granger non-
causality test 
Null hypothesis Lag order F-statistics N. Obs. 















                                                          
137 See Appendix 3.A to see the autocorrelation tests regarding the variables.  
138 We think it is important to give some explanation about the issue concerning the Hadri test because 
the standard procedure to test stationarity is to have some tests whose null hypothesis indicates 
stationarity and others whose null indicates non-stationarity.  
139 To obtain the optimal lag length we consider the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). 
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GINI does not Granger 
Cause LP 
10  0.38927 
(0.9509) 
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The numbers in parenthesis are probability values. ** indicates the relevant coefficient is significant at 1%; * at 5%. 
Table 3.4. Results for causality between the RP and the GINI using standard Granger non-
causality test 
Null hypothesis Lag order F-statistics N. Obs.  






































































































The numbers in parenthesis are probability values. ** indicates the relevant coefficient is significant at 1%; * at 5%. 
Given the standard non-causality test null-hypothesis is regarding all countries, the final 
conclusion derived from the testing is also regarding all countries, and it is consistent with SS’s 
findings. Although there is no evidence of causality from inequality to progressivity we can reject 
the null of non-causality in the other direction (although there is not much evidence to support 
it at the optimal lag length of 1). In other words, the results basically suggest Governments do 
not react to income inequality with more progressive income tax schedules, and provide some 
equivocal evidence that tax progressivity affects pre-tax income inequality. Thus, following the 
basic Granger causality testing procedures our findings are at odds with the idea that one of the 
main uses of income taxes is to fight income inequality.    
Now we do the same analysis using the DH test instead of the standard Granger non-causality. 
Table 3.5 shows the results for the LP and the GINI. This time we consider just 9 lag orders 
because it is the maximum possible for the DH test given the number of observations available. 
The results show there is a striking difference between using the standard Granger and the DH 
causality test, namely that bidirectional causality is observed at almost all lag orders when the 
DH technique is implemented. It strongly suggests (the only exceptions occur with 8 and 9 lag 
orders, presumably because the reduced number of observations) a group of countries (at least 
one) within the nine uses tax progressivity as a tool to combat income inequality, i.e. income 
inequality causes income tax to become more progressive.  
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Table 3.6 presents the results for the RP and the GINI (also in this case the maximum lag order 
is 9). They confirm the hypothesis just discussed, although less strongly (lag orders 1 and 2 show 
causality just from RP to GINI, while lag orders 7, 8 and 9 show causality in the opposite 
direction). 
Table 3.5. Results for causality between the LP and the GINI using the DH causality test 
Null hypothesis Lag order W-statistics Zbar-statistics 
GINI does not Granger 
Cause LP 
1 3.60539 4.93657** 
(8.E-07) 
LP does not Granger Cause 
GINI 
1 3.67146  5.06437** 
(4.E-07) 
GINI does not Granger 
Cause LP 
2 4.75149 3.52490** 
(0.0004) 
LP does not Granger Cause 
GINI 
2 4.35398 2.99329** 
(0.0028) 
GINI does not Granger 
Cause LP 
3 10.7278 8.01411** 
(1.E-15) 
LP does not Granger Cause 
GINI 
3 8.28067 5.41192** 
(6.E-08) 
GINI does not Granger 
Cause LP 
4 11.2274 6.19194** 
(6.E-10) 
LP does not Granger Cause 
GINI 
4 10.9529 5.94718** 
(3.E-09) 
GINI does not Granger 
Cause LP 
5 18.3880 9.95097** 
(0.0000) 
LP does not Granger Cause 
GINI 
5 14.6830 7.11207** 
(1.E-12) 
GINI does not Granger 
Cause LP 
6 30.7995 16.0914** 
(0.0000) 
LP does not Granger Cause 
GINI 
6 12.0999 3.67988** 
(0.0002) 
GINI does not Granger 
Cause LP 
7 16.5873 5.03138** 
(5.E-07) 
LP does not Granger Cause 
GINI 
7 11.9540 2.38684* 
(0.0170) 
GINI does not Granger 
Cause LP 
8 16.2051 3.36024** 
(0.0008) 
LP does not Granger Cause 
GINI 
8 11.3394 1.05639 
(0.2908) 
GINI does not Granger 
Cause LP 
9 21.1481 3.49531** 
(0.0005) 
LP does not Granger Cause 
GINI 
9 10.6966 -0.01993 
(0.9841) 
The numbers in parenthesis are probability values. ** indicates the relevant coefficient is significant at 1%; * at 5%. 
Table 3.6. Results for causality between the RP and the GINI using the DH causality test 
Null hypothesis Lag order W-statistics Zbar-statistics 
GINI does not Granger 
Cause RP 
1 1.75012 1.34821 
(0.1776) 
RP does not Granger 
Cause GINI 
1 10.4149 18.1072** 
(0.0000) 
GINI does not Granger 
Cause RP 




RP does not Granger 
Cause GINI 
2 3.95963 2.46590* 
(0.0137) 
GINI does not Granger 
Cause RP 
3 8.37511 5.51234** 
(4.E-08) 
RP does not Granger 
Cause GINI 
3 7.13914 4.19808** 
(3.E-05) 
GINI does not Granger 
Cause RP 
4 11.7504 6.65839** 
(3.E-11) 
RP does not Granger 
Cause GINI 
4 9.84256 4.95704** 
(7.E-07) 
GINI does not Granger 
Cause RP 
5 22.6581 13.2229** 
(0.0000) 
RP does not Granger 
Cause GINI 
5 11.7747 4.88366** 
(1.E-06) 
GINI does not Granger 
Cause RP 
6 44.0337 24.8754** 
(0.0000) 
RP does not Granger 
Cause GINI 
6 10.6335 2.70664** 
(0.0068) 
GINI does not Granger 
Cause RP 
7 16.6151 5.04725** 
(4.E-07) 
RP does not Granger 
Cause GINI 
7 9.34525 0.89786 
(0.3693) 
GINI does not Granger 
Cause RP 
8 14.6153 2.60751** 
(0.0091) 
RP does not Granger 
Cause GINI 
8 9.11899 0.00508 
(0.9959) 
GINI does not Granger 
Cause RP 
9 41.4124 10.3110** 
(0.0000) 
RP does not Granger 
Cause GINI 
9 10.1178 -0.21459 
(0.8301) 
The numbers in parenthesis are probability values. ** indicates the relevant coefficient is significant at 1%; * at 5%. 
Thus, the general conclusion based on these results is that we cannot rule out causality from 
PITP to pre-tax income inequality (that countries use income tax to tackle income inequality) 
when the causality-testing technique used allows coefficients to vary across panels. The 
different test results are probably due to the arguably different ways that countries react to 
inequality. Such variation is not detected by the standard Granger causality, but can be grasped 
to some extent by the DH causality test, in which auto-regressive and slope coefficients vary 
with country.  
There are several works investigating factors determining inequality aversion, and therefore 
pointing out variables potentially causing countries to treat inequality differently. Standard 
public choice economics, for example, considers current income position as key to the degree 
of inequality (e.g. Romer, 1975, Meltzer and Richards, 1981), whereas expected future income 
is pointed out as an important factor by works like Hirschman (1973) and Bénabou and OK 
(2001). Hirschman (1973), for example, argues future income expectance may cause countries 
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developing fast to be less inequality averse, given in such countries there tends to be more 
people expecting their income to be increasing in the future.  
Mobility experience – i.e. positive or negative past experiences concerning one’s career – can 
also be pointed out as a potential cause of the degree of inequality aversion (e.g. see Alesina 
and Ferrara, 2001), given its relationship with earnings expectance. More specifically, earning 
expectations tend to be higher if past experiences regarding earnings are positive. Also, Piketty 
(1995) points out that mobility experience is likely to be related to beliefs regarding the costs of 
redistribution. This is, those who had positive experiences regarding their careers tend to believe 
the income distribution depends more on effort than individuals who had negative experiences. 
Piketty (1995)’s argument stresses the importance of perceptions of the determinants of 
income generation (e.g. hard work vs luck for example) to the determination of the degree of 
income inequality. Also, perception of actual income inequality and legacy of communist 
ideology (see Suhrcke, 2001) are examples of factors potentially causing countries to treat 
inequality differently.  
The results also suggest that the EMU parameters estimated in chapter one are based on 
reasonably solid grounds (although they simplify the way in which income taxation is conducted) 
by substantiating the intuition implicit in the referred estimates that the degree of progressivity 
reflects inequality aversion. Moreover, it implies it is not accurate to portrait political rhetoric 
stressing problems related to income inequality as a way to push more progressive income tax 
schedules as being poorly effective.  
Notice I am not saying that compensatory arguments140 (described by SS as the most powerful 
explanation for increased progressivity) are less effective than the inequality one. I just point 
out that the evidence provided here finds the arguments favouring progressivity based on 
income inequality as more effective than in SS’s study. In other words, the evidence suggests 
Governments in general understand income tax progressivity should be used to combat income 
inequality and use it with such a purpose. However, as Piketty (2014) and Zolt (2009) point out, 
the intensity with which it is used for the aforementioned purpose varies over time (and 
probably over country).  
                                                          
140 This is, the idea that Governments tax the rich more heavily (increase progressivity) when it is clear 
they have privileges which are not granted to the rest of the population as a way to compensate the 
general public.  
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To check the robustness of SS’s findings we run standard Granger non-causality tests and DH 
causality tests using SS’s dataset.141 In this analysis the index of pre-tax income inequality are 
the top 1% and 0.01% income shares and the index of tax progressivity is the top marginal 
income tax rates.142 The top rates data cover 20 countries from 1900 to 2010; the top 1% income 
share data covers 18 countries and the top 0.01% income share data covers 14 countries (in both 
cases the period covered varies across countries). All results regarding the analysis are shown in 
Appendix 3.C. 
Before applying the causality tests, we check whether the variables are stationary at level. The 
results show we cannot reject this hypothesis, so we run the causality tests with the variables in 
levels. We must notice that in the same way with the RP, LP and GINI, the top marginal rates 
and top income shares are highly autocorrelated, which makes the Hadri (2000) stationarity test 
unreliable.   
The standard Granger non-causality tests results show bidirectional causality between top rates 
and both top 1% and 0.01% income shares at most lag lengths (we consider up to 10 lags). At 
the optimal lag length we have bidirectional causality between top rates and the top 1% and 
causality from top 0.01% income share. Such findings are indeed very different from SS’s results, 
also based on Granger non-causality, which suggests their findings regarding the issue are 
somewhat fragile.  
The DH causality tests also show similar results; for almost all lag lengths there is causality 
between income inequality and progressivity.143 All these results confirm the findings presented 
earlier, also suggesting there is bidirectional causality between inequality and progressivity.  
We also analyse the SS dataset (top rates and top income shares) and the dataset for this study 
(LP, RP and GINI) in the same fashion as SS. This is, we include time fixed effects and time trends 
to control for variables potentially affecting both income inequality and progressivity. The 
analysis is carried out for annual data a lag length of 2. (The results for this analysis are presented 
on Appendix 3.D).     
To be more specific, the model implemented is the same one reviewed in the literature review 
regarding SS, but instead of one lag we include 2, and instead of using 5-years mean values we 
                                                          
141 It is basically an illustration of the importance of the DH methodology and a demonstration of the fact 
that the same findings are found across different datasets. 
142 The top marginal rates used by SS are available at http://press.princeton.edu/titles/10674.html and 
the top income shares are obtained from the World Wealth and Income Database. 




use annual data. Although this is not SS’s main specification, it is very similar to the specification 
they implement. 
The results regarding top rates and top 1% shares suggest there is causality from progressivity 
to income inequality only, as SS defend. However, the results obtained with top rates and top 
0.01% shares and with the GINI and the RP suggest bidirectional causality and causality from 
inequality to progressivity respectively (no causality was found with the GINI and the LP 
indexes).  These results demonstrate that even with the conventional Granger causality testing 
methodology the presence or absence of causality and also its direction depend greatly on the 
precise measures of inequality and progressivity employed. This stands in contrast to the robust 
results obtained using the DH procedure.  
I also run endogeneity tests between the GINI, the LP and the RP. I consider IV fixed effects panel 
regressions with time trend or time dummies, and use lagged variables for each considered 
variable as instrument. In all cases the endogeneity hypothesis was rejected. See Appendix 3.F 
for more details. 
3.6. Conclusion 
In this study we investigate causality between gross income inequality and tax progressivity. 
Income tax, something at the core of both economics and politics, is often thought of as one of 
the most powerful tools to counter income inequality, which in turn is often seen as a threat 
capable of undermining countries’ political and economic stability. Simultaneously tax 
progressivity can, according to standard economics theory, affect pre-tax income inequality via 
behavioural responses of the individuals affected by changes in the level of progressivity.  
Given the universal nature of income taxes there are strikingly few empirical works investigating 
income tax determinants; and the present investigation contributes to the literature by 
providing further work in the area. One of the main contributions consists of providing evidence 
which contradicts the only other substantive piece of research which suggests income inequality 
is of little relevance in determining the level of progression of income tax schedules.  
By shedding light on the causality issue we also contribute to future debates regarding 
Government action towards income inequality. According to the results obtained the call to use 
political rhetoric involving income inequality in order to increase progressivity reveals itself 
effective.    
Moreover, the causality relation from inequality to progressivity is supportive of the EASA 
method used in chapter 1, given that aversion to societal inequality is meant to lead to changes 
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in tax progressivity. Therefore, this chapter provides evidence supporting the basic intuition of 
the method used to obtain an estimate of EMU in chapter 1.  
Notice, however, that I am not saying the validity of the estimates derived in chapter 1 depend 
on the present analysis. It seems to me possible that there could be no causal influence and still 
the degree of tax progressivity could reveal something about inequality aversion. What I say is 
that since the EASA assume inequality aversion and progressivity move together and it makes 
more sense to think that inequality aversion causes progressivity, the causality relation 
supported by the evidence shown herein provides in turn some support for the EASA and EMU 
estimates obtained by it. 
Since I found just SS using statistical causality tests to address the issue I built on their work 
mainly by using more precise indexes of tax progressivity and gross income inequality, by 
checking issues related to stationarity that were overlooked in their analysis and finally by 
implementing more appropriate causality tests.          
The tax progressivity measures used in this study (the LP and RP calculated at the APW income 
level) are both more representative given the income level at which they are calculated are more 
representative of the population’s income level and both indices stem directly from the 
standard tax progression definition. GINI coefficients were used to measure income inequality. 
Compared to the top income shares used by SS, they provide more information on inequality 
throughout the whole income distribution. An issue with regards to using the GINI, however, is 
that some observations are obtained via interpolation. 
Part of the standard procedure to implement bivariate Granger non-causality is to test whether 
the variables considered are stationary. However, although SS use the standard causality test 
they overlook the stationarity testing of the variables indexing income inequality and tax 
progressivity. Thus another way we contribute to the understanding of causality between the 
two variables is by investigating stationarity of the variables involved. Our results suggest the 
inequality and progressivity measures used in the study are stationary in levels. 
Besides the Granger non-causality test we also resort to Dumitrescu and Hurlin’s (2012) Granger 
non-causality test in heterogenous panels test (DH test). This last test allows autoregressive and 
slope coefficients to vary across panels and is hence able to identify causality within a group of 
panels, thus providing more detailed information on causality between the variables.   
The Granger non-causality tests results suggest a conclusion very similar to the one given by SS, 
i.e. that although tax progressivity affects income inequality, governments do not tend to use 
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the first as a tool to address the second. Put simply, we find evidence that tax progressivity 
affects income inequality, but do not find evidence of causality in the reverse direction.   
The results regarding the DH test, on the other hand, show that gross income inequality affects 
tax progressivity. It is consistent with the hypothesis that countries use income tax as a means 
to address inequality. Some Governments (although perhaps not all) do indeed change tax 
progressivity as a result of gross earnings inequality, but there is also a behavioural response 
from workers because tax progressivity alters gross earnings. The fact that the conventional 
causality tests show no causality but the DH tests do is probably because different countries 
have different decision-making processes some of which are slow and unresponsive. 
I also must also note that contrary to what SS report when I analyse their data using conventional 
Granger tests I find bidirectional causality. I do not replicate perfectly their analysis, but because 
I use their data and the same causality testing technique, the same qualitative results were 
expected. This is a major surprise given that when I use conventional Granger tests and my 
dataset I find unidirectional causality. Nonetheless, it further substantiates the importance of 
using the DH methodology from the outset. Applying this methodology the results are 
unambiguous for both datasets.  
In summary, the results from the study suggest at least some Governments take inequality into 
consideration when proposing income tax schedules and thus that the political rhetoric 
describing income tax as a useful instrument to tackle the dangers of income inequality cannot 
be rejected as inefficient. It does not mean, however, that action via income taxes is 
instantaneously taken to avoid inequality, and that the latter is the only factor determining the 
form of tax schedules. The determination of such fiscal policy is certainly complex and, although 
the fact progressivity is not rising as fast as before, results imply inequality play a significant role 






Adam, S., & Loutzenhiser, G. (2007). Integrating Income Tax and National Insurance: An Interim 
Report. The Institute of for Fiscal Studies, Working Paper 21. 
Alesina, A. and E. La Ferrara (2005). Preferences for Redistribution in the Land of Opportunities. 
Journal of Public Economics, 89, 897-931. 
Alm, J., & Finlay, K. (2012). Who Benefits from Tax Evasion? Tulane Economics Working Paper 
Series. 
Atkinson, A. B. (1970). On the Measurement of Inequality. Journal of Economic Theory, 2(3), 
244-63. 
Atkinson, A. B., & Stiglitz, J. E. (1980). Lectures on Public Economics. Maidenhead: McGraw-
Hill. 
Becker, G. (1980). On the long mn steady state in a simple dynamic model of equilibrium with 
heterogenous agents. Quarterly Journal of Economics 95, 375-382. 
Bénabou, R. and E. Ok (2001). Social Mobility and the Demand for Redistribution: the POUM 
Hypothesis. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 447-487. 
Choi, I. (2001). “Unit Root Tests for Panel Data,” Journal of International Money and Finance, 
20, 249-272. 
Cooper, D. H., Lutz, B. F., & Palumbo, M. G. (2015). The Role of Taxes in Mitigating Income 
Inequality Across the U.S. States. 
degl’Innocenti, D. G., & Rablen, M. D. (2016). Income Tax Avoidance and Evasion: A Narrow 
Bracketing Approach. Public Finance Review, 1-23. 
Dumitrescu, E., & Hurlin, C. (2012). Testing for Granger Non-causality in Heterogeneous Panels. 
Economic Modelling, 29, 1450-1460. 
Echevarría, C. A. (2012). Income tax progressivity, physical capital, aggregate uncertainty and 
long-run growth in an OLG economy. Journal of Macroeconomics, 34, 955-974. 
Egger, P., Radulescu, D., & Rees, R. (n.d.). The Determinants of Personal Income Tax Progressivity 
Around the Globe. 
Ehrenberg, R. G., & Smith, R. S. (2012). Modern Labor Economics: Theory and Public Policy. 
Boston: Pearson. 
Fisher, J. M. (2014). Fairer Shores: Tax Havens, Tax Avoidance, And Corporate Social 
Responsibility. Boston University Law Review, 94, 337-365. 
Galli, E. (2002). Tax Progressivity and Economic and Political Determinants: an Empirical Analysis 
for the OECD Countries. SIEP XIV conference. 
Granger, C. W. J. (1980). Testing for Causality: a Personal Viewpoint. Journal of Economic 
Dynamics and Control, 2, 329-352. 
130 
 
Hadri, K. (2000). Testing for Stationarity in Heterogeneous Panel Data. Econometric Journal, 3, 
148-161. 
Hirschman, A.O. (1973). The Changing Tolerance for Income Inequality in the Course of 
Economic Development, with a Mathematical Appendix by Michael Rothschild. Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 87, 544-566. 
House of Lords: Select Committee on Economic Affairs. (2013). Tackling Corporate Tax 
Avoidance in a Global Economy: is a New Approach Needed? Report. 
Im, K. S., Pesaran M. H., & Shin Y. (2003). Testing for Unit Roots in Heterogeneous Panels. Journal 
of Econometrics, 115, 53-74. 
Joumard, I., Pisu, M., & Bloch, D. (2012). Tackling Income Inequality The Role of Taxes and 
Transfers. OECD Journal: Economic Studies, published online first. 
Kakwani, N. (1977). Measurement of tax progressivity: an international comparison. Economic 
Journal, 87, 71-80. 
Kesselman, J. R., & Cheung, R. (2004). Tax Incidence, Progressivity, and Inequality in Canada. 
Canadian Tax Journal, 52(3), 709-789. 
Kiefer, D. W. (1984). Distributional Tax Progressivity Indexes. National Tax Journal, 37(4), 497-
513. 
Levin, A., Lin C. F., & Chu C. (2002). Unit Root Tests in Panel Data: Asymptotic and Finite-Sample 
Properties. Journal of Econometrics, 108, 1-24. 
Liddle, B., & Messinis, G. (2015). Which comes first – urbanization or economic growth? Evidence 
from heterogeneous panel causality tests. Applied Economics Letters, 22(5), 349-355. 
Maddala, G. S., & Wu S. (1999). A Comparative Study of Unit Root Tests with Panel Data and a 
New Simple Test. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 61, 631-652. 
Meltzer, A. and S. Richards (1981). A Rational Theory of the Size of Government. Journal of 
Political Economy, 89, 914-27. 
Musgrave, R. A., & Thin, T. (1948). Income Tax Progression, 1929-48. Journal of Political 
Economy, 56, 498-514. 
Piketty, T. (2014). Capital in the Twenty-First Century. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press. 
Piketty, T., Saez, E., & Stantcheva, S. (2011). Optimal Taxation of Top Labor Incomes: A Tale of 
Three Elasticities. NBER Working Paper No. 17616. 
Piketty, T. (1995). Social Mobility and Redistributive Politics. Quarterly Journal of Economics 110 
(3), 551-584. 
Ramsey, F. P. (1929). A Mathematical Theory of Saving. The Economic Journal, 38(152), 543-559. 
Reed, H., & Dixon, M. (2005). National Insurance: Does it Have a Future? Public Policy Research, 
102-110. 
Reynolds M. O., & Smolensky, E. (1977). Public Expenditures, Taxes, and the Distribution of 
Income: The United States, 1950, 1961, 1970. New York: Academic Press. 
131 
 
Roine, J., Vlachos, J., & Waldenström, D. (2009). The long-run determinants of inequality: What 
can we learn from top income data? Journal of Public Economics, 93, 974-988. 
Romer, T. (1975 ). Individual Welfare, Majority Voting and the Properties of a Linear Income Tax. 
Journal of Public Economics, 7, 163-188. 
Sarte, P. G. (1997). Progressive Taxation and Income Inequality in Dynamic Competitive 
Equilibrium. Journal of Public Economics, 66, 145-171. 
Scheve, K., & Stasavage, D. (2010). The Conscription of Wealth: Mass Warfare and the Demand 
for Progressive Taxation. International Organization, 64, 529-561. 
Scheve, K., & Stasavage, D. (2016). Taxing the Rich: a History of Fiscal Fairness in the United 
States and Europe. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Sikka, P., & Willmott, H. (2013). The tax avoidance industry: accountancy firms on the make. 
Critical perspectives on international business, 9(4), 415-443. 
Sokoloff, K. L., & Zolt, E. M. (2006). Inequality and Taxation: Evidence from the Americas on How 
Inequality May Influence Tax Institutions. Tax Law Review, 59, 201-276. 
Stanovnik, T., & Verbic, M. (2014). Personal income tax reforms and tax progressivity in Slovenia, 
1991-2012. Financial Theory and Practice, 38 (4) 441-463. 
Suhrcke, Marc (2001). Preferences for Inequality: East vs. West. Innocenti Working Paper No. 
89. Florence: UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre. 
Thoresen, T. O. (2004). Reduced Tax Progressivity in Norway in the Nineties: The Effect from Tax 
Changes. International Tax and Public Finance, 11, 487-506. 
Verbist, G., Figari, F. (2013). The redistributive effect and progressivity of taxes revisited: An 
International Comparison across the European Union. GINI Discussion Paper 88. 
Zolt, E. M. (2009). Inequality, Collective Action, and Taxing and Spending Patterns of State and 






Appendix 3.A – Autocorrelation tests 
 
Autocorrelation tests for the LP, RP and GINI: 
LP:  
Date: 11/04/16   Time: 11:04    
Sample: 1948 2007      
Included observations: 453     
       
       
Autocorrelation Partial Correlation  AC   PAC  Q-Stat  Prob 
       
       
       .|***** |        .|***** | 1 0.730 0.730 242.83 0.000 
       .|****  |        .|.     | 2 0.559 0.057 385.71 0.000 
       .|***   |        .|.     | 3 0.433 0.015 471.73 0.000 
       .|***   |        .|.     | 4 0.364 0.062 532.47 0.000 
       .|**    |        .|*     | 5 0.351 0.113 589.18 0.000 
       .|***   |        .|*     | 6 0.353 0.083 646.70 0.000 
       .|**    |        .|.     | 7 0.308 -0.041 690.51 0.000 
       .|**    |        .|.     | 8 0.260 -0.010 721.77 0.000 
       .|*     |        .|.     | 9 0.208 -0.016 741.92 0.000 
       .|*     |        .|.     | 10 0.163 -0.021 754.29 0.000 
       .|*     |        .|.     | 11 0.119 -0.044 760.89 0.000 
       .|*     |        .|.     | 12 0.097 -0.001 765.29 0.000 
       .|.     |        .|.     | 13 0.068 -0.029 767.43 0.000 
       .|.     |        .|.     | 14 0.048 -0.006 768.52 0.000 
       .|.     |        .|.     | 15 0.022 -0.027 768.75 0.000 
       .|.     |        .|.     | 16 -0.000 -0.013 768.75 0.000 
       .|.     |        .|.     | 17 -0.001 0.030 768.75 0.000 
       .|.     |        .|.     | 18 -0.010 -0.014 768.79 0.000 
       .|.     |        .|.     | 19 0.001 0.036 768.79 0.000 
       .|.     |        .|.     | 20 -0.003 -0.009 768.80 0.000 
       .|.     |        .|.     | 21 -0.008 0.001 768.83 0.000 
       .|.     |        .|.     | 22 -0.013 0.003 768.91 0.000 
       .|.     |        .|.     | 23 -0.019 -0.010 769.09 0.000 
       .|.     |        .|.     | 24 -0.012 0.019 769.16 0.000 
       .|.     |        .|.     | 25 -0.017 -0.023 769.29 0.000 
       .|.     |        .|.     | 26 -0.015 0.003 769.39 0.000 
       .|.     |        .|.     | 27 -0.030 -0.039 769.83 0.000 
       .|.     |        .|.     | 28 -0.022 0.031 770.06 0.000 
       
       
    
RP: 
Date: 11/04/16   Time: 11:06    
Sample: 1948 2007      
Included observations: 453     
       
       
Autocorrelation Partial Correlation  AC   PAC  Q-Stat  Prob 
       
       
       .|******|        .|******| 1 0.788 0.788 283.15 0.000 
       .|***** |        .|*     | 2 0.658 0.098 480.97 0.000 
       .|****  |        .|*     | 3 0.574 0.078 631.91 0.000 
       .|****  |        .|.     | 4 0.501 0.023 747.34 0.000 
       .|***   |        .|.     | 5 0.455 0.055 842.45 0.000 
       .|***   |        .|.     | 6 0.430 0.069 927.81 0.000 
       .|***   |        .|.     | 7 0.395 0.005 1000.0 0.000 
       .|***   |        .|.     | 8 0.356 -0.008 1058.6 0.000 
       .|**    |        .|.     | 9 0.308 -0.035 1102.6 0.000 
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       .|**    |        .|.     | 10 0.259 -0.031 1133.7 0.000 
       .|**    |        .|.     | 11 0.224 0.002 1157.1 0.000 
       .|*     |        .|.     | 12 0.195 -0.005 1175.0 0.000 
       .|*     |        .|.     | 13 0.160 -0.032 1187.0 0.000 
       .|*     |        .|.     | 14 0.132 -0.013 1195.1 0.000 
       .|*     |        .|.     | 15 0.098 -0.034 1199.6 0.000 
       .|.     |        .|.     | 16 0.060 -0.035 1201.4 0.000 
       .|.     |        .|.     | 17 0.044 0.020 1202.3 0.000 
       .|.     |        .|.     | 18 0.023 -0.023 1202.5 0.000 
       .|.     |        .|.     | 19 0.009 0.006 1202.6 0.000 
       .|.     |        .|.     | 20 -0.001 -0.002 1202.6 0.000 
       .|.     |        .|.     | 21 -0.021 -0.027 1202.8 0.000 
       .|.     |        .|.     | 22 -0.033 0.002 1203.3 0.000 
       .|.     |        .|.     | 23 -0.047 -0.016 1204.4 0.000 
       .|.     |        .|.     | 24 -0.050 0.017 1205.6 0.000 
       *|.     |        .|.     | 25 -0.074 -0.060 1208.2 0.000 
       *|.     |        .|.     | 26 -0.073 0.026 1210.8 0.000 
       *|.     |        .|.     | 27 -0.079 -0.014 1213.8 0.000 
       *|.     |        .|.     | 28 -0.067 0.043 1216.0 0.000 
 
GINI: 
Date: 11/04/16   Time: 11:08    
Sample: 1948 2007      
Included observations: 407     
       
       
Autocorrelation Partial Correlation  AC   PAC  Q-Stat  Prob 
       
       
       .|*******        .|******* 1 0.906 0.906 336.33 0.000 
       .|******|        *|.     | 2 0.800 -0.115 599.15 0.000 
       .|***** |        .|.     | 3 0.708 0.028 805.88 0.000 
       .|***** |        .|*     | 4 0.642 0.074 975.87 0.000 
       .|****  |        .|.     | 5 0.583 -0.005 1116.7 0.000 
       .|****  |        .|.     | 6 0.539 0.056 1237.4 0.000 
       .|****  |        *|.     | 7 0.486 -0.078 1335.6 0.000 
       .|***   |        .|.     | 8 0.437 0.020 1415.4 0.000 
       .|***   |        .|.     | 9 0.383 -0.062 1476.7 0.000 
       .|**    |        *|.     | 10 0.318 -0.090 1519.1 0.000 
       .|**    |        .|.     | 11 0.254 -0.029 1546.3 0.000 
       .|*     |        *|.     | 12 0.189 -0.080 1561.3 0.000 
       .|*     |        .|.     | 13 0.128 -0.028 1568.1 0.000 
       .|.     |        .|.     | 14 0.072 -0.039 1570.4 0.000 
       .|.     |        .|.     | 15 0.022 -0.030 1570.6 0.000 
       .|.     |        .|.     | 16 -0.015 0.031 1570.7 0.000 
       .|.     |        *|.     | 17 -0.056 -0.077 1572.0 0.000 
       *|.     |        .|.     | 18 -0.093 0.001 1575.7 0.000 
       *|.     |        .|.     | 19 -0.116 0.054 1581.5 0.000 
       *|.     |        .|.     | 20 -0.124 0.040 1588.1 0.000 
       *|.     |        .|.     | 21 -0.133 -0.013 1595.7 0.000 
       *|.     |        .|.     | 22 -0.146 -0.033 1604.9 0.000 
       *|.     |        .|.     | 23 -0.161 -0.002 1616.1 0.000 






Appendix 3.B – GINI, LP and RP charts (each country separately) 
 
Figure 3B.1. The GINI and the LP index for the UK 
Source: see text. Note: The LP is multiplied by 10 in order to facilitate visualization 
Figure 3B.2. The GINI and the RP index for the UK 
 

































Figure 3B.3. The GINI and the LP index for Sweden 
Source: see text. Note: The LP is multiplied by 10 in order to facilitate visualization 
Figure 3B.4. The GINI and the RP index for Sweden 
 



































Figure 3B.5. The GINI and the LP index for Norway 
 
Source: see text. Note: The LP is multiplied by 10 in order to facilitate visualization 
Figure 3B.6. The GINI and the RP index for Norway 
 











































Figure 3B.7. The GINI and the LP index for Italy 
 
Source: see text. Note: The LP is multiplied by 10 in order to facilitate visualization 
Figure 3B.8. The GINI and the RP index for Italy 
 



































Figure 3B.9. The GINI and the LP index for Ireland 
 
Source: see text. Note: The LP is multiplied by 10 in order to facilitate visualization 
Figure 3B.10. The GINI and the RP index for Ireland 
 



































Figure 3B.11. The GINI and the LP index for Germany 
 
Source: see text. Note: The LP is multiplied by 10 in order to facilitate visualization 
Figure 3B.12. The GINI and the RP index for Germany 
 



































Figure 3B.13. The GINI and the LP index for France 
 
Source: see text. Note: The LP is multiplied by 10 in order to facilitate visualization  
Figure 3B.14. The GINI and the RP index for France 
 
































Figure 3B.15. The GINI and the LP index for Denmark 
 
Source: see text. Note: The LP is multiplied by 10 in order to facilitate visualization  
Figure 3B.16. The GINI and the RP index for Denmark 
 




































Figure 3B.17. The GINI and the LP index for Belgium 
 
Source: see text. Note: The LP is multiplied by 10 in order to facilitate visualization 
Figure 3B.18. The GINI and the RP index for Belgium 
 






























Appendix 3.C – Causality tests (SS’s dataset)  
 
Table 3C.1. Summary statistics for the top marginal tax rates and the top 1% and 0.01% 
income shares 
Var Mean Stdev Median Max Min NbObs 
Top rate 45.77050 22.98871  48.6268 97.50000 0 1988 
Top 0.01% 1.268332 1.008856 0.850000 5.120000  0.17000 1220 
Top 1% 10.53619 4.270170 9.440000  28.0400  3.49000 1595 
 
Table 3C.2. Stationarity tests for the GINI, RP and LP (H0=not stationary) 
Variables Levin, Lin and Chu Im, Pesaran and Shin ADF PP 
























Source: see text. Notes: The numbers in parenthesis are probability values. ** indicates the relevant coefficient is 
significant at 1%; * at 5%. The lag orders are obtained with the Akaike Information Criteria (AIC). 
Autocorrelation tests for the top marginal tax rates and the top 1% and 0.01% income shares: 
 
TOP MARGINAL RATE: 
TOP RATE 
Date: 05/08/17   Time: 10:39    
Sample: 1900 2010      
Included observations: 1988     
       
       Autocorrelation Partial Correlation  AC   PAC  Q-Stat  Prob 
       
               |*******         |******* 1 0.961 0.961 1839.3 0.000 
        |*******         |      | 2 0.919 -0.060 3522.5 0.000 
        |******|         |      | 3 0.878 -0.007 5060.0 0.000 
        |******|         |      | 4 0.838 -0.017 6459.8 0.000 
        |******|         |      | 5 0.797 -0.027 7727.0 0.000 
        |***** |         |      | 6 0.760 0.024 8878.9 0.000 
        |***** |         |      | 7 0.724 -0.009 9924.4 0.000 
        |***** |         |      | 8 0.689 -0.006 10872. 0.000 
        |***** |         |      | 9 0.657 0.025 11735. 0.000 
        |***** |         |      | 10 0.626 -0.022 12518. 0.000 
        |****  |         |      | 11 0.596 0.013 13230. 0.000 
        |****  |         |      | 12 0.567 -0.026 13873. 0.000 
        |****  |         |      | 13 0.535 -0.044 14447. 0.000 
        |****  |         |      | 14 0.506 0.014 14959. 0.000 
        |***   |         |      | 15 0.478 0.000 15417. 0.000 
        |***   |         |      | 16 0.450 -0.010 15824. 0.000 
        |***   |         |      | 17 0.426 0.019 16188. 0.000 
        |***   |         |      | 18 0.401 -0.018 16511. 0.000 
        |***   |         |      | 19 0.378 -0.005 16798. 0.000 
        |**    |         |      | 20 0.352 -0.049 17047. 0.000 
        |**    |         |      | 21 0.328 0.014 17263. 0.000 
        |**    |         |      | 22 0.303 -0.026 17448. 0.000 
        |**    |         |      | 23 0.279 -0.012 17605. 0.000 
        |**    |         |      | 24 0.253 -0.038 17734. 0.000 
        |**    |         |      | 25 0.225 -0.053 17836. 0.000 
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        |*     |         |      | 26 0.195 -0.044 17913. 0.000 
        |*     |         |      | 27 0.164 -0.026 17967. 0.000 
        |*     |         |      | 28 0.133 -0.026 18003. 0.000 
        |*     |         |      | 29 0.104 -0.004 18025. 0.000 
        |*     |         |      | 30 0.078 0.003 18037. 0.000 
        |      |         |      | 31 0.052 -0.023 18042. 0.000 
        |      |         |      | 32 0.026 -0.026 18044. 0.000 
        |      |         |      | 33 0.003 0.016 18044. 0.000 
        |      |         |      | 34 -0.018 -0.004 18044. 0.000 
        |      |         |      | 35 -0.039 -0.027 18047. 0.000 




Date: 05/08/17   Time: 10:46    
Sample: 1900 2010      
Included observations: 1220     
       
       Autocorrelation Partial Correlation  AC   PAC  Q-Stat  Prob 
       
               |*******         |******* 1 0.970 0.970 1149.9 0.000 
        |*******        *|      | 2 0.929 -0.188 2206.2 0.000 
        |******|        *|      | 3 0.882 -0.100 3159.4 0.000 
        |******|         |      | 4 0.836 0.013 4015.6 0.000 
        |******|         |      | 5 0.793 0.037 4786.9 0.000 
        |***** |         |      | 6 0.753 0.011 5483.7 0.000 
        |***** |         |      | 7 0.716 -0.002 6114.4 0.000 
        |***** |         |      | 8 0.682 -0.002 6685.7 0.000 
        |***** |         |      | 9 0.650 0.020 7205.1 0.000 
        |****  |         |      | 10 0.617 -0.035 7674.9 0.000 
        |****  |         |      | 11 0.585 -0.032 8096.5 0.000 
        |****  |         |      | 12 0.549 -0.061 8468.6 0.000 
        |****  |         |      | 13 0.513 -0.010 8793.5 0.000 
        |***   |         |      | 14 0.477 -0.007 9074.8 0.000 
        |***   |         |      | 15 0.443 -0.000 9317.2 0.000 
        |***   |         |      | 16 0.410 -0.015 9525.0 0.000 
        |***   |         |      | 17 0.379 0.005 9703.0 0.000 
        |**    |         |      | 18 0.352 0.030 9856.8 0.000 
        |**    |         |      | 19 0.325 -0.048 9987.9 0.000 
        |**    |         |      | 20 0.300 0.019 10100. 0.000 
        |**    |         |      | 21 0.274 -0.064 10193. 0.000 
        |**    |         |      | 22 0.245 -0.027 10268. 0.000 
        |**    |         |      | 23 0.217 -0.012 10327. 0.000 
        |*     |         |      | 24 0.190 0.014 10372. 0.000 
        |*     |         |      | 25 0.165 -0.005 10405. 0.000 
        |*     |         |      | 26 0.141 -0.003 10430. 0.000 
        |*     |         |      | 27 0.117 -0.049 10447. 0.000 
        |*     |         |      | 28 0.093 -0.018 10458. 0.000 
        |      |         |      | 29 0.070 0.001 10464. 0.000 
        |      |         |      | 30 0.050 0.007 10467. 0.000 
        |      |         |      | 31 0.030 -0.019 10469. 0.000 
        |      |         |      | 32 0.010 -0.007 10469. 0.000 
        |      |         |      | 33 -0.008 -0.009 10469. 0.000 
        |      |         |      | 34 -0.026 -0.006 10470. 0.000 
        |      |         |      | 35 -0.043 -0.013 10472. 0.000 
        |      |         |      | 36 -0.060 -0.020 10477. 0.000 
       






Date: 05/08/17   Time: 10:52    
Sample: 1900 2010      
Included observations: 1595     
       
       Autocorrelation Partial Correlation  AC   PAC  Q-Stat  Prob 
       
               |*******         |******* 1 0.963 0.963 1482.1 0.000 
        |*******        *|      | 2 0.920 -0.101 2835.9 0.000 
        |******|         |      | 3 0.876 -0.037 4063.0 0.000 
        |******|         |      | 4 0.832 -0.008 5172.0 0.000 
        |******|         |      | 5 0.795 0.063 6185.0 0.000 
        |***** |         |      | 6 0.759 -0.016 7109.5 0.000 
        |***** |         |      | 7 0.726 0.009 7955.4 0.000 
        |***** |         |      | 8 0.696 0.014 8732.1 0.000 
        |***** |         |      | 9 0.667 0.005 9445.9 0.000 
        |***** |         |      | 10 0.637 -0.027 10098. 0.000 
        |****  |         |      | 11 0.608 -0.015 10692. 0.000 
        |****  |         |      | 12 0.575 -0.056 11224. 0.000 
        |****  |         |      | 13 0.539 -0.060 11691. 0.000 
        |****  |         |      | 14 0.501 -0.030 12096. 0.000 
        |***   |         |      | 15 0.464 -0.016 12443. 0.000 
        |***   |         |      | 16 0.429 0.004 12741. 0.000 
        |***   |         |      | 17 0.400 0.039 12999. 0.000 
        |***   |         |      | 18 0.374 0.006 13225. 0.000 
        |**    |         |      | 19 0.348 -0.023 13421. 0.000 
        |**    |         |      | 20 0.325 0.009 13591. 0.000 
        |**    |         |      | 21 0.301 -0.020 13738. 0.000 
        |**    |         |      | 22 0.276 -0.017 13861. 0.000 
        |**    |         |      | 23 0.252 -0.013 13964. 0.000 
        |**    |         |      | 24 0.227 -0.016 14048. 0.000 
        |*     |         |      | 25 0.203 0.005 14115. 0.000 
        |*     |         |      | 26 0.180 -0.011 14168. 0.000 
        |*     |         |      | 27 0.156 -0.044 14207. 0.000 
        |*     |         |      | 28 0.131 -0.036 14235. 0.000 
        |*     |         |      | 29 0.106 -0.014 14253. 0.000 
        |*     |         |      | 30 0.082 -0.016 14264. 0.000 
        |      |         |      | 31 0.060 -0.002 14270. 0.000 
        |      |         |      | 32 0.040 0.000 14273. 0.000 
        |      |         |      | 33 0.020 -0.019 14274. 0.000 
        |      |         |      | 34 0.000 -0.017 14274. 0.000 
        |      |         |      | 35 -0.019 -0.003 14274. 0.000 
        |      |         |      | 36 -0.037 -0.001 14276. 0.000 
       
       
 
Standard Granger non-causality tests: 
 
Table 3C.3. Results for causality between top marginal rates and top 1% income share using 
standard Granger non-causality test 
Null hypothesis Lag order F-statistics 
TOP RATE does not Granger Cause TOP 1% 
1 23.8126** 
(1.E-06) 
TOP 1% does not Granger Cause TOP RATE 1 18.1390** 
(2.E-05) 
TOP RATE does not Granger Cause TOP 1% 2 10.7138** 
(2.E-05) 




TOP RATE does not Granger Cause TOP 1% 3 6.57428** 
(0.0002) 
TOP 1% does not Granger Cause TOP RATE 3 5.64375** 
(0.0008) 
TOP RATE does not Granger Cause TOP 1% 4 5.00835** 
(0.0005) 
TOP 1% does not Granger Cause TOP RATE 4 4.29473** 
(0.0019) 
TOP RATE does not Granger Cause TOP 1% 5 5.59896** 
(4.E-05) 
TOP 1% does not Granger Cause TOP RATE 5 3.08654** 
(0.0089) 
TOP RATE does not Granger Cause TOP 1% 6 3.76034** 
(0.0010) 
TOP 1% does not Granger Cause TOP RATE 6 4.38101** 
(0.0002) 
TOP RATE does not Granger Cause TOP 1% 7 3.62304** 
(0.0007) 
TOP 1% does not Granger Cause TOP RATE 7 4.42852** 
(7.E-05) 
TOP RATE does not Granger Cause TOP 1% 8 3.47724** 
(0.0006) 
TOP 1% does not Granger Cause TOP RATE 8 4.49789** 
(2.E-05) 
TOP RATE does not Granger Cause TOP 1% 9 3.22957** 
(0.0007) 
TOP 1% does not Granger Cause TOP RATE 9 4.26689** 
(2.E-05) 
TOP RATE does not Granger Cause TOP 1% 10 3.23017** 
(0.0004) 
TOP 1% does not Granger Cause TOP RATE 10 3.87584** 
(3.E-05) 
The numbers in parenthesis are probability values. ** indicates the relevant coefficient is significant at 1%; * at 5%. 
Optimal lag length = 5 (AIC). 
 
Table 3C.4. Results for causality between top marginal rates and top 0.01% income share 
using standard Granger non-causality test 
Null hypothesis Lag order F-statistics 
TOP 0.01% does not Granger Cause TOP RATE 
1 17.1437** 
(4.E-05) 
TOP RATE does not Granger Cause TOP 0.01% 1 18.1885** 
(2.E-05) 
TOP 0.01% does not Granger Cause TOP RATE 2 9.91814** 
(5.E-05) 
TOP RATE does not Granger Cause TOP 0.01% 2 7.41109** 
(0.0006) 
TOP 0.01% does not Granger Cause TOP RATE 3 7.78331** 
(4.E-05) 
TOP RATE does not Granger Cause TOP 0.01% 3 4.92525** 
(0.0021) 
TOP 0.01% does not Granger Cause TOP RATE 4 7.31120** 
(8.E-06) 
TOP RATE does not Granger Cause TOP 0.01% 4 3.92518** 
(0.0036) 
TOP 0.01% does not Granger Cause TOP RATE 5 7.63271** 
(5.E-07) 




TOP 0.01% does not Granger Cause TOP RATE 6 6.65685** 
(6.E-07) 
TOP RATE does not Granger Cause TOP 0.01% 6 2.16427* 
(0.0441) 
TOP 0.01% does not Granger Cause TOP RATE 7 7.03519** 
(3.E-08) 
TOP RATE does not Granger Cause TOP 0.01% 7 1.96126 
(0.0573) 
TOP 0.01% does not Granger Cause TOP RATE 8 6.86498** 
(8.E-09) 
TOP RATE does not Granger Cause TOP 0.01% 8 1.55868 
(0.1330) 
TOP 0.01% does not Granger Cause TOP RATE 9 6.34137** 
(9.E-09) 
TOP RATE does not Granger Cause TOP 0.01% 9 1.48005 
(0.1504) 
TOP 0.01% does not Granger Cause TOP RATE 10 5.71196** 
(2.E-08) 
TOP RATE does not Granger Cause TOP 0.01% 10 1.60644 
(0.0996) 
The numbers in parenthesis are probability values. ** indicates the relevant coefficient is significant at 1%; * at 5%. 
Optimal lag length = 9 (AIC). 
DH causality tests: 
 
Table 3C.5. Results for causality between top marginal rates and top 1% income share using 
DH causality test 
Null hypothesis Lag order F-statistics 
TOP RATE does not Granger Cause TOP 1% 
1 16.3260** 
(0.0000) 
TOP 1% does not Granger Cause TOP RATE 1 9.90204** 
(0.0000) 
TOP RATE does not Granger Cause TOP 1% 2 7.93697** 
(2.E-15) 
TOP 1% does not Granger Cause TOP RATE 2 2.05150* 
(0.0402) 
TOP RATE does not Granger Cause TOP 1% 3 6.24780** 
(4.E-10) 
TOP 1% does not Granger Cause TOP RATE 3 1.82016 
(0.0687) 
TOP RATE does not Granger Cause TOP 1% 4 8.88536** 
(0.0000) 
TOP 1% does not Granger Cause TOP RATE 4 2.43755* 
(0.0148) 
TOP RATE does not Granger Cause TOP 1% 5 11.4366** 
(0.0000) 
TOP 1% does not Granger Cause TOP RATE 5 3.75514** 
(0.0002) 
TOP RATE does not Granger Cause TOP 1% 6 10.5955** 
(0.0000) 
TOP 1% does not Granger Cause TOP RATE 6 4.63268** 
(4.E-06) 
TOP RATE does not Granger Cause TOP 1% 7 9.45150** 
(0.0000) 
TOP 1% does not Granger Cause TOP RATE 7 4.72847** 
(2.E-06) 




TOP 1% does not Granger Cause TOP RATE 8 2.94917** 
(0.0032) 
The numbers in parenthesis are probability values. ** indicates the relevant coefficient is significant at 1%; * at 5%. 
 
Table 3C.6. Results for causality between top marginal rates and top 0.01% income share 
using DH causality test 
Null hypothesis Lag order F-statistics 
TOP RATE does not Granger Cause TOP 0.01% 
1 22.9705** 
(0.0000) 
TOP 0.01% does not Granger Cause TOP RATE 1 1.64213 
(0.1006) 
TOP RATE does not Granger Cause TOP 0.01% 2 15.8432** 
(0.0000) 
TOP 0.01% does not Granger Cause TOP RATE 2 0.82810 
(0.4076) 
TOP RATE does not Granger Cause TOP 0.01% 3 12.2173** 
(0.0000) 
TOP 0.01% does not Granger Cause TOP RATE 3 2.23058* 
(0.0257) 
TOP RATE does not Granger Cause TOP 0.01% 4 11.9852** 
(0.0000) 
TOP 0.01% does not Granger Cause TOP RATE 4 8.42073** 
(0.0000) 
TOP RATE does not Granger Cause TOP 0.01% 5 9.03063** 
(0.0000) 
TOP 0.01% does not Granger Cause TOP RATE 5 48.8441** 
(0.0000) 
TOP RATE does not Granger Cause TOP 0.01% 6 8.61655** 
(0.0000) 
TOP 0.01% does not Granger Cause TOP RATE 6 47.7446** 
(0.0000) 
TOP RATE does not Granger Cause TOP 0.01% 7 10.2194** 
(0.0000) 
TOP 0.01% does not Granger Cause TOP RATE 7 44.2808** 
(0.0000) 
TOP RATE does not Granger Cause TOP 0.01% 8 10.8639** 
(0.0000) 
TOP 0.01% does not Granger Cause TOP RATE 8 78.2729** 
(0.0000) 
TOP RATE does not Granger Cause TOP 0.01% 9 6.01330** 
(2.E-09) 
TOP 0.01% does not Granger Cause TOP RATE 9 113.608** 
(0.0000) 
TOP RATE does not Granger Cause TOP 0.01% 10 3.47590** 
(0.0005) 
TOP 0.01% does not Granger Cause TOP RATE 10 67.7275** 
(0.0000) 





Appendix 3.D – Causality tests with country fixed effects and time effects 
 
Table 3D.1. Causality with time effects (top rates and top 1% income share) 
 Top income tax rate Income share of top 1% 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
















































Common Time Trends No Yes No Yes 
Period Fixed Effects Yes No Yes No 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.958000 0.950565 0.973937 0.968591 
Number of Observations 1513 1513 1507 1507 
The table reports robust standard errors in parentheses and p-values. ** indicates the relevant coefficient is 
significant at 1%; * at 5%. 
 
Table 3D.2. Causality with time effects (top rates and top 0.01% income share) 
 Top income tax rate Income share of top 1% 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
















































Common Time Trends No Yes No Yes 
Period Fixed Effects Yes No Yes No 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.958421 0.948805 0.981667 0.972423 
Number of Observations 1138 1138 1133 1133 
The table reports robust standard errors in parentheses and p-values. ** indicates the relevant coefficient is 
significant at 1%; * at 5%. 
 
Table 3D.3. Causality with time effects (GINI and LP) 
 GINI LP 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 















































Common Time Trends No Yes No Yes 
Period Fixed Effects Yes No Yes No 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.893550 0.871287 0.678532 0.596034 
Number of Observations 389 389 389 389 
The table reports robust standard errors in parentheses and p-values. ** indicates the relevant coefficient is 
significant at 1%; * at 5%. 
 
Table 3D.4. Causality with time effects (GINI and RP) 
 GINI RP 

















































Common Time Trends No Yes No Yes 
Period Fixed Effects Yes No Yes No 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.893223 0.871123 0.723691 0.660238 
Number of Observations 389 389 389 389 
The table reports robust standard errors in parentheses and p-values. ** indicates the relevant coefficient is 
significant at 1%; * at 5%. 
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Appendix 3.E – Brief discussion on global progressivity measures 
 
Global indexes, which differently from the RP and LP measures take into account the whole 
income distribution, are mostly based on two related procedures: they or compare pre and post-
taxes income distribution and regard as progressive the tax structures which after applied lead 
to more equal income distributions, or measure how much the tax structure deviate from a 
proportional tax system (Kesselman and Cheung, 2004). The first procedure is more common 
and both enclose the idea that progressivity is the property of PIT systems of leading to a more 
equal income distribution.  
As an example of the first kind (comparison between pre and post-taxes income distributions) 
consider Reynolds and Smolensky (1977) measure, given by 
𝐺(𝑌 − 𝑇(𝑌)) − 𝐺(𝑌),          (3E.1) 
where 𝐺(. ) is the Gini income inequality measure. 
A very popular measure constructed on the basis of the second procedure (deviation from 
proportionality) is the Kakwani (1977) measure, given by 
𝐶(𝑇) − 𝐺(𝑌),           (3E.2) 
where 𝐶(𝑇) is the tax concentration coefficient and 𝐺(𝑌) is the Gini coefficient.  
The GINI coefficient basically measures the area between a diagonal line indicating complete 
equality (in a Cartesian plane where the X axis indicates the cumulative percentage of the 
population and the Y axis represents the cumulative percentage of income) and the Lorenz 
curve, whilst the tax concentration coefficient correspond to the area between the diagonal line 
and the tax concentration (TC) curve (indicating the percentage of total taxes paid in a Cartesian 
plane where the X axis indicates the cumulative percentage of population and the Y axis 
represents the cumulative percentage of tax). Thus the Kakwani (1977) index measures the area 
between the Lorenz and the TC curve, which corresponds to measuring deviation from 
proportionality once the TC curve corresponds to the Lorenz curve when the tax system is 
proportional. 
The measure is positive for progressive, zero for proportional and negative for regressive tax 
systems. Some other progressivity measures consider different income inequality index (as the 
Atkinson (1970) measure) to compare post and pre-tax income distributions. An example would 
be Kiefer’s (1984) measure, given by 
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𝐼(𝑌) − 𝐼(𝑌 − 𝑇(𝑌)),          (3E.3) 





Appendix 3.F – Endogeneity tests 
 
To test endogeneity144 between GINI, LP and RP I run 8 fixed effects IV panel regressions. Besides 
varying in terms of the variables used, the regressions vary in terms of the type of time effects 
used (time trend or time dummies). Also, I use lagged variables of order 1 as the instrument 
concerning the supposedly endogenous variable. So, for example, in the first regression the GINI 
is regressed against the LP and time trend is used to capture time effects; the regressor tested 
is the LP and the instrument used is the first order lag of the LP variable. Table 3F.1 present all 
the results.     
Table 3F.1. Endogeneity tests regarding the GINI, RP and LP variables 
 Dependent variables 
 GINI GINI GINI GINI LP LP RP RP 





- - - - - - 




- - - - 





















Time Trend YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO 
Period FE NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R-squared .24 .03 .24 .08 .06 .03 .03 .08 
N. Obs. 405 405 405 405 398 398 398 398 
The numbers in parenthesis are robust standard errors. ** indicates the relevant coefficient is significant at 1%; * at 
5% and ° at 10%. 
The results suggest there is no endogeneity between the variables considered, which supports 
the validity of the causality analysis. 
 
  
                                                          
144 Again, I apply the “difference-in-Sargan” test for endogeneity. 
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Chapter 4: The Elasticity of Marginal Utility and Psychological Traits 
 
4.1. Introduction 
Many studies have been concerned with estimating the EMU parameter, given the importance 
it has to public investment decision-taking and economics in general. Most methods to estimate 
it use observations from the general population or from convenience samples of students 
without bothering to measure individuals’ psychological traits, such that little attention has 
been given to whether and how the EMU is affected by psychological traits and to the bearings 
that sampling has on the normative significance of the parameter.  
In this chapter, there are two main analyses. The first investigates the relationship between the 
parameter and socially desirable traits. Such research has bearings on the normative significance 
of the EMU to the extent that attitudes of those possessing socially desirable traits can arguably 
be regarded as having more normative significance themselves. In the second analysis, I 
investigate how the context-sensitivity of the EMU relates to such traits. That is, the objective is 
to see whether people with particular psychological traits provide estimates of the EMU which 
are constant across the different contexts in which the parameter can be estimated. It sheds 
light on the issue of whether the Standard Welfare Economics Model (SWEM) is an appropriate 
normative framework, since it assumes the EMU is constant across the referred contexts (risk 
aversion, inequality aversion and time preference).145 
This context analysis can also help to enlighten a debate within the literature regarding the 
different results found by Atkinson et al. (2009) and Groom and Maddison (2013) concerning 
the EMU context-sensitivity. Using experimental methods the first set of authors obtained 
results suggesting the EMU varies across contexts, while using mostly revealed-preferences 
based techniques the second set of authors obtained results suggesting the EMU does not vary 
across contexts. Examining how psychological traits affect the EMU context-sensitivity may 
reveal, to some extent, why they achieved different results. It must also be said the analyses 
executed in my study are unprecedented (as shown in the literature review). It is probably so 
due to the lack of attention devoted to the issue of how to test normative significance in 
economics. 
                                                          




𝑖=1 (𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑠)(1 + 𝛿)
−𝑡 , where 𝐸(𝑊) stands for the 
(expected, i.e. relative to the expected utility theory) welfare, 𝑝𝑠 is the probability of state of nature 𝑠 
occurring, 𝛿 is the utility discount rate, 𝑖 indicates a given individual and 𝑡 a certain period of time. Many 
works use such framework to analyse welfare in economics, and in it the EMU can be interpreted in the 
three different ways referred above (Atkinson et al., 2009). 
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Underlying the first analysis is the idea that attitudes observed in a group possessing socially 
desirable traits can and should be given more normative weight – i.e. can be thought as being 
closer to what should be done. If that is the case the EMU obtained from people possessing 
desirable traits will have more normative value. Also, if that is the case, a model describing the 
behaviour of those possessing desirable psychological traits has more normative significance. 
This is, if the EMU of those possessing desirable traits is less likely to vary across contexts, as 
predicted by the SWEM, it would suggest the model gives a good description of individuals 
supposedly acting ideally, which would therefore support the model’s usage as a normative 
model (i.e. as capable of prescribing ideal decisions). That relates to the second analysis. 
I call the idea that normative estimates should be obtained only from those displaying particular 
psychological traits ‘sample framing’. It suggests that when normative considerations are to be 
derived from empirical observations one should consider to frame its sample in order for it to 
reflect not the general population, but people whose attitudes have, for some reason (e.g. their 
psychological traits, their knowledge, etc.), more normative weight regarding the particular 
topic under consideration. In short, if we are examining what should be done based on 
observations, we should not base our conclusions on observations of just anyone, but just on 
observations of those who, for some reason, are expected to meet a normative criteria. 
Notice the SWEM has been largely used even though it is not certain it describes people’s 
behaviour, because its use can be justified based on the argument that it reflects rational 
conduct and thus normative behaviour. It basically means that decisions can be taken based on 
results derived from the model because it is assumed it unveils – to a large degree – the ideal 
decision. It highlights the importance of testing the model’s assumed normative significance, 
which is done in the ‘context analysis’. 
The sample framing idea itself and its use to estimate an EMU with more normative significance 
are inspired by Drupp et al.’s (2015) study. This study surveys prominent economists who are 
familiar with social discounting on the components of the Ramsey Rule, one of which being the 
EMU. It is the only work to my knowledge that investigates the value of the EMU according to 
experts (their survey text can be found on Appendix 4.C; see question 3).146  
The estimate of EMU they obtain can arguably be seen as possessing more weight than values 
obtained from the general population (or from a convenience sample of students) based, 
amongst other things, on the respondents’ knowledge about the issue. The fact that they are 
                                                          
146 Weitzman (2001) also surveys amongst experts on the SDR, but not on its determinants, such that 
there are no considerations regarding the EMU. 
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experts however does not mean that their answers have great normative significance. In terms 
of psychological traits, it is plausible to assume that prominent economists, as most prominent 
scientists, are likely to be weakly empathetic (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). Socially desirable traits 
(if we accept that empathy is a desirable trait) are not always correlated with expertise, which 
shows how my study and Drupp et al.’s (2015) study differ in terms of ‘sample-fitting’.    
The concept of ‘socially desirable’ can certainly change over time and place, and although some 
traits’ social desirability might be found to be considered more or less constant historically, it is 
by no means my intention to enter into such a discussion. Rather, I will ground my choice of 
socially desirable traits on the importance currently attributed to some traits by the psychology 
and economics mainstream literature – mainly when it comes to policy makers. This is the basis 
for my focusing on empathy and reflectiveness throughout the analysis. Besides, these traits 
summarize well147 what one usually would expect a social planner to be – rational148 (reflective, 
not impulsive) and considerate of others’ problems, i.e. to be genuinely willing to solve them 
(empathetic).149 Later on I will provide a much more detailed description of what I mean by these 
two traits. 
At this point it should be noticed that although throughout the study I refer to empathy as a 
socially desirable trait, it is not everyone’s opinion that decisions made by empathetic people 
are always better. Bloom (2016), for example, claims “on balance, empathy is a negative in 
human affairs. It’s not cholesterol. It’s sugary soda, tempting and delicious and bad for us” 
Bloom (2016: 13). He argues basically that the focal (i.e. inability to refer to more than one 
person) and biased nature of empathy leads people to make bad decisions systematically. Such 
opinion contrasts frontally with others that place empathy as central to morality (e.g. Baron-
Cohen, 2011; Rifkin, 2009).150 Moreover, Bloom (2016) declares that besides criticising the 
weight given to empathy he intends “to make a case for the value of conscious, deliberative 
reasoning” Bloom (2016: 5). That is, he defends more weight being given to reflectiveness than 
to empathy (mainly when it comes to decisions taken for society). 
                                                          
147 In the sense they potentially origin many other characteristics perceived as socially beneficial. 
148 The use of reflectiveness as rationality is based on Stanovich (2011), in which it is argued this trait 
defines rationality. Also based on that we give preference to reflectiveness over other cognitive abilities 
in the study.  
149 Notice they regard the social planner’s capacity and willingness to solve other people’s problems.  
150 It must be noticed that Bloom (2016) focuses on emotional empathy, i.e. empathy as the ability to feel 
what someone else is feeling. As such the empathy measure which is most related to his analysis in this 
study is the Empathy Quotient (EQ), and the one which is least related to it is the Reading the Mind in the 




Such controversy reinforces the importance of empathy (and reflectiveness) as the key 
psychological traits. Notice however, I am not aiming to resolve the question of whether 
empathy is a desirable trait in this chapter, but I do want to answer the question as to whether 
the possession of empathy makes a difference.    
I also consider two other traits social planners are expected to have: time consistency when 
choosing for others – which basically refers to whether the different selves (in different points 
of time) of the decision-taker disagree about decisions taken on behalf of others – and maturity 
(i.e. being in full possession of important neural faculties needed to take decisions, which in 
general takes place about after the early twenties). Regarding the first trait, besides being 
socially desirable for allowing rational planning, a time consistent social planner (which by 
definition chooses for others) is often assumed in economics analysis,151 which adds interest in 
looking at the EMU of those possessing it.  
Regarding maturity, I refer basically to a body of literature showing adolescents’ brains 
(individuals around the age of 12 to the early 20s) are still developing and because of that they 
are more likely to change their behaviour and choices after they grow older, besides being also 
more likely to engage in anti-social behaviour. Regarding the first aspect neuroimaging studies 
provide evidence that adolescence is hallmarked by goal flexibility. During this period, cognitive 
engagement depends more on “the social and motivational salience of a goal” (Crone and Dahl, 
2012: 645). Such aspect coupled with the developmental nature of adolescence justifies the 
placing of less weight on the choices of such young people. Such evidence regularly provides 
support for courts to consider adolescents less responsible for their actions (Steinberg, 2013).     
Regarding the second aspect of immaturity (being prone to engage in anti-social behaviour), 
brain models point to a gap in cognitive control and affective processes as one of the main cause 
of antisocial behaviour amongst young people (Steinberg, 2008; Somerville et al., 2010; Ernst 
and Fudge, 2009).152 The basic idea is that sensation-seeking increases substantially during this 
period while impulse control just improves gradually with age, rendering the gap mentioned 
before (Harden and Tucker-Drob, 2011). Moreover, it is important to notice that although these 
findings have been absorbed and understood by psychologists they are still to penetrate the 
thinking of economists.  
                                                          
151 It is implicit, for example, in the SWEM, in which utility is discounted exponentially and therefore time 
consistently. 
152 Other researchers have started to suggest less emphasis should be given to cognitive control, while 
more attention should be directed to how it articulates with affective processing and social development 
(Pfeifer and Allen, 2012).   
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Empathy is measured in three different ways [via the Empathy Quotient (EQ), based on Baron-
Cohen and Wheelwright (2004), the Read the Mind in the Eyes test (RME), based on Baron-
Cohen et al. (2001a) and the Autism Spectrum Quotient (AQ), based on Baron-Cohen et al. 
(2001b)]. Reflectiveness is measured in two different ways [via the CRT, based on Frederick 
(2005) and the Model Free/Model Based (MFMB) test, based on Doll et al. (2012) and Eppinger 
et al. (2013)]. I will provide more extensive details on the traits measurements later on in the 
chapter. All of them focus on different aspects of the factors to be gauged. By measuring the 
traits from different angles I thus get insight into aspects of empathy and reflectiveness that are 
most relevant to the determination of EMU.153 
The data used in this study is obtained experimentally. I present respondents with a survey 
through which they reveal, in three different ways, a range within which their EMU value is 
contained. The ways to derive the EMU intervals correspond to the contexts in which the same 
EMU value is assumed by the SWEM. That is, I estimate the EMU as risk aversion, inequality 
aversion and as the EIS. In the same survey I measure the traits considered previously (empathy, 
reflectivity, time consistency and maturity). There are 9 relevant tasks in total: 3 measuring the 
EMU (as risk aversion, inequality aversion and the EIS), 3 measuring empathy, 2 measuring 
reflectiveness, and one identifying those choosing time consistently for others.154  
In my study most tasks are hypothetical (in that they do not explicitly motivate individuals by 
using economic incentives).155 This is in line with other experimental studies measuring empathy 
(e.g. Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright, 2004; Baron-Cohen et al., 2001; Baron-Cohen et al., 2001); 
reflectiveness (e.g. Frederick, 2005; Toplak et al., 2011); risk aversion (Weber et al., 2002; 
Hanoch et al., 2006), inequality aversion (e.g. Amiel et al., 1999; Carlsson et al., 2005; Pirttila 
and Uusitalo, 2008) and the EIS (e.g. Barsky et al., 1997; Atkinson et al., 2009).156 In the task 
relative to choosing time-consistently for others it is very difficult to incentivize given the fact 
they choose for other people. The same happens for other tasks, as for example the one 
                                                          
153 Notice to measure any of the traits one has to strict their definition, such that an individual may be 
considered highly empathetic (reflective) according to one measure and weakly so according another. The 
measuring of them in different ways allows us to understand better in which sense empathy 
(reflectiveness) relate to the EMU. 
154 There is also a task measuring Working Memory capacity in the survey, but it is not used in this 
particular study. More details on the tasks, including parts which are not used in this study are provided 
in section 4.3.  
155 In the MFMB task most of the participants had the possibility to get an actual prize (more details on 
that are given in section 4.3). Participants (mostly students) receive money or course credits to take part. 
156 Atkinson et al. (2009), one of the central references for this study measures inequality aversion, risk 
aversion and the EIS using hypothetical questions. 
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measuring inequality aversion. In the questionnaires measuring empathy it is likewise not 
possible to incentivize.    
I use interval regression techniques throughout. I divide the sample between highly versus lowly 
reflective and high versus lowly empathetic participants according to the different test scores 
and then investigate for each group whether the EMU measured in a given context (say risk 
aversion) is significantly different from the EMU measured in another (say EIS)157. I do that by 
including dummies in the interval regression specifications in a way that allows us to test for 
variation across contexts. I repeat the same strategy to determine whether the other two traits 
(being time consistent when choosing for others and maturity) have any influence on the 
issue.158  
I use three strategies to determine how the EMU estimates vary across the different traits (EMU 
estimate analysis). In the first I divide the participants according to the relevant traits in the same 
fashion as in the context analysis and estimate the EMU for the different groups using interval 
regressions. This time the regression specification consists of just an intercept, allowing to 
obtain a point EMU estimate per group.  
In the second I run 6 interval regressions, each containing an index of empathy and 
reflectiveness, and three dummy variables: one indicating time-consistency when choosing for 
others, another indicating maturity and another indicating the context the EMU (as in all cases 
the dependent variable) was estimated in. After this process, I run another interval regression 
containing just the variables that were significant at least once in the previous regressions. The 
third is the same as the second, but without the context dummies. The goal is to observe how 
the EMU varies in response to the psychological traits only. 
The results for the ‘context analysis’ show more empathetic people’s EMU tends to be more 
context-sensitive. By contrast more reflective people’s EMU (as measured by the MFMB159 task) 
tend to be less context-sensitive. Time-consistent people’s EMU tend to be more context-
sensitive and more mature (with more than 24 years) people’s EMU tend to be less context-
sensitive. These results suggest that although the SWEM is a not a good description of any group 
                                                          
157 Notice there are three combinations to test in this analysis: whether the EMU as risk aversion is equal 
to the EMU as (intra-temporal) inequality aversion, whether the EMU as risk aversion is equal to the EMU 
as the EIS and whether the EMU as (intra-temporal) inequality aversion is equal to the EMU as the EIS. 
158 With regards to these other two traits we compare participants being time consistent (for others) as 
opposed to those not being time consistent and those older than 24 as opposed to those less than or 
equal to 24 years old. 
159 The MFMB index basically measures how goal-directed, as opposed to habit-directed, one behaves. 
Since to be goal-directed requires reflectiveness, it can be considered as a reflectiveness index. The 
measure is discussed in more detail on section 4.3.  
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related to the traits examined (in no case the EMU is the same in all contexts), it describes better 
people who are highly reflective, mature, weakly empathetic and do not choose time-
consistently for others. The findings confirm the suspicion that estimates of EMU differ 
depending on psychological traits and that for some sorts of respondents the differences across 
contexts are much more pronounced than others. 
Moreover, the finding that traits are partially responsible for variation in the EMU context 
sensitivity may help to explain the different results found by Atkinson et al. (2009) and Groom 
and Maddison (2013) concerning the issue: Atkinson et al. (2009) used a convenience sample of 
students.     
The results show basically that more empathetic and time consistent people tend to have higher 
EMU estimates, which suggests the ideal EMU value tends to be higher than estimated by works 
drawing samples from the general population or students (i.e. not ‘sample framing’) – if one is 
prepared to accept empathy as a socially desirable trait concerning decisions for society. 
In subsection 2 I review the main methods concerning the estimation of the EMU, arguing that 
estimating it experimentally is the methodology that best serves the objectives of the present 
analysis. In the same section I review the literature concerned with estimating experimentally 
the EMU in the three contexts referred above. In subsection 3 I describe the experiment run in 
the study, giving details on how the EMU is estimated in the three different contexts, on the 
measuring of the aforementioned traits and on the empirical strategy to approach people’s EMU 
context-sensitivity and the effects of desirable traits on participants’ EMU values. In subsection 
4 I present and discuss the results. Subsection 5 concludes.      
4.2. Literature review  
This section is organized as follows. In the first subsection I briefly review the main methods to 
estimate the EMU and give the reasons as to why I focus on works estimating it experimentally. 
In the second subsection I search for works estimating the parameter (using any method) and 
relating the estimates to the personality traits considered herein. Since no such work is found 
doing that I give more details on Atkinson et al. (2009). Although it does not relate the EMU 
estimates to the psychological traits considered herein, it is the only work found in the search 
estimating the EMU experimentally in the three contexts considered in the present study.160  
                                                          
160 Besides, it is a central work to the present investigation due to being the first (to knowledge) to test 
experimentally the EMU parameter equality across the three contexts as implicit in the standard 
economics welfare theory.  
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In the third to fifth subsections I describe key aspects of studies experimentally estimating the 
EMU in each of the three contexts. What I mostly look for in the works retrieved is whether they 
relate the estimates to any of the traits considered in this study or whether they investigate 
EMU variation across contexts. In subsection 6 I comment on the review undertaken.  
4.2.1. Main methods to derive the EMU 
Methods to estimate the EMU can be divided in those based on revealed preferences and stated 
preferences.161 The ones belonging to the second group are found in works measuring the EMU 
experimentally as an inequality aversion parameter (Amiel et al., 1999; Carlsson et al., 2005; 
Pirttila and Uusitalo, 2008); as a risk aversion parameter (Barsky et al., 1997; Eckel and 
Grossman, 2002; Holt and Larry, 2002) or as given by the EIS (Barsky, et al., 1997 and Atkinson, 
et al., 2009). Yet another kind of work estimating the EMU by stated preferences are those 
reporting experts’ opinions about the appropriate value of the coefficient.162 
In the first group we have works inferring the EMU from income tax schedules (Stern, 1977; 
Cowell and Gardiner, 1999; Evans, 2005; Groom and Maddison 2013), works estimating the EMU 
(as an intertemporal inequality aversion parameter) from lifetime consumption behaviour as 
revealed in the market (Blundell et al.,1994; Attanasio and Weber, 1989 and Groom and 
Maddison, 2013), works based on the Frisch’s (1959) formula, which holds for additively 
separable utility function (wants independence) (Evans, 2004; Evans et al., 2005; Halicioglu and 
Karatas, 2013), and works estimating the parameter from insurance data (Szpiro, 1986).  
Empirical works estimating the EMU based on revealed preferences data do not generally 
include information that would enable one to measure the psychological characteristics of the 
individual; such characteristics are usually measured experimentally via games or 
questionnaires. Of course, such coordination is possible, but far more difficult to undertake than 
to obtain both the personality traits and the EMU estimates experimentally. 
The difficulty just mentioned regarding EMU estimates based on revealed preference values 
makes it quite unlikely that works using such an approach can perform the same kind of analysis 
undertaken herein. Therefore, I focus on works estimating the EMU experimentally163 in the 
literature review.  
                                                          
161 Notice I refer to empirical works only, since it is not possible to measure psychological traits 
theoretically (i.e. using models). 
162 Just Drupp et al. (2015) have used this methodology so far (to knowledge). 
163 With ‘experimentally’ I refer basically to Harrison and List’s (2004) taxonomy of field experiments: 




4.2.2. Works estimating the EMU  
A search was executed on June the 2nd (2016) with the following search terms: TX “elasticity of 
marginal utility” and 49 works were retrieved. I further refined them by picking just published 
articles in English, thus ending up with 33 works.164 Of those none analyses the normative 
significance of the parameter based on participants’ psychologies or whether such psychologies 
cause the parameter to vary across the different contexts described above. The only 
investigation found estimating the EMU experimentally was Atkinson et al. (2009), which tests 
whether in general people have the same EMU when it is measured as risk aversion, inequality 
aversion and EIS. Given this work’s centrality to the analysis I also made a search on Web of 
Science database for works citing it. In total 17 works were retrieved, but none carried out the 
kind of analyses of relevance to my research. 
Atkinson et al. (2009) elicits the EMU by three different experiments, each one looking at the 
EMU from a different perspective. The first takes it as a risk averse parameter, the second as an 
(intra-temporal) inequality aversion parameter and the third as an inter-temporal inequality 
aversion parameter (i.e. as the EIS).165 They use a “convenience sample” of more than 3,000 
participants whose age median is 27 years. It indicates young people are overrepresented, given 
the median age in the UK is 40 (Office of National Statistics, 2016). Given what the psychological 
evidence on the immaturity of people under 24 presented before, this is a potentially very 
important aspect of Atkinson et al. (2009) study. They do not consider differences in people’s 
personality traits in their study. 
They also investigate factors causing variation in the EMU estimates. Between all the variables 
considered just the result regarding age is relevant to the present study. It shows age has a small 
and positive effect on the EMU measured as inequality aversion.  
The median EMU measured as risk aversion is in the interval 3-5 (that is also the modal group); 
the median EMU measured as inequality aversion was in the interval 2-3 (the modal group is 
above 7.5); for the EMU implied in the EIS the midpoint of the median respondent was 8.8. 
                                                          
164 Below I am going to search for estimates of EMU in different contexts where the parameter is usually 
known by a different name e.g. inequality aversion, risk aversion, the elasticity of intertemporal 
substitution. 
165 The methods used to estimate risk aversion and the EIS are based on Barsky et al. (1997), and the 
method used to estimate inequality aversion is based on Carlsson et al. (2005) and Johansson-Stennman 
et al. (2002).    
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It is worth noticing that in measuring the EMU as the EIS based in Barsky et al. (1997) they select 
consistent answers,166 such that in a way they give more weight to responses possessing a 
socially desirable trait. Nonetheless, there is no analysis on how the values they found compare 
with those not possessing such a trait or any explicit link with normative significance. 
Given the threefold interpretation regarding the EMU when the SWEM applies, I turn now to 
reviewing works estimating the EMU experimentally in each of them.167   
4.2.3. EMU as inequality aversion  
To search for works estimating the EMU as inequality aversion I used the following search terms 
(on EconLit, June 1st 2016): TX "inequality avers*" AND (TX measure* OR TX experiment*). 288 
works were retrieved. I further select them by picking just published articles in English (such a 
procedure was adopted in all searches), ending up with 182 works. From those, 5 were found 
estimating the EMU experimentally as inequality aversion. Most works in the search are not 
experimental or do not use the curvature of a hypothesized utility function (i.e. the EMU) as the 
inequality aversion measure, which puts them out of the area of interest of the present research.  
The first (in chronological order) work investigating the EMU as inequality aversion is Amiel et 
al. (1999). They use ‘leaky bucket’ questions168 and traditional utilitarian welfare function in 
order to elicit the EMU. They do that for three different utility functions: an isoelastic, a constant 
absolute risk aversion, and another one based on the Gini measure of inequality.169 Four 
different groups of students participated in the experiment (the first with 41 respondents, the 
second with 37, the third with 272 and the fourth with 56). The median EMU obtained from the 
participant groups for each welfare equation ranged from 0.095 to 0.227 and the parameter 
estimates derived from fitting the different welfare functions over all responses and individuals 
ranged from 0.05 to 0.248. Comparing to other estimates the ones obtained by Amiel et al. 
(1999) are remarkably low. 
                                                          
166 Given we use a similar methodology to measure the EMU as the EIS, more details on the selection of 
consistent answers are given in section 4.3. 
167 Notice I do not include Atkinson et al. (2009) in the review to follow once it was already resented in 
the present section. 
168 Basically, a question asking how much loss per donation unit one is willing to accept in a transfer from 
a rich to a poor.    
169 See chapter 1 for more details on the iso-elastic utility function. The constant absolute risk aversion 
(CARA) utility (exponential utility) is given by 1 − 𝑒−𝛼𝑦, where 𝑦 is income/consumption and 𝛼 is the 






∑ (𝑁 + 1 − 𝑖)𝑦𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1 , where the number of 
incomes in a given income distribution is ranked as follows: 𝑖 = 𝑦1, < 𝑦2 < ⋯ < 𝑦𝑁, where 𝑦 is income.  
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The second is Johansson-Stenman et al. (2002), which also estimates the EMU as an inequality 
aversion parameter, but now by asking participants to choose among different income 
distributions. They assume a utilitarian welfare function with isoelastic utility and present two 
uniform income distributions to the respondents, one being more unequal than the other. 
Comparing how one chooses allows the authors to infer the EMU.170 Since participants choose 
from behind a veil of ignorance171 in the experiment the EMU is interpreted as both inequality 
and risk aversion.172  
They recruited students (374 of them), and the median inequality/risk parameter (EMU) was 
between 2 and 3. They relate the estimates173 with some of the participants’ characteristics, 
finding left-wing voters are more inequality averse and business students less inequality averse 
than other students.  
The third is Carlsson et al. (2003). They investigate the inequality aversion parameter of Indian 
students taking decisions from behind a veil of ignorance in the same fashion of Johansson-
Stenman et al. (2002). The difference in terms of methodology is basically that in this study the 
societies to be chosen by the interviewees present right-angled triangular distributions instead 
of uniform distributions.174  
364 students were interviewed, but just 338 were considered once 26 gave answers which were 
inconsistent with the assumptions made. The median EMU value was about 3. They relate the 
estimates to some characteristics of the respondents using interval regression, finding students’ 
household income is negatively related to the EMU, respondent’s own income is positively 
related to the EMU, those whose parents are left-wing voters are more inequality averse and 
that economics, technology and social science students are less inequality averse than the rest.  
The fourth is Carlsson et al. (2005). They assume a general utility function presenting a constant 
parameter of individual inequality aversion which can be interpreted as the curvature of the 
utility function (in the same way as the EMU). Given such preferences they derive the inequality 
                                                          
170 Indifference between the two distributions implies an EMU number, such that the choice of one implies 
someone’s EMU is above or below such value. 
171 It means after choosing a given distribution there is, hypothetically, an equal probability the participant 
will be in any point of the distribution he chose.  
172 I classify the work as measuring inequality aversion due to the influence its method has on other works’ 
methods to measure inequality aversion. 
173 They use an estimation of the relative risk premium when the respondent is indifferent between the 
two societies as the dependent variable of a OLS regression to investigate the determinants of inequality 
(risk) aversion. 
174 These are claimed to be more compatible with the Indian case. 
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aversion parameter by presenting the participants different societal income distributions in 
which there is a trade-off between mean income and inequality (standard deviation).  
To run the experiment, they relied on a sample of students (324 of them). The median value for 
the EMU is in the interval 0.09-0.22. They also relate the estimates to the participants’ 
characteristics using interval regression, finding women and left-wingers are more inequality 
averse, while technology and business students are less inequality averse.  
Finally Pirttila and Uusitalo (2008) gauge the EMU by two methods and compare them. The first 
is the one used by Amiel et al. (1999) and the second is the one used by Carlsson et al. (2005), 
explained above. The study has 3,000 participants from general Finnish population. The median 
EMU as measured by Amiel et al.’s (1999) methodology was below 0.5, and the median EMU as 
measured by Carlsson et al.’s (2005) methodology was larger than 3.  
4.2.4. EMU as risk aversion  
Due to the great number of works estimating the EMU as risk aversion,175 I further specify the 
search in this section by seeking works not just estimating it experimentally, but also relating 
the estimates to the psychological traits considered in this research. The following search terms 
were used on EconLit (on the 28th of December, 2016): TX "risk avers*" AND (TX empath* OR TX 
“cognitive ability” OR TX "time consisten*” OR TX age). 147 journal articles in English were 
retrieved. From those 4 were found to be estimating the EMU as risk aversion and relating the 
estimates to one of the traits considered in the study. 2 related them to age and 2 related them 
to reflectiveness.176 Many works measuring risk aversion experimentally did not do it with the 
EMU, and many others used risk aversion together with other traits not considered in the study 
(e.g. alcoholism, divorce, tendency to cheat, etc.). 
The first work is Harrison et al. (2007), in which the EMU as risk aversion is estimated for a 
representative sample of the Danish population and related to various of its socio-demographic 
                                                          
175 The search terms TX “risk avers*” AND (TX measure* OR experiment*), for example, retrieved 1,164 
journal articles in English. 
176 To further check whether there were works relating the EMU as risk aversion to the traits considered 
I disentangled the main search in five smaller searches. In the first I used the terms TX "risk avers*" AND 
TX empath* and no works were retrieved. In the second I used the terms  TX "risk avers*" AND TX "time 
consisten*” and 18 works were retrieved, but none related risk aversion to how time consistently one 
chooses for others. In the third I used the terms TX "risk avers*" AND TX “cognitive ability” and 10 works 
were retrieved, from which 2 fitted within the category concerned in the study. In the fourth I used the 
terms TX "risk avers*" AND TX age, and 119 works were retrieved, from which 2 fitted within the category 
concerned in the study. In the fifth I used the terms TX "risk avers*" AND TX maturity, and 38 works were 
retrieved, but none of them referred to maturity as a psychological trait, but as a financial term (e.g. debt 
maturity structure). The fact the four works kept were the same found in the main search substantiates 
the accuracy of the latter.   
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characteristics including age. The method used to elicit the EMU is a modification of Holt and 
Larry’s (2002) Multiple Price List (MPL)177 (assuming participants’ preferences are described by 
an iso-elastic utility function). The first modification is that participants answer four times the 
MPL with a different set of 4 prizes (money) each time; it allows them to test whether risk 
aversion varies with income for the sample. The second involves refining the estimates by asking 
participants to choose among lotteries lying between the preferred and not-preferred options 
implied in the option switches. The third intends to tackle the framing effect178 by including two 
asymmetric frames in the experiment: one with probabilities of 0.3 (and 0.7), 0.5, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9 
and 1 for the lotteries179 (skewHI treatment) and other with probabilities of 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.5, 
0.7, and 1 (skewLO)180. The asymmetric frames allow to test for framing effects if people tend to 
switch in the middle the skewLO (skweHI) would skew the answers to be low (high) probability 
ones. 
253 people across Denmark with ages between 19 to 75 years old participated. The mean CRRA 
(which is the same as the EMU) coefficient is equal to 0.67 (for the skewedLO and skewedHI the 
mean CRRA coefficient is 0.43 and 0.91 respectively).181 The authors also conclude the 
coefficient does not vary significantly over income, and thus the iso-elastic utility assumption is 
appropriate for their investigation. Finally, they find support for an inverse correlation between 
age and risk aversion.  
The second work is Hryshko et al. (2011). They look at answers given to the Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics (PSID) (US) (a general population survey) which can be used as data coming 
from an experiment of the same kind of the one done by Barsky et al. (1997) to elicit EMU.182 
About 5000 people participate. The questions ask basically whether the interviewee would 
accept to change his actual job for a job in which he has a 50% chance to get paid the double of 
what he receives currently and a 50% chance to get a wage cut of (1 − 𝜆)% (which varies).183 
                                                          
177 Holt and Larry’s (2002) MPL consists basically of 10 choices between two lotteries, say A and B. The 
difference between the 2 prizes (which keep constant through the 10 questions in both lotteries) at stake 
in A is smaller than in B and the probabilities to gain a given prize is the same in A and B for a given 
question. Given participants’ underlying utility function an EMU interval can be obtained using the 
switching point from A to B.  
178 More specifically, the tendency to switch option in the middle of the table. 
179 As opposed to the probabilities of 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, and 1 of the usual symmetric 
frame. 
180 Notice the asymmetric frames have 6 questions instead of 10. 
181 They use interval regressions to obtain point estimates. 
182 Therefore they do not apply the experiment themselves, but use the data coming from one (though 
the “experimenter” was not aware of the experiment itself). 
183 The cut regarding the first question is 33.33%; if the respondent accepts the new job he answers 
another question in which 1 − 𝜆 = 50%, if he accepts again 1 − 𝜆 = 75% and then the sequence stops; 
If he does not accept 1 − 𝜆 = 50% it also stops; if he does not accept 1 − 𝜆 = 33.33% another question 
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𝑈(𝜆𝑐) ≥ 𝑈(𝑐), where 𝑈(𝑐) is the utility of consumption 𝑐. Assuming 𝑈(𝑐) is iso-elastic, if the 
respondent is indifferent then 𝜆 = (2 − 21−𝜂)1/(1−𝜂). With such structure, it is possible to 
derive EMU (𝜂) intervals from the answers to the questions described.184     
The median EMU interval was 2 to 3.76 (with midpoint of 2.88), and the EMU interval mode was 
above 7.53. The authors also relate the EMU to some of the participants characteristics, 
concluding older individuals are more risk averse.  
Now I present works relating the EMU as risk aversion to reflectiveness (included in the broader 
area of cognitive ability).  
The first is Taylor (2013). He estimates risk aversion using the Holt and Larry (2002) MPL referred 
above in two ways: just hypothetically and with real incentives, and uses maximum likelihood 
methods to investigate, among other things, the influence of reflectiveness, as measured by the 
Cognitive Reflectiveness Test (CRT),185 on the EMU estimates. 
He finds CRT scores relate to the level of risk aversion in the hypothetical design, such that more 
reflective participants are significantly less risk averse in the hypothetical setting.186 Considering 
such influences together with the also-found influence of gender187 on the EMU estimates, and 
knowing the CRT varies from 0 to 3, we can determine that the EMU varies from 0.237 to 1.1 
according to the econometric specifications. 
Andersson et al. (2016) measure risk aversion using two different MPLs. The basic difference is 
that in the first (MPL 1) the switching point indicating risk neutrality is the third option (located 
relatively “high up”), while in MPL 2 such point is located relatively “low down” (is the sixth 
option). They also measure reflectiveness using the CRT. 
Using interval regressions, they find the CRRA parameter for subjects with average cognitive 
ability score (measured by a standard intelligence test called “IST 2000 R”) is 0.34 for MPL 1 and 
0.01 for MPL 2. The relation between CRT scores and the EMU is ambiguous (like the relation 
                                                          
is asked with 1 − 𝜆 = 20%; if he accepts the sequence stops, if he does not then he is presented with a 
question in which 1 − 𝜆 = 10% and then the sequence stops. Thus there are 6 possible groups regarding 
the questions sequence: yes, yes, yes (those who accept three times); yes, yes, no; yes, no; no, yes; no, 
no, yes and no, no, no. 
184 Those who (don’t) accept the new job for a given question will have an EMU smaller (higher) than the 
one given by 𝜆 = (2 − 21−𝜂)1/(1−𝜂). 
185 The details regarding this reflectiveness measure are given on section 4.3. 
186 There is no influence of reflectiveness on the EMU in the real incentive setting. 
187 Women are found to be significantly more risk averse than man. 
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between the IST and the EMU); for the MPL 1 they find a negative relation and for the MPL 2 
they find a positive relation. Such results suggest cognitive ability (including reflectivity) is not 
actually related to risk aversion, but to noise linked to the measuring of it, generating spurious 
correlation between risk aversion and reflectiveness (cognitive ability). To be more precise, they 
argue the fact that high reflectiveness is associated with less noisy estimates of risk aversion 
generates correlation between the variables.    
4.2.5. EMU as the EIS 
To find experimental works estimating the EMU as intertemporal inequality aversion (measured 
by the EIS) I used the following search terms on EconLit (on December the 28th, 2016): TX 
“elasticity of intertemporal substitution” AND (TX measure* OR TX experiment*). 15 journal 
articles in English were retrieved, and just one was found estimating the EMU as EIS 
experimentally.  
One such work was Barsky et al. (1997). They assume participants (from the general public) 
behave in accordance to the Ramsey rule, then ask them to choose among different spending 
plans implying a consumption growth rate for a specified rate of return. By considering three 
responses they can derive a EMU range per participant.188 They have 198 observations, but once 
they exclude answers inconsistent with utility maximization and also uninformative responses 
they end up with only 116 observations. Therefore, as in other works performing this type of 
selection, the results reflect the choice of the consistent participants, and are hence linked to a 
psychological trait, albeit in a very indirect way. The midpoint of the modal EMU interval implied 
in the EIS estimated by them was 8.7. 
4.2.6. Comments on literature review on works eliciting the EMU experimentally 
The first clear conclusion to take from the literature review is that the work in this chapter is 
quite unprecedented. No work was found relating the EMU to psychological traits in order to 
get insight into its normative significance, or examining how the EMU context-sensitivity relates 
to psychological traits in order to get insight into the SWEM normative significance. Moreover, 
no work was found trying to solve the controversy implicit in Atkinson et al. (2009) and Groom 
and Maddison (2013), or selecting a sample based upon psychological traits [rather than 
expertise as Drupp et al. (2015) do] to define a value for the EMU.   
                                                          
188 Given the Ramsey rule 𝑟 = 𝛿 + 𝜂𝑔, where 𝑟 represents a return rate, 𝛿 the utility discount in the SWEM 
and 𝑔 growth, and that in each answer the participant chooses a preferred rate of growth given a return 
rate, for 2 of such answers it is possible to derive a value for 𝜂 and 𝛿. 
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Although some works relate the estimated EMU to participants’ characteristics, just the ones 
estimating risk aversion were found relating them to traits that are considered in my study (i.e. 
maturity and reflectiveness).  
The works estimating the EMU as risk aversion that related it to age got different conclusions on 
how age affects risk aversion. Harrison et al. (2007) found age is inversely correlated with risk 
aversion, while Hryshko et al. (2011) found the opposite (both use samples taken from the 
general public). The first result is surprising in view of studies in psychology relating age and risk-
taking behaviour (Steinberg, 2008; Steinberg and Scott, 2003). It suggests the relation between 
the EMU as risk aversion and maturity may not be so clear as between maturity and risk-taking 
behaviour as expressed in more general measurement forms (used in psychology studies). 
Atkinson et al. (2009) find no correlation between age and risk aversion further adding to the 
ambiguity over the role of age.  
All works estimating the EMU as inequality aversion, except Pirttila and Uusitalo (2008), worked 
with samples consisting of young people (students). The fact that Pirttila and Uusitalo (2008) got 
a larger inequality aversion estimate than Carlsson et al. (2005) and Atkinson et al. (2009) (all 
using similar methods) is also consistent with Atkinson et al. (2009) finding that in the inequality 
aversion context the EMU is positively related to age.  
The only work found estimating the EMU in the EIS context, apart from Atkinson et al. (2009), is 
Barsky et al. (1997), which samples from the general population, such that the fact it obtains an 
EIS similar to Atkinsons et al. (2009) (which samples among young people), is once again 
consistent with Atkinson et al. (2009) not finding any correlation between age and the EIS. 
It is important to clarify that although the present study does not investigate age, but maturity, 
these are obviously related variables (maturity is a binary variable identifying mature and non-
mature people) – at the same time, it is worthy to keep in mind they are not the same thing. 
Two works were found relating the EMU as risk aversion to reflectivity (as measured by the CRT, 
only). Taylor (2013) finds a negative correlation between the EMU and CRT scores, while 
Andersson et al. (2016) find both positive and negative correlation between reflectiveness and 
the EMU, depending on how they measure risk aversion. Therefore, the relationship between 
risk aversion and the CRT is unclear.  
In this chapter besides measuring reflectiveness using the CRT, we also measure it using the 
MFMB task. As discussed in more detail later on, the MFMB has not just the advantage of 
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measuring reflectivity from a different perspective, but also of allowing for a more accurate 
measurement of the trait. 
No work was found relating empathy and the EMU directly, but two (Johansson-Stenman et al., 
2002; Carlsson et al., 2005) related the parameter measured as inequality aversion to political 
preferences. Given there is evidence suggesting left-wingers are more empathetic (Dodd et al., 
2011; Mondak et al., 2010), we expect to find empathetic people are inequality averse. 
Therefore, according to the works retrieved in the literature review my study is the first one 
relating the EMU (in each context) to how time-consistently one chooses for other people, to 
maturity (as such, not as age) and to empathy. It is also the first time one relates the EMU as 
inequality aversion and as the EIS to reflectiveness. Although these are not  main contributions, 
they are useful to expand the understanding of how key traits relate to risk and inequality 
aversion and the EIS. 
Many of the works retrieved (Carlsson et al., 2003; Carlsson et al., 2005; Harisson et al., 2007; 
Andersson et al., 2016) used interval regression in their analysis to relate traits to the EMU 
estimates. Harrison et al. (2007) also used such techniques to obtain EMU point estimates. It 
suggests that it is an established technique in the literature to perform the kind of analysis 
intended here. Like Harisson et al. (2007), we use it not just to relate the estimates to the traits, 
but also to obtains point estimates.    
Finally, table 4.1 presents all works cited in the literature review with some key characteristics 
of each. 
Table 4.1. Literature review 
Study EMU Context Traits 
considered189  
Atkinson et al. (2009) 1 2-3 IA Age 
Amiel et al. (1999) 0.095-0.248 IA None 
Johansson -Stenman et al. (2003) 2-3 IA None 
Carlsson et al. (2003) 3 IA None 
Carlsson et al. (2005) 0.09-0.22 IA None 
Pirttila and Uusitalo (2008) 1 <0.5 IA None 
Pirttila and Uusitalo (2008) 2 >3 IA None 
Atkinson et al. (2009) 2 3-5 RA Age 
Harrison et al. (2007) 0.43-0.91 RA Age 
Hryshko et al. (2011) 2-3.76 RA Age 
Taylor (2013) 0.23-1.1 RA CRT 
Andersson et al. (2016) 0.01-0.34 RA CRT 
Atkinson et al. (2009) 3 8.8 EIS Age 
Barsky et al. (1997) 8.7 EIS None 
                                                          
189 By traits we mean the traits considered in this study. 
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Source: see text 
4.3. Methodology   
4.3.1. Brief experiment description 
In this brief experiment description I address the participants, the apparatus used, the 
experimental design and the general procedure. 
4.3.1.1. Participants 
93 adults (age between 18 and 33 years, mean = 21 years, s.d. = 3.88 years) of whom 73 (78%) 
were females190 and 17 (18%) were over 24191 participated in exchange for £7 or course credits. 
They were recruited through the University of Birmingham’s Psychology Research Participation 
Scheme and all reported good physical and mental health. Informed consent was obtained prior 
to testing.  
4.3.1.2. Apparatus and experimental design 
A computer [64-bit Operating System, 1920 by 1080 pixels and 80Hz monitor (ProLite B2483HS)] 
was used to implement 8 of the 10 tasks. All tests were programmed using Psychopy as the 
programming platform (written in Python). The computer controlled and timed the displays 
used in each task and recorded responses using millisecond accuracy via a keyboard and/or 
mouse. The remaining 2 tasks were applied with pen and paper. The participants were tested 
individually, in a quiet and well-lit room.  
The participants are randomly divided in two groups: half were given the Risky Prospects (RP) 
questionnaire (discussed below) as the first task and the Distributive Alternatives (DA) 
questionnaire (also discussed below) as the eighth task; the other half were given the DA 
questionnaire first and the RP questionnaire as the eighth task.192 In all other respects 
participants in both groups are treated equally.193 The tasks are hypothetical.194  
                                                          
190 For three participants, the gender response is not available. 
191 Among these 17, 8 (47%) were female. Among the 76 participants under 24, 62 (82%) were female. 
192 For the first 10 participants half responded just to the DA version and the other half just to the RP 
version.   
193 By applying the DA and RP alternately we intended to test for priming effect in the first 15 questions 
of the DA and RP questionnaires. However, given these questions were not used in the present research 
we do not pursue the priming issue anymore. 
194 With the exception of the MFMB task.  
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4.3.1.3. General procedure 
The experimental session comprises 10 tasks. Below I give a general idea of how the experiment 
looks like as a whole. Details and further explanations are given in the sections to come.  
The tests completed (in the order applied) are: 1) the DA or the RP questionnaires – both have 
16 questions, and in each participants choose one among alternatives presented to them to 
establish their EMU; 2) the MFMB task – a game consisting basically of choosing between two 
options, with probability to obtain a hypothetical reward thereby establishing the participant’s 
degree of reflectivity;195 3) the RME task – in which participants  choose among four words the 
one best describing eye expression photos; the task consisted of 36 trials and establishes the 
respondent’s empathy; 4) the Working Memory task (WM) – in which participants are told to 
remember a sequence of numbers seen on the screen and type them (in the reverse and regular 
order);196 5) the CRT – in which participants are asked to answer to three seemingly simple 
questions; there are no alternatives, they had to type their (numerical) answers. This test also 
measures respondents’ reflectivity; 6) the EQ questionnaire – in which participants are asked to 
answer 60 questions using a 4-points agreement scale (definitely agree, slightly agree, slightly 
disagree, definitely disagree) thereby providing an alternative measure of empathy; 7) the AQ, 
which is equal to the sixth task in terms of procedure; the questions are obviously different and 
there are 50 of them instead of 60. This provides an alternative measure of empathy; 8) the DA 
or the RP questionnaire (see the first task);197 9) the Time Consistency (when choosing for other 
people) task (TC) – in which participants choose on behalf of other people they know nothing 
about among alternatives having to do with receiving a given amount of money at a given point 
in time or another larger amount of money at a more distant point in time; 10) the EIS task – in 
which participants are asked to choose, again in behalf of other people they know nothing about, 
among different retirement plans thereby revealing a third estimate of EMU.198 Respondents 
typically completed these tasks in less than 90 minutes.  
                                                          
195 Depending on the amount of hypothetical rewards obtained the participant could get a real reward. 
More details are provided below. 
196 The data collected in this task (WM) was not used in this study. Nonetheless we describe the task given 
it was part of the experiment. 
197 If the participant answered the RP questionnaire first task he would answer the DA questionnaire in 
the eighth and vice-versa. 
198 Notice the first 10 individuals were not submitted to tasks 8, 9 and 10 and subjects 11 to 32 answered 
to a slightly different task 10 due to improvements undertaken along the experiment implementation. For 
participants 11 to 32 the questionnaire had 4 cards, each containing from 3 to 5 plans. The difference in 
card number is regarding a test to verify whether participants are consistent with the assumptions made. 
In the beginning, just one card was used to such end; after participant 32 two cards were dedicated to it. 




4.3.2. Tasks and measures 
In this section I now explain in detail the strategy to estimate the EMU (in each context) and to 
measure the traits through the tasks referred above.  
4.3.2.1. The RP and the DA questionnaires and the elicitation of the EMU as risk aversion [16th 
question of the RP (task 1 or 8)] 
The RP or DA (first or eighth task) is based on Tversky and Kahneman (1979); Michaelson (2015); 
Eckel and Grossman (2002); and Atkinson et al. (2009). These tasks consist of responding to a 
questionnaire containing 16 questions. Just the last question measures risk aversion for those 
answering the RP whereas for those answering the DA it measures inequality aversion. Here I 
focus on the last question of the RP to explain how risk aversion is estimated. The next section 
deals with the last question of the DA, used to estimate the EMU as inequality aversion. The first 
fifteen questions involve choosing between two risky prospects (or distributive alternatives) and 
one (measuring the EMU) involves choosing between 6 risky prospects (or distributive 
alternatives).199  
The task is self-paced and unspeeded; the questions and choices are presented simultaneously 
and remain on the screen until a response is given. The first 15 questions are presented in a 
random order for each participant (the 16th is always the last question). 200  
The 16th question of the RP is based on Eckel and Grossman (2002) whose work is not reviewed 
in the literature review because they do not relate their estimates to any of the traits considered 
in this study. We chose their method given its simplicity, efficiency (given the assumptions 
described below) and because it can be applied rapidly (given that the participants have many 
tasks to complete in the experiment). This question is used to measure the EMU as risk aversion. 
Assuming respondents act in accordance to the Expected Utility Theory (EUT) and their 
preference is represented by an iso-elastic (CRRA) utility function we can estimate the EMU 
using the following question, which consists of choosing among 6 lotteries.  
Indicate among the six following gambles the one you would most like to participate in: 
                                                          
199 As noticed before the first 15 questions of both the DA and RP were not used in this study, but were 
included in the description for being part of the experiment. 
200 Half participants were assigned to each of these random orders. The alternatives presented per 
question in the first 15 questions were also randomized in two different ways to avoid participants 
answering randomly to obtain very high (low) scores. Given these questions are not used in the study I do 




a) 28 pounds for sure; 
b) A 50% chance of 24 pounds and a 50% chance of 36 pounds; 
c) A 50% chance of 20 pounds and a 50% chance of 44 pounds; 
d) A 50% chance of 16 pounds and a 50% chance of 52 pounds; 
e) A 50% chance of 12 pounds and a 50% chance of 60 pounds; 
f) A 50% chance of 2 pounds and a 50% chance of 70 pounds. 
To understand how it measures the EMU as inequality aversion, consider the case where 
someone chooses alternative b. If he is an expected CRRA utility maximizer we can represent 
the utility concerning the alternative as  
𝑈(𝑏) = 0.5 (
24(1−𝜂)−1
1−𝜂
) + 0.5 (
36(1−𝜂)−1
1−𝜂
).         (4.1) 
For him to choose it, it must be larger then 𝑈(𝑖), where 𝑖 = 𝑎, 𝑐, 𝑑, 𝑒, 𝑓.201 To obtain the EMU 
(𝜂) one has to calibrate the parameter with numbers satisfying the inequality referred above 
(i.e. 𝑈(𝑏) > 𝑈(𝑖), ∀⁡𝑖). In the case of the example, it corresponds to numbers in the interval 1.16 
- 3.46. 
Notice in this case the respondent is assumed to be taking only his own utility function into 
consideration, such that the EMU obtained represents his own risk aversion. It corresponds to 
the SWEM with one period, one person and two states of nature.202 
4.3.2.2. The elicitation of the EMU as (intra-temporal) inequality aversion [16th question of the 
DA (task 1 or 8)] 
The last question of the DA questionnaire, which measures inequality aversion, is based on 
Atkinson et al. (2009) (which draws from Johansson-Stenman et al., 2002 and Carlsson et al., 
2005). It goes as follows: 
Imagine now that MANY OTHER PEOPLE WERE INCLUDED IN THE GROUP203 and that they will be 
UNIFORMLY DISTRIBUTED BETWEEN A MAXIMUM AND A MINIMUM INCOME AMOUNT YOU 
HAVE TO CHOOSE. So, for example, if you choose a maximum of 100 and a minimum of 90 
                                                          
201 This is, the other 5 alternatives. Notice the only difference between 𝑈(𝑏) and 𝑈(𝑖) is that the values 
entering the equation are different. 
202 See the introduction (first footnote). 
203 It refers to a group of people who will hypothetically be affected by the participant’s choices 
(remember there are 15 questions to be answered before the one detailed here). The instructions for the 
task (available in Appendix 4.A) contains more details. 
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pounds, 10% of the people will receive 91 pounds, other 10% will receive 92, and so on up to 100 
pounds. If you choose a maximum of 110 and a minimum of 85 pounds, 4% of the people will get 
86 pounds, other 4% will get 87 pounds, and so on up to 110 pounds. Indicate among the 6 
following distributions the one you would like the people in the group to participate in: 
a) People will be uniformly distributed between 308 and 319 pounds; 
b) People will be uniformly distributed between 264 and 396 pounds; 
c) People will be uniformly distributed between 220 and 484 pounds; 
d) People will be uniformly distributed between 176 and 572 pounds; 
e) People will be uniformly distributed between 132 and 660 pounds; 
f) People will be uniformly distributed between 22 and 770 pounds. 
Assuming respondents have a utilitarian welfare function with an isoelastic social utility function 
as the criterion function by which they choose among different income distributions, a uniform 
income distribution would yield the following choice criterion function:                                 














),      (4.2) 
where 𝑚𝑎𝑥 and 𝑚𝑖𝑛 are the maximum and the minimum income value in the concerned 
distribution, respectively. If one is indifferent between two alternatives presented in the 







).          (4.3) 
From the above equality an EMU (𝜂) range can be obtained, since the parameter satisfying the 
equality give the maximum EMU for those choosing the more unequal distribution (B in the 
example) and the minimum EMU for those choosing the more equal distribution. 
In this case the EMU is not assumed to be a parameter from the utility function of the 
respondent, but from his social welfare function (SWF), i.e. from the utility of the representative 
agent he is choosing for. It is normative in the sense that it is the inequality aversion level the 
respondent thinks of as appropriate. The model assumed corresponds to the SWEM with one 
period and many (homogeneous) individuals (i.e. one representative agent). Also, notice that 
for the representative agent there are many possible states of nature, given he can be assigned 
to any point of the income distribution with the same probability.    
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4.3.2.3. Reflectiveness (tasks 2 and 5) 
In this section I explain how I extract reflectiveness measures from tasks 2 and 5 (the MFMB and 
the CRT respectively) of the experiment.  
The MFMB (task 2) (based on Doll et al., 2012; Eppinger et al., 2013). In this game the 
participants are presented with the following context: there are two planets (each with a 
different colour, say pink and golden) and two spaceships (A and B), one of which leads to one 
of the two planets (e.g. the pink planet) on 70% of trips (common transition) and to the other 
planet on 30% of trips (rare transition). The other spaceship proceeds in the same way but 
inverting the planets (i.e. it would take one to the golden planet 70% of the time and to the pink 
planet 30% of the time). Each planet yields a gem or a rock with a changing-over-time 
(independent Gaussian random walks between p = 0.25 to 0.75, s.d. = 0.025) probability. The 
player’s objective is to maximize the number of gems they get by choosing between the 
spaceships in 200 trials. Half of participants in each questionnaire group are submitted to 
treatment 1, where spaceship A leads to the pink planet 70% of the time and the other half is 
submitted to treatment 2 where spaceship B leads to the pink planet 70% of the time.  
The number yielded in the MFMB task indicates how Model Based (MB) a respondent is and 
comes from the frequency the respondent acted as a typical Model Based (MB) subject (i.e. fully 
considering the game context to obtain gems, as I discuss below) minus the frequency with 
which they acted as the typical Model Free (MF) subject (acting fully based on association 
between actions and effects, as I also discuss below).204  
The typical MF subject chooses the same spaceship he did previously if it yielded him a gem and 
switches spaceship if the previous yielded him a stone. Notice that in this case there is no 
accounting for the probabilities referred in the game instructions. On the other hand, the typical 
MB subject takes into consideration the probabilities associated with a spaceship leading to one 
or other planet to obtain the maximum amount of gems.  
So if a spaceship goes to its “common planet” (the one it reaches with 70% chance) and it yields 
a gem (a common reward event) the Typical MB subject (TMB) acts in the same way as the 
Typical MF (TMF) subject and chooses the same spaceship again (because it suggests the 
common planet is likely to yield gems); if the spaceship instead takes to its “rare planet” (the 
one it reaches with a 30% chance) and it yields a gem (a rare reward event) the TMB switches 
                                                          
204 The frequencies referred are regarding the number of times the participants choose the same 
spaceship they chose in the previous trial (i.e. the probability to stay).  
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spaceship (because it suggests the planet most likely to give gems is the other one). If the 
spaceship chosen goes to its common planet and gives a stone (common non-reward event) the 
TMB also chooses the same way as the TMF subject and switches spaceship; and finally if the 
spaceship chosen goes to the rare planet which gives a stone (a rare non-reward event) the TMB 
(differently from the TMF) chooses the same spaceship again (because it suggests the planet to 
which the other spaceship goes more often is more likely to give a stone). 
To sum up, the probability to be MF is calculated by the probability to stay (i.e. choose the same 
spaceship as the one chosen previously) when a common event (when the spaceship leads to 
the planet it does 70% of the time) is rewarded plus the probability to stay when a rare event is 
rewarded minus the probability to stay when a common event is not rewarded minus the 
probability to stay when a rare event is not rewarded. The probability to be MB is given by the 
probability  to stay when a common event is rewarded plus the probability to stay when a rare 
event is not rewarded minus the probability to stay when a rare event is rewarded minus the 
probability to stay when a common event is not rewarded. 
The subjects are given both written and oral instructions before starting, including a clear 
statement about the probabilities linking spaceships to planets. A sheet summarizing the task is 
kept with them during the selection process.205 At the beginning of each trial the subjects view 
both spaceships and have to choose between them by using a mouse to position a cursor over 
the spaceship right-clicking on the chosen one. After choosing they see an image of the planet 
the spaceship has taken them to (for 2 seconds) and then an image of the yield they got (for 1 
second). The task is self-paced and unspeeded.  
This task is used to index participants’ reflectiveness; the basic idea is that more reflective 
people will tend to take into consideration the current level of probability of finding a gem rather 
than just using the known, stable probability of which spaceship goes to which planet.  A 
tendency to use information about the reward received on the just previous trial indicates using 
a cognitive model of the two-chain event (goal-directed behaviour) and is therefore indicative 
of reflectance. In contrast, less reflective participants will tend to choose the spaceship based 
on the stable probabilities predicting the outcome of the first choice (habit-directed behaviour) 
without regard to eventual consequences (actual reward outcome). Such behavioural 
                                                          
205 Starting from participant 24 the participants were presented with the score (number of gems obtained) 
ranking of the previous participants. Those scoring more than the third, second and first in the ranking 
earned prizes (a small chocolate bar for those getting the third place, a big chocolate bar for those getting 
the second place and both bars for those getting the first place). 
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tendencies show low reflectance. The instructions given to the respondents can be found in 
appendix 4.B. 
Model-based behaviour is related to reflectiveness in that those acting in such way are more 
likely to supress habitual responses in order to respond in a manner more compatible with their 
goals. In the mind dual-system approach such operation corresponds to being reflective, i.e. 
stopping autonomous processing and simulate in order to figure out the most appropriate 
manner to achieve one’s goals. 
The CRT (task 5) (Cognitive reflection test) (Frederick, 2005). In this task participants are asked 
to respond to three apparently simple questions. Each one of them is kept on the screen until 
an answer is typed and entered. The task is self-paced and unspeeded.  
The three questions are tailored in a way that causes a wrong answer to come most readily to 
mind just after the reading of it. The basic idea is that a low reflective subject would indeed give 
such a (wrong) answer, whereas a highly reflective one would resist the impulse of rashly giving 
that answer, being therefore more likely to give the correct answer. The questions and the 
answers explained can be found in appendix 4.B.  
This test has been widely used as the main measure of reflectiveness. The capacity to refrain 
from giving the intuitive but wrong responses corresponds to control over autonomous 
processing. It shows greater reflectiveness, given it is linked to the ability to supervise and 
interrupt intuitive thinking when appropriate. The reflectiveness index yielded by the task 
consists of the number of correct answers given by the participant (0 correct responses indicates 
lowest reflectiveness and 3 correct responses indicate highest reflectiveness).   
However, some works (Welsh et al., n.d. and Hoppe and Kusterer, 2011) argue the CRT has 
predictive power just with regards to biases that arise from problems having a calculable correct 
response, whose solution requires analytical skills. They thus suggest the CRT has serious 
limitations to measure reflectiveness in general. Moreover, the vast majority of respondents 
give no correct responses, which decreases the resolution of the test. Because of these 
shortcomings, we chose to measure reflectiveness in the alternative way presented above (the 
MFMB) which is the preferred approach.  
4.3.2.4. Empathy (tasks 3, 6 and 7) 
In this section I explain how I extract empathy measures from tasks 3, 6 and 7 (the RME, the EQ 
and the AQ, respectively).  
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We use three different tasks to look at empathy. The reason is because it is a broad concept and 
as such it can be approached in different ways. We want to check whether those alternative 
approaches change the results. We then look at empathy as related to ‘theory of mind’ or 
cognitive empathy (i.e. being able to recognise others’ feelings and intentions, with the RME 
task), as related to autism (with AQ questionnaire) and as related to emotional empathy (feeling 
what someone else feels), which is the most common sense given to the word (with the EQ 
questionnaire).  
The RME (task 3) (based on Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). In this task for each of the 36 trials 
subjects are presented with a photograph of the eye region of different actors expressing 
different emotions or thoughts. Together with the picture, which keeps being visualized until an 
answer is given, there are four alternatives describing the eye expression, one of which is 
correct. The response is given by typing a keyboard key corresponding to the description chosen 
(the subjects are given a list of word definitions in case they are not familiar with some of the 
words describing the thoughts or emotions concerned). The task is self-paced and unspeeded.  
The test is originally described to be an ‘advanced theory of mind test’, where ‘theory of mind’ 
stands for “the ability to attribute mental states to oneself or another person” (Premack and 
Woodruff, 1978 as cited in Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). The concept is also referred by other 
names and overlaps with empathy (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). In this study, it is one of the ways 
used to measure empathy. The instructions for the task and an example of a trial can be seen in 
appendix 4.B. 
The RME contains 36 questions, each of which can be right or wrong. The scale formed by 
counting the correct answers allows to measure empathy as revealed by the capacity to “tune 
in” to other people’s mental states. It goes from 0 to 36 correct answers, where 0 means low 
empathy and 36 means high empathy.  
The EQ (task 6) (based on Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright, 2004). In this task subjects are asked 
to respond to 60 questions using a four-points scale going from ‘strongly agree’ to ‘strongly 
disagree’. The question and the scale appear simultaneously on the screen and remain in view 
until an answer is given (by pressing a key corresponding to the option chosen). The task is self-
paced and unspeeded.  
As the name suggests the questionnaire contains questions tailored to measure subjects’ degree 
of empathy. The questionnaire can be found on appendix 4.B.206 The minimum score is 0 and 
                                                          
206 The questions were given in a fixed order for all subjects. 
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the maximum 80, where 0 represents the lowest level of empathy and 80 represents the highest 
level of empathy (the scoring process is shown in appendix 4.B).  
The AQ (task 7) (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). This task is virtually identical to the previous one in 
structure. The only difference is that the questions are different and there are 50 instead of 60 
of them. 
The questionnaire is used to determine the autism degree of the subjects, and the scale goes 
from 0 to 50, where 0 indicates low level of autism (equivalent to a high degree of empathy) and 
50 indicates high level of autism (related to a low degree of empathy). The scoring process is 
shown in appendix 4.B. 
In the same way as with the RME, although the AQ is not intended to measure empathy directly, 
it allows us to look at it from a different standpoint, given the strong relation existing between 
autism and empathy. 
4.3.2.5. Time consistency when choosing for others (task 9) 
In this section I describe the strategy to identify those choosing more time-consistently for 
others. 
The TC (task 9) (based on Chark et al., 2015). In this task the participants are asked to choose 40 
times for someone they have never and will never meet between an amount of money to be 
received on a specific day and another larger amount to be received on a later day. There are 4 
sets of 10 questions. The first set of choices is between a sum of money received ‘today’ and a 
larger sum received ‘7 days from now’ (the amounts of money received vary across the 
questions within and between each set); the second set of choices is between a sum received ‘2 
days from now’ and a larger sum received 9 days from now’; the third set of choices is between 
‘31 days from now’ and ‘38 days from now’; the final set of choices is between ‘301 from now’ 
and ‘308 days from now’. Participants receive a sheet containing the instructions and the 
questions and respond by ticking with a pen the preferred answers. The task is self-paced and 
unspeeded. 
The basic idea is that a time-consistent (exponential discounter) individual would keep their 
inter-temporal preference the same in the different questions set, e.g. if they prefer £100 today 
rather than £125 in ‘7 days from now’ they would also prefer £100 in ‘301 days from now’ than 
£125 in ‘308 days from now’. The questionnaire can be found in Appendix 4.A. It is important to 
keep in mind that this task is regarding choosing time consistently for others, not for themselves. 
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Intuitively speaking the definition of time-consistency relies on the idea that when faced with 
options between receiving a sum of money in a specific date and another larger sum on another 
more distant date the time-consistent agent would base his choice on the distance between the 
two dates, not on the distance between the dates and the present. In other words, the time-
consistent agent is not present-biased, i.e. does not give more weight to sums to be received 
closer to the present.207    
Mathematically time-consistency is modelled as exponential discounting, which can be 
represented as 
𝑑 = 1 (1 + 𝑟)𝑡⁡⁄ ,            (4.4)    
where 𝑑 is the discount factor multiplying the amount to be discounted, 𝑟 is the discount rate 
and 𝑡 is the period the sum is to be received.  
The task allows me to distinguish between hyperbolic discounters208 and exponential 
discounters. Also by including trade-offs between values received in the present and in 7 days 
from the present (which is not in Chark et al., 2015) it allows me to detect quasi-hyperbolic 
discounters209 (the questionnaire can be seen in appendix 4.A).210  
The ones choosing in the same way in the four scenarios are regarded as choosing (time) 
consistently for others.  
4.3.2.6. The elicitation of the EMU as the EIS (task 10) 
The EIS test (Task 10) (Barsky et al., 1997 and Atkinson et al., 2009). In this task the participants 
are asked to choose, for a group of people they do not know, among different retirement plans. 
The context is as follows: the hypothetical group of individuals is composed of 50 year old 
people, and they (and their partners) are expected to live to be 80. There is no inflation, and 
their income after tax is guaranteed to be £3000 each month from age 50 to age 80. The 
respondents are presented with 5 cards, each of which contains from 2 to 5 retirement plans 
which consist of getting a loan before retirement and paying it off afterwards, i.e. spending more 
                                                          
207 Risk issues with receiving a sum in the future must be null. 




where 𝑎 is a parameter regarding the curvature of the discount factor with respect to time.  
209 The quasi-hyperbolic discounter is biased in the short-run but discounts consistently in the long-run, 
i.e. when the trade-offs occurs further in the future. Mathematically it can be represented as the following 
sequence of discounting factors {1, 𝑏𝑑, … , 𝑏𝑑𝑡 , …}, where 0<𝑏<1.   
210 Respondents 1 to 10 did not answer this questionnaire and respondents 11 to 24 answered the 
questionnaire as in Chark et al. (2015). Also the no-risk statement in the instruction (see appendix A) was 
put from participant 27 onwards. 
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before than after retirement, or saving before retirement and spending more after. Each plan 
implies a different interest rate and consumption growth, from which the EMU as inter-temporal 
inequality aversion can be estimated. 
The task was administrated by giving the participants a sheet of paper containing both the 
instructions and the alternatives. The task is self-paced and unspeeded. 
In Barsky et al. (1997) the respondents take decisions for themselves, and in Atkinson et al. 
(2009) they decide for the government. In my study by contrast they are asked to decide directly 
for others. In decisions to be taken for society as a whole like in Atkinson et al. (2009) empathy 
has a relativelly small role to play, given the impersonal nature of the question. The context we 
use is more appropriate for this study because it is more likely to reveal how empathy affects 
the EIS and at the same time keeps the respondent in the position of a social planner (i.e. 
choosing for others).  
A social planner maximizing a welfare function (consistent with the SWEM) represented by 𝑊 =
∑ (1 + 𝛿)−𝑡𝑈(𝐶𝑡)
𝑡=∞
𝑡=0 , where 𝛿 is the utility discount rate and 𝑈(𝐶𝑡) is a iso-elastic utility 
function, subject to an inter-temporal wealth constraint represented by  
𝐴𝑡+1 − 𝐴𝑡 = 𝑟𝑡𝐴𝑡 + 𝑌𝑡 − 𝐶𝑡,            (4.5) 
where 𝐴 stands for the amount of assets possessed, 𝑟 is the rate of interest and 𝑌 is labour 
income, yields the Euler equation, which can be expressed as 
∆ log(𝐶𝑡) = 𝑠(𝑟𝑡 − 𝜌),            (4.6) 
where 𝑠 is the EIS (1 𝜂⁄  or 
1
𝐸𝑀𝑈⁄ ) and 𝜌 yields information on the value of the subjective 
discount rate. Notice it contains four parameters, consumption growth, return rate, pure 
discount rate and 𝜂 (the EMU). In each decision for each card in the questionnaire concerned 
there is a consumption growth and a return rate implicit, so with two choices it is possible to 
derive an implicit pure discount rate and an EMU value.  
There are at most five choices per card. Each card assumes an interest rate and each choice 
within a card a range of growth rates, such that the preferred growth can be anywhere between 
the alternatives above and below the chosen option. Therefore, an EMU range is estimated 
considering the answers for the cards presented, the breath of which depends on the number 
of questions asked per card.  
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The procedure to obtain the intervals is as follows. I compare the answers given for all 
combinations of card answers211 thereby getting three interval estimates, and then I consider 
the interval which is common to all of them.212 Only responses consistent with the assumed 
model are considered. This basically means the chosen growth rate must be increasing with 
interest rate.213 
Consider the example given in figures 4.1 (second card) and 4.2 (fourth card) below. The card 
represented in figure 4.1 assumes an interest rate of 0%, while the one in figure 4.2 assumes an 
interest rate of 4.6%. Option 2 in figure 4.1 presents an annual decrease rate that ranges from 
4.7% to 1.2% and option 4 in figure 4.2 presents an annual growth that ranges from 1.4% to 
3.5%. Assuming the participant chooses option 2, for example, in the third card (presented in 
Appendix 4.B) then the consistent decrease rate for option 2 in figure 4.1 goes from 2.7% to 
1.2%. With the information above we can substitute the interest rates and growth rates into the 
Euler equation in order to obtain an EMU range (which in the case above goes from 0.74 to 1.12). 
                                                          
211 Which are 3, both for the first 22 participants (11 to 32) and for rest.  
212 When the intervals do not overlap, I consider the whole range covered by the three. 
213 There are also two (one for the first 22 participants) questions designed to check whether the 
participant understood the questionnaire. 
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Figure 4.1. Task 10 card example (0% interest rate) 
Source: see text 
Figure 4.2. Task 10 card example (4.6% interest rate) 
Source: see text 
As in the previous estimation procedure it is assumed that the respondents are maximizing a 
social welfare function, and are therefore are viewed as social planners taking decisions for 
others. As such the EMU estimated is not from their own utility function, but from the social 
utility function considered appropriate by the participant. The difference in this setting 
compared to the one regarding intra-temporal inequality aversion is that the social planner 











































































4.3.3. Data description 
In this section I provide summary statistics regarding the variables observed in the experiment 
described above. 
Tables 4.2 and 4.3 show the results regarding the EMU estimates gauged from the 16th question 
of the RP and DA, respectively (i.e. risk aversion and inequality aversion, respectively). For the 
first the median and mode are 0.71-1.16 and >3.6, respectively. For inequality aversion, the 
median and mode are both >7.5. The risk aversion median is consistent with the risk aversion 
estimated in Harrison et al. (2007) (0.43-0.91) and Taylor (2013) (0.23-1.1), and the inequlity 
aversion median is consistent with the inequality aversion estimated by the second study of 
Pirttila and Uusitalo (2008) (>3). For the EIS the median midpoint is 7.34, which is lower than 
Barsky et al.’s (1997) midpoint estimate of 8.7.214 
Table 4.2. Frequency distribution for risk aversion 
Range Frequency Percent Cumulative percent 
<0 9 10 10 
0-0.5 6 7 17 
0.5-0.71 9 10 27 
0.71-1.16 23 26 53 
1.16-3.6 16 18 71 
3.6> 24 28 100 
Total 87 100  
Source: see text. 
Table 4.3. Frequency distribution for inequality aversion 
Range Frequency Percent Cumulative percent 
<0 8 10 10 
0-1.5 3 4 14 
1.5-2.11 5 6 20 
2.11-3.75 7 8 28 
3.75-7.75 11 13 41 
7.75> 49 59 100 
Total 83 100  
Source: see text. 
Table 4.4 shows the summary statistics for all other variables observed in the experiment, and 
table 4.5 gives additional details regarding the CRT, the TC, gender and age. 
Table 4.4. Summary statistics for CRT, MFMB, EQ, AQ, RME, TC, AGE 
Var Mean Stdev Median Max Min NbObs 
CRT 0.81 1.07 0 3 0 93 
MFMB 0.04 0.22 0.03 0.6 -0.4 92215 
                                                          
214 I do not include a table for the EIS because each choice combination estimates a specific EIS value 
range. 
215 The test was not registered for 1 participant. 
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EQ 45.37 12.51 46 72 16 93 
AQ 17.55 5.89 17 34 5 93 
RME 25.68 3.66 26 36 16 93 
TC 0.12 0.33 0 1 0 83 
AGE 21.34 3.9 20 33 18 86216 
Source: see text 
Table 4.5. Additional details for the CRT, TC, gender and age 
No of right questions in the CRT test Frequency Percentage 
0 52 56% 
1 18 19% 
2 12 13% 
3 11 12% 
Choosing time consistently 10 12% 
Not choosing time consistently 73 88% 
Female217 73 78% 
Above 24 17 18% 
Source: see text 
4.3.4. Empirical strategy 
In this section I give a brief explanation regarding interval regressions, the statistical procedure 
used throughout.  I then analyse the context-sensitivity of the EMU estimates and its relation 
with socially desirable traits and lastly examine the influence of these traits on the EMU. 
4.3.4.1. Interval regressions 
Consider the following linear structural model218 
𝑦 = 𝒙𝜷 + 𝑢             (4.7) 
𝐸(𝑢|𝒙) = 0,             (4.8) 
where 𝒙 is the vector of explanatory variables, and 𝜷 is the vector of coefficients. 
In the case of interval regressions, the dependent variable 𝑦 is observed in intervals (which is 
the case for risk aversion, inequality aversion and the EIS in this study), so we actually observe a 
different variable 𝑤, which can be described as 𝑤 = 0 if 𝑦 ≤ 𝑟1, 𝑤 = 1 if 𝑟1 < 𝑦 ≤ 𝑟2, …, 𝑤 = 𝐽 
if 𝑦 > 𝑟𝐽, where 𝑟1 < 𝑟2… < 𝑟𝐽 are known interval limits. 
If we assume  
𝑢𝑖|𝒙𝑖, 𝑟𝑖~𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙⁡(0, 𝜎
2),           (4.9) 
                                                          
216 Age was not registered for 7 people. 
217 Gender was not registered for 3 people. 
218 The explanation is based on Wooldridge’s (2010).  
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where the subscript 𝑖 for 𝑢 and 𝒙 indicates we refer to the observations, not to the structural 
model, we can derive the conditional probabilities 𝑃(𝑤 = 𝑗|𝒙) for 𝑗 = 0, 1, … , 𝐽 and thus obtain 
the maximum likelihood estimators ?̂? and 𝜎2̂ for 𝜷 and 𝜎2, respectively. 
For each random draw 𝑖 the conditional log likelihood (𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃(𝑤|𝒙)) used for obtaining the 
estimators is given by 
 𝑙𝑖(𝜷, 𝜎) = 1[𝑤𝑖 = 0]log⁡{Φ[(𝑟1 − 𝒙𝑖𝜷)/𝜎]} + 1[𝑤𝑖 = 1]log⁡{Φ[(𝑟2 − 𝒙𝑖𝜷)/𝜎 − Φ[(𝑟1 −
𝒙𝑖𝜷)/𝜎]} + ⋯+ 1[𝑤𝑖 = 𝐽]log⁡{1 − Φ[(𝑟𝐽 − 𝒙𝑖𝜷)/𝜎]},      (4.10) 
where 1[. ] refers to a dummy variable equal to 1 when what is inside the brackets is true and 
equal to 0 otherwise, and Φ(. ) represents the standard normal cumulative distribution function 
(cdf).219  
The ?̂? and 𝜎2̂ are the parameters that solve  
max
𝜷,𝜎
𝐸[𝑙𝑖(𝜷, 𝜎)],          (4.11) 
whose sample analogue is 
max
𝜷,𝜎
𝑁−1∑ 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃(𝑤𝑖|𝒙𝑖; 𝜷, 𝜎)
𝑁
𝑖=1 .         (4.12) 
Finally, it must be noticed that if the interval limits change across 𝑖, which is the case for the 
analyses regarding the EIS, we have to make a further assumption, which is 
𝐷(𝑦𝑖|𝒙𝑖 , 𝑟𝑖1, … , 𝑟𝑖𝐽) = 𝐷(𝑦𝑖|𝒙𝑖),         (4.13) 
which basically says the interval limits must be independent of 𝑦𝑖  conditional on 𝒙𝑖 [𝐷(. ) stands 
for distribution].  
4.3.4.2. Context analysis 
The main question regarding the context analysis is whether highly empathetic/reflective 
participants’ EMU varies across contexts more than does lowly empathetic/reflective 
participants’ EMU. I also look at the influence of age and time consistency. 
To answer this question we stack the data220 and then divide the participants into highly and 
lowly empathetic/reflective according to the different empathy and reflectiveness measures. 
Such a division was made in two ways. In the first we divided the sample in two after ordering it 
                                                          




220 This is, we stacked the estimates of the EMU as risk aversion, inequality aversion and as the EIS and 
the corresponding trait measurements.  
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according to the empathy/reflectiveness measures, obtaining the 50% most and least 
empathetic/reflective. In the second just the 33% at the beginning and end of the distribution 
are considered, rendering an analysis relative to the third at the top and bottom of the ordered 
measures. Throughout this analysis I account for clustering at the level of the respondent given 
that for most participants the EMU is measured as risk/inequality aversion and EIS.221 
We conduct the same analysis for those older than 24 years as opposed to those younger (or 
exactly at 24 years) and those choosing time consistently for others as opposed to those not 
choosing time consistently. The results obtained for each group referred above are also 
compared with the ones obtained considering all the participants. 
To test whether the EMU (𝜂) estimated as the EIS is equal to the EMU estimated as risk and 
inequality aversion inside the groups referred above we use interval regressions of the following 
form: 
𝜂 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑅𝑃 + 𝛽2𝐷𝐷𝐴,         (4.14) 
where 𝐷𝑅𝑃 is a dummy variable indicating the EMU intervals were estimated as risk aversion 
and 𝐷𝐷𝐴 is a dummy variable indicating the EMU intervals were estimated as inequality aversion. 
In such a framework, the EMU estimated as the EIS equals to 𝛽0, the EMU estimated as risk 
aversion equals to 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 and the EMU estimated as inequality aversion equals to 𝛽0 + 𝛽2. 
Thus, to test whether the EMU as risk (inequality) aversion is equal to the EMU as the EIS we 
have to look at whether 𝛽1 = 0 (𝛽2 = 0).    
To test whether the EMU as risk aversion is equal to the EMU as inequality aversion we use the 
following equation: 
𝜂 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑅𝑃 + 𝛽2𝐷𝐸𝐼𝑆,         (4.15) 
in which 𝐷𝐸𝐼𝑆 is a dummy variable indicating the EMU intervals were estimated as the EIS. In this 
case, the EMU estimated as risk aversion equals to 𝛽0 + 𝛽1, as in the last equation. The EMU 
estimated as inequality aversion, on the other hand, equals to 𝛽0. Thus, to test whether the EMU 
                                                          
221 To be more precise that is the case for 52 participants out of 93. 31 participants answered just the RP 
and DA due to their not answering consistently the questionnaire eliciting the EMU as the EIS, thus having 
their EMU estimated only as risk aversion and inequality aversion. 5 participants answered just the RP and 
other five just answered the DA (having thus their EMU estimated as risk and inequality aversion only), 
due to being interviewed at the beginning of the research (they were the first 10 to participate) where 
the task relative to estimating the EMU as the EIS was not included and the participants were given just 
one of the two tasks regarding EMU estimation. Moreover, the 5 participants answering just the DA had 
not their EMU as inequality aversion considered, since after the pilot the method to estimate the EMU as 
inequality aversion changed. 
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as risk aversion is equal to the EMU as inequality aversion we examine whether 𝛽1 is statistically 
different from 0. 
4.3.4.3. EMU estimates analysis 
For this analysis I do three kind of analysis (in all I use interval regressions). In the first I do not 
stack the data, but estimate an EMU parameter for each group222 in each of the three contexts 
and then compare them. In the same way as for the context analysis, the estimations obtained 
for each group are also compared with the estimations obtained considering all the participants 
(within each context).  
In the second I stack the data and run 6 pooled regressions (accounting for clustering at the level 
of the participant), each one with an index of empathy, an index of reflectiveness, a dummy 
indicating those choosing time consistently for others, another dummy indicating those with 
more than 24 years of age, and more two dummies indicating context as explanatory 
variables.223 Then I run another regression containing just variables that were significant in at 
least one of the 6 previous regressions. From the latter I derive conclusions on how the traits 
affect the EMU for the sample. 
The third is the same as the second, but without the context dummies. The goal is to observe 
how the EMU varies in response to the psychological traits only. 
4.4. Results and discussion 
In the first subsection of this section I present the results regarding the context analysis (in which 
I analyse the constancy of the EMU across the contexts). In the second I look at the results 
regarding the EMU estimates analysis (in which I analyse how the traits considered affect the 
EMU estimates). In the final subsection I discuss the results in light of the literature reviewed 
earlier (section 4.2). 
4.4.1. Context analysis 
The context analysis results for all participants show in general they treat the risk prospect (RP) 
context224 differently from the distributional alternatives (DA) and EIS contexts,225 but treat the 
                                                          
222 The framework for the analysis is similar to the one regarding the previous analysis. The data is divided 
between the 50% and 30% most (least) reflective and empathetic participants, those with more than 24 
years old as opposed to those with less than (or equal to) 24 and those choosing time consistently for 
others as opposed to those not choosing time consistently for others. So these are the groups referred. 
223 It must be 6 regressions in order to contemplate all the combinations regarding the 2 indexes of 
reflectiveness and the 3 indexes of empathy considered. 
224 The context in which the EMU as risk aversion is estimated. 
225 The contexts in which the EMU is estimated as inequality aversion and as the EIS, respectively. 
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DA context in the same way they treat the EIS.226 The results for the 50% most (least) 
empathetic/reflective participants can be visualized on table 4.6. Notice highly empathetic 
people as measured by the EQ and the RME scale treat the DA context differently from the EIS, 
suggesting more empathetic people tend to treat all contexts differently, as opposed to low 
empathetic people whose EMU as inequality aversion is not significantly different from the EMU 
as EIS.  
Table 4.6. Context analysis for the 50% most (least) empathetic/reflective participants 
 H0: RP=EIS H0: DA=EIS H0: RP=DA 




























































The table presents z-statistics. The numbers in parenthesis are p-values. ** indicates the relevant coefficient is 
significant at 1%, * at 5% and ° at 10%. 
The results regarding the 33% most (least) empathetic/reflective participants in table 4.7 also 
suggest more empathetic people tend to treat the DA context differently from the EIS, but in 
addition show low reflective people as measured by the MFMB scale tend to do the same. Notice 
the fact the effect of empathy on how participants treat the contexts was detected in the 
comparison between the 50% and 33% most (least) empathetic and the effect of reflectiveness 
appeared only when we compared the most (least) 33% reflective227 suggests the empathy 
effect is stronger (more easily detectable).  
                                                          
226 It basically means that only their EMU estimated as inequality aversion is equal to their EMU estimated 
as the EIS. Considering all participants, the coefficient testing RP=EIS (which is the null hypothesis) is -6.11 
(the p-value being 9.97e-10), the coefficient testing RP=DA (H0) is -7.91 (the p-value being 2.48e-15) and 
finally the coefficient testing DA=EIS (H0) is 1.69 (the p-value being 9.10e-02). Notice we consider the 5% 
significance level as the criterion to regard equality between contexts. 
227 To be more precise, the same effect is shown in the 50% comparison (table 4.6) for the MFMB, but 
just if we consider a 10% significance level.   
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Considering that empathy is an intuitive trait (not the result of reflection or slow thinking), it 
does not come as a surprise that more empathetic tend to treat intra-temporal inequality (DA) 
aversion differently from inter-temporal inequality aversion (EIS). To regard these two contexts 
as equals one would have to think about one person in different points of time as different 
people, which requires the ability to abstract inequality itself from the two different kinds of 
inequality (intra and inter-temporal) implied in the contexts. Such exercise is arguably more 
likely to occur when intuitive feelings caused by empathy are not much salient, given human 
limited capacity to direct attention to multiple objects. 
In other words, if someone is highly empathetic his attention will be in great part directed to the 
emotional charge released by the situation, which makes him less likely to realize (given 
attention and processing limitation) the similarity between redistributing money for one person 
or group over time (inter-temporal inequality) and across people (intra-temporal inequality).    
This same account helps to explain why highly reflective participants are more likely to treat the 
two contexts referred equally. This is, as more reflective they are capable to think more 
considerately about the situation, which increases the probability to realize the two contexts 
are not so different as it may look at first.228     
Table 4.7. Context analysis for the 33% most (least) empathetic/reflective participants 
 H0: RP=EIS H0: DA=EIS H0: RP=DA 
















































                                                          
228 Moreover, it is interesting to note reflectivity as measured by the CRT and empathy as measured by 
the AQ have no effect on the EMU context-sensitivity. 
229 Observations for DA=27; EIS=18; RP=28. 
230 Observations for DA=29; EIS=14; RP=30. 
231 Observations for DA=26; EIS=27; RP=20. 
232 Observations for DA=24; EIS=24; RP=24. 
233 Observations for DA=26; EIS=20; RP=27. 
234 Observations for DA=28; EIS=13; RP=32. 
235 Observations for DA=29; EIS=15; RP=29. 
236 Observations for DA=27; EIS=16; RP=30. 
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The table presents z-statistics. The numbers in parenthesis are p-values. ** indicates the relevant coefficient is 
significant at 1%, * at 5% and ° at 10%. 
The results regarding those choosing more time consistently for others and with more than 24 
years are shown in table 4.8 and table 4.9 respectively. The first shows participants choosing 
time consistently for others tend to treat the DA and EIS contexts differently, just like the most 
empathetic ones.239 The second shows participants with more than 24 years treat just the RP 
and the DA contexts differently, being thus those getting closer to act as predicted by the SWEM. 
Those with less than 24 treat all contexts differently, as the most empathetic and those choosing 
time consistently for others.240 
As long as maturity is concerned, the results are consistent with immature people being more 
impulsive.241 The basic idea is that given reflectiveness is associated with being able to refrain 
from giving impulsive responses, it is expected that younger people act more similarly to those 
with low reflectivity, which seems to be indeed the case. This shows the dangers of choosing 
convenience samples comprising students for estimating the EMU, given the SWEM 
assumptions do not fit their behaviour.242 
Table 4.8. Context analysis for participants (not) choosing time consistently for others 













The table presents z-statistics. The numbers in parenthesis are p-values. ** indicates the relevant coefficient is 
significant at 1%, * at 5% and ° at 10%. 
Table 4.9. Context analysis for participants with more (less) than 24 years old243 
 H0: RP=EIS H0: DA=EIS H0: RP=DA 






                                                          
237 Observations for DA=25; EIS=23; RP=25. 
238 Observations for DA=23; EIS=12; RP=38. 
239 It is important to note there are just 10 participants who chose time consistently for others. All of them 
answered the RP and the DA, but only six answered the RP, the DA and the EIS. 
240 It is important to notice there are only 17 people with more than 24 years old in the sample. From 
those we have 6 observations of the EMU as the EIS, 11 observations of the EMU as inequality aversion 
and 14 observations of the EMU as risk aversion. 
241 See the introduction for more details on works investigating the relation between age and impulsivity. 
242 It is important to notice these results were not known before applying the experiment, but as a result 
of the analysis, such that our choice to use a convenience sample could be not influenced by this finding. 
243 If we consider those below 24 (L_age) and above or equal to 24 (H_age) we have that 𝑅𝑃/𝐷𝐴 = 𝐸𝐼𝑆 
and 𝑅𝑃 ≠ 𝐷𝐴 for H_age and 𝑅𝑃 ≠ 𝐷𝐴/𝐸𝐼𝑆⁡and 𝐷𝐴 = 𝐸𝐼𝑆 for L_age, which does not change the general 
conclusion regarding being older than 24. 
244 DA=11, EIS=6, RP=14 observations. 
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The table presents z-statistics. The numbers in parenthesis are p-values. ** indicates the relevant coefficient is 
significant at 1%, * at 5% and ° at 10%. 
It is interesting to note at this point that different to Atkinson et al. (2009), Groom and 
Maddison’s (2013) results (which are mostly based on revealed preferences, therefore not 
experimentally) suggest people in general do not treat the three contexts differently. Since 
Atkinson et al.’s (2009) sample is probably formed by younger people than the ones used by 
Groom and Maddison (2013),245 based on the results shown on table 4.9 it is reasonable to 
speculate that differences in age between the samples is an important factor generating the 
different conclusions. It must be noticed however, that there are many other differences 
between Atkinson et al. (2009) and Groom and Maddison (2013) that may cause the results to 
differ, especially variations regarding the methodologies used. 
Therefore, overall the results regarding the context analysis suggest more empathetic people 
tend to treat contexts more differently than less empathetic. More specifically, they treat the 
DA and EIS contexts differently, whereas less empathetic people treat them equally. The same 
effect is observed in participants who choose time consistently for other people, in participants 
with less or equal to 24 years and in less reflective participants, although the latter effect is 
probably weaker than the empathy effect.  On the other hand, people with more than 24 years 
treated two of the three comparisons equally, being those acting closer to predicted by SWEM 
in the study. Such result may help to understand why Atkinson et al. (2009) and Groom and 
Maddison (2013) got results suggesting different conclusions with regards the constancy of the 
EMU across the contexts. 
4.4.2. EMU estimates analysis 
The EMU point estimates (calculated per context by interval regression) considering all 
participants can be seen on table 4.10. The EMU estimated as risk aversion is about 2, the EMU 
as inequality aversion is about 9 and the EMU estimated as EIS is about 5.5.  
The point estimate for the EMU as risk aversion is compatible with the median values obtained 
by works like Carlsson et al. (2005) (with median EMU in the interval 2-3) and Hryshko et al. 
(2011) (with EMU median in the interval 2 to 3.76), while the median interval obtained in the 
study (0.71-1.16) is compatible with values obtained by Taylor (2013) (0.237 - 1.1) and Harrison 
et al. (2007) (0.43 - 0.91).  
                                                          
245 Atkinson et al.’s (2009) sample overrepresents young people, which is not the case for Groom and 
Maddison (2013), who in most cases use samples obtained from the general public to derive their results.   
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The point estimate for the EMU as inequality aversion is far above the median values obtained 
by the works gathered in the literature review (with median varying from 0 to 3); that is also the 
case for the median interval in the study (above 7.5). However, the modal value is the same as 
for Atkinson et al. (2009) (above 7.5), which indicates the point estimate is probably compatible 
with the value they would have obtained had they estimated a point estimate using interval 
regression. 
Finally, the point estimate for the EMU as EIS is below the interval midpoint of the median 
individual in Atkinson et al. (2009) (8.8) and the modal response in Barsky et al. (1997) (midpoint 
of 8.7). However, the mode and the median midpoint obtained in the study (7.34) are reasonably 
compatible with the values obtained in the studies mentioned.  
Table 4.10. EMU estimation per context considering all participants 
 EMU 
RP (risk aversion) 1.950 
(0.237) 




Source: see text. Standard errors are shown in parenthesis. 
In the following I present the results regarding the first kind of analysis referred in section 
4.3.4.3, in which I compare EMU estimates for low and highly reflective participants, low and 
highly empathetic participants, mature and imature participants and finally time consistent and 
not time consistent participants.  
The estimates regarding the 50% most (least) empathetic/reflective are presented on table 4.11. 
Notice the estimates for the highly reflective (as measured by both the CRT and the MFMB 
scales) are lower than the ones referring to low reflective in the RP and DA contexts. The 
differences are larger than 0.5246 in all cases except for the MFMB scale in the RP context. It 
suggests the EMU estimated is smaller for highly reflective people. Also notice all estimates for 
the highly empathetic in the RP and DA contexts are smaller than the ones obtained considering 
all participants. Figure 4.3 makes it easier to visualize the results. 
Table 4.11. EMU estimation per context regarding the 50% most/least empathetic/reflective 













                                                          
246 Which is significant in the SDR context. Nonehteless, Appendix 4.D shows the EMU estimates 95% 




















































Source: see text. Standard errors are shown in parenthesis.  
Figure 4.3. EMU estimation per context regarding the 50% most/least empathetic/reflective 
Source: see text. Notes: (1) L_ stands for the 50% least empathetic/reflective and H_ stands for the 50% most 
empathetic/reflective. 
The estimates for the 30% most (least) empathetic/reflective people are shown on table 4.12. 
Notice the estimates for the highly empathetic in the RP and DA contexts are higher than the 
ones regarding the low empathetic, and it is the opposite in the EIS context. It suggests EMU 
estimates tend to be higher for more empathetic people in the RP and DA contexts and tend to 
be lower in the EIS context.  
However, some results from table 4.11 contradict those shown on table 4.12, which brings into 
question the conclusions regarding the effects of reflectiveness and empathy on the EMU 
estimates referred. Figure 4.4 makes it easier to visualize the results.      
Table 4.12. EMU estimation per context regarding the 30% most/least empathetic/reflective 
HIGHLY EMP/REF RP DA EIS 














































































Source: see text. Standard errors are shown in parenthesis. 
Figure 4.4. EMU estimation per context regarding the 30% most/least empathetic/reflective 
Source: see text. 
The estimates for participants with more (less) than 24 years old and choosing (not choosing) 
time consistently for others are shown in tables 4.13 and 4.14, respectively. Participants with 
more than 24 have higher estimates than participants with less than 24 for the RP and EIS 
contexts; it is the opposite for the DA context.247 On the other hand, in this analysis it is not 
possible to say whether there are significant differences in EMU estimates for participants 
choosing consistently and not consistently for others in the DA context, considering that all time 
                                                          
247 Considering those above or equal 24 (H_age) and below 24 (L_age) we have for the RP: EMU=2.439 
(H_age) and EMU=1.777 (L_age); for the DA: EMU=10.91 (H_age) and EMU=9.03 (L_age); for the EIS: 
























consistent chose the highest interval (above 7.5). In the other 2 contexts there are no significant 
differences. 
Table 4.13. EMU estimation per context for participants with more (less) than 24 years old 














Source: see text. 
Table 4.14. EMU estimation per context for participants choosing (not choosing) time 
consistently for others 
 EMU  
TC (choosing time consistently for others)_RP 1.997 
(0.887) 









Source: see text. 
Thus the general conclusion is that more empathetic people tend to have different values for 
the EMU than low empathetic people, but the way they differ varies across contexts. More 
empathetic have higher values for the RP and DA contexts and lower values for the EIS contexts. 
Similarly, those with more than 24 years differ from those with 24 years or more in EMU values, 
but the direction of the difference varies across contexts. They have higher values for the RP and 
EIS contexts and lower values for the DA context.249   
In Appendix 4.D we show the 95% confidence interval for all EMU parameters estimated in this 
analysis. It shows the estimates vary significantly across contexts, but no significant variation 
                                                          
248 All participants in this category have EMU above 7.75. 
249 Another interesting result worthy to mention is that we found a significant correlation between left 
handed people and choosing time consistently for others. 
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across traits is found. The lowest EMU was obtained in the risk aversion context and the highest 
in the inequality aversion context.  
Now I present the results for the second analysis referred to in section 4.3.4.3, for which I run 
interval regressions in order to determine what traits and contexts significantly affect the EMU 
and to measure their influence on the parameter. For both the second and third analysis 
presented in this section the final regression and the 6 regressions indicating the significant 
variables to be included in it are shown in Appendix 4.E.   
In all six regressions run to identify traits and contexts significantly affecting the EMU the dummy 
indicating risk aversion context was significant (meaning the RP context was treated differently 
while the DA and EIS context were treated equally);250 in the two regressions where the RME 
index for empathy was used it was significant. Also, the dummy indicating those choosing time 
consistently for others was significant in all cases. Both the empathy measure and the time 
consistency dummy are positively related to the EMU estimate, suggesting those possessing 
such characteristics tend to have higher estimates than the general population.  
For those being maximally empathetic according to the RME251 measure and choosing time 
consistently for others the EMU as risk aversion is equal to 3.63; as inequality aversion and EIS 
the EMU is 8.27. For the least empathetic252 and not choosing time consistently for others the 
EMU as risk aversion is -4.64; as inequality aversion and EIS the EMU is 0.    
Finally, the results regarding the third analysis referred in section 4.3.4.3 (which is equal to the 
previous analysis without the context dummies)253 are as follows. Both the RME and the time 
consistency regarding others variables were significant at least once in the first 6 regressions,254 
being thus included in the final regression. Considering the latter we have an EMU of 9 for the 
most empathetic and time consistent people, an EMU not significantly different from 0 for the 
least empathetic and not time consistent people and an EMU of 4.75 for the “average person” 
(not choosing time consistently for others and at the mean RME score).  
4.4.3. Discussion 
In this section I relate the results from the EMU estimates analysis with the literature review 
comments made in section 4.2.6. Notice I do not address the context analysis in this section 
                                                          
250 Which is in accordance with the context analysis considering all participants in all contexts. 
251 This is, scoring 36 points in the RME test. 
252 Scoring 0 in the RME test. 
253 It allows us to concentrate on the traits. 
254 The time consistency variable was significant in all 6 and the RME was significant in the two regressions 
it is included in. 
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because no other work was found in the literature review dealing with the same issues (i.e. with 
how psychological traits affect the EMU context-sensitivity). 
The findings shown in analyses 2 and 3 that empathy is positively related with the EMU is 
consistent with our expectations, which are based on the relationship between empathy and 
political views found in Johansson-Stenman et al. (2002) and Carlsson et al. (2005). However, in 
the present study the relation is found for the EMU in general (considered equally across the 
contexts), not for inequality aversion, which is the factor investigated by the articles. 
The first study’s results (in which the EMU estimates are shown for each context and measure) 
regarding the effect of empathy on the EMU are also consistent with the papers cited early (and 
therefore with our expectations). In almost all cases (there is one exception)255 the EMU as 
inequality aversion is higher for highly empathetic people.       
Also in the first analysis, almost all the results256 regarding the relationship between the EMU as 
risk aversion and reflectiveness show a negative correlation between the variables. This is 
consistent with the Taylor (2013) results. 
The negative correlation between maturity and the EMU as inequality aversion (also found in 
the first analysis) is consistent with Harrison et a. (2007), but differs from results found in 
Hryshko et al.  (2011) and works in psychology (like Steinberg, 2008 and Steinberg and Scott, 
2003) which show a positive correlation between age and risk-taking behaviour. This result is 
fragile though, for If we regard those with 24 years as mature the correlation becomes positive.                     
The findings regarding the relation between choosing time consistently for others (in analyses 2 
and 3) and the EMU is (to knowledge) unprecedented. However, it again refers to the EMU in 
general.  
4.5. Conclusion 
In this work, I estimate the EMU and measure psychological traits which are arguably perceived 
as socially desirable for a sample of roughly 93 people (the majority are students).257 The 
parameter is estimated experimentally in three different ways, each of which interpret it 
differently as risk aversion, intra-temporal inequality aversion (or simply inequality aversion) 
                                                          
255 The exception being for the AQ when the comparison is done for 50% most and least empathetic. 
256 Once again there is one exception, which is for the MFMB measure when the comparison is done 
between the 30% most and least reflective. 
257 It is important to notice again that the influence of age (and therefore of using a sample consisting 
mostly of students) on the EMU was noticed as a result of the experiment and therefore could not be 
taken into consideration for the design of the experiment. Nonetheless, it would be certainly ideal to have 
a sample representative of the general population. 
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and inter-temporal inequality aversion (EIS). The traits referred are empathy, reflectiveness, 
maturity and time consistency when choosing for others. 
The two main analyses carried out with the data aim to obtain EMU estimates with more 
normative significance than works estimating it using samples drawn from the general 
population or only students (i.e. which do not ‘sample-frame’) and to investigate whether the 
traits influence the constancy of the parameter across the contexts.  
The analysis drew mainly from Drupp et al. (2015) and Atkinson et al. (2009). The first survey 
among prestigious economists familiar with the subject what EMU they think is ideal to be 
considered in the (long-term) SDR determination. The fact that scientists have been shown to 
be highly autistic and therefore less empathetic (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) suggests another 
sample selection useful to deriving an ideal EMU can be obtained based on psychological traits 
perceived as socially desirable, such as empathy. The second tests the constancy of the EMU 
across the different contexts considered herein, but they do not select their sample in any way 
to reflect ideal social planners,258 such that their study does not test the SWEM normative 
validity.  
In the first analysis the parameter estimates regarding those possessing a high level of the 
named traits are compared to those possessing a low level of them in order to identify the 
direction the parameter goes when the traits vary (EMU estimates analysis). In the second the 
two groups are again compared in terms of which has their EMU varying more across contexts 
(context analysis). 
Regarding the context analysis the results suggest more empathetic (as measured by the RME 
test and the EQ questionnaire) people’s EMU estimates vary more across contexts than low 
empathetic people EMU estimates, and for people in general (i.e. when the whole sample is 
considered). The same happens for those choosing time consistently compared to others. On 
the other hand, more reflective people, as measured by the MFMB test, have their estimates 
varying less than those less reflective, but not less than people in general.259 For those possessing 
more than 24 years we find they treat contexts more equally than those with less than or equal 
24 and also more equally than the general analysis (whole sample).  
No group treated all three contexts equally as predicted by the SWEM, which suggests besides 
not describing the behaviour of the general population, the model also does not describe the 
                                                          
258 In this study it is done by comparing those possessing a high (low) level of psychological traits perceived 
as socially desirable. 
259 Less reflective people (MFMB), however, treat the context more differently than people in general. 
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behaviour of ideal social planners (in terms of socially desirable traits), not serving thus as a good 
normative model. Such results reinforce the need to develop a theoretical framework capable 
of disentangling risk, inequality and intertemporal inequality,260 but also calls attention to the 
fact some specific groups may be better described by the model than others.  
Moreover, the results relative to how maturity influences the constancy of the parameter across 
contexts may help to explain why results in Atkinson et al. (2009) and Groom and Maddison 
(2013) lead to different conclusions regarding the issue. It is also possible to conjecture that the 
findings relative to the other traits also contribute in this respect if one assumes their samples 
differ in the degree of empathy, reflectiveness, etc. (which is possible given how different they 
are).    
Regarding the first analysis the results are for the most part mixed. More empathetic 
participants had lower estimates in the RP context (risk aversion) and DA context (inequality 
aversion) and higher for the EIS context. Participants with more than 24 had higher estimates 
for the RP and EIS contexts and lower for the DA context. The results for more reflective 
participants were not consistent and there is no significant difference between those choosing 
and not choosing time consistently for others in the RP and EIS contexts, while in the DA context 
it is not possible to determine whether it is different or not.  
For the second and third analysis the results show more empathetic participants and 
participants choosing time consistently for others tend to have higher estimates. Such results 
suggest the ideal social planners as defined in the study tend to have higher EMU estimates than 
the general population. 
A direct policy implication of the results presented above is that the ideal EMU is higher than 
the one obtained from the general population. It must be underlined that such recommendation 
relies on the assumption that the ideal EMU does not simply reflect the preferences of the 
majority of the population, but reflects to a larger extent the preferences of the individuals 
possessing socially desirable psychological traits. 
Notice, however, that the EMU values obtained in the EMU estimates analysis are the result of 
a first attempt at estimating how much larger (assuming empathy is a desirable trait) the ideal 
EMU value is relative to the EMU value of the overall population. Therefore, it is important that 
more works investigate the issue – in special works trying to integrate ‘sample framing’ with 
                                                          
260 As noticed in chapter 1 Epstein and Zin (1989) give an important contribution in that sense by 
disentangling the EIS and risk aversion.  
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revealed-preferences techniques of estimating the EMU – before additional and more specific 
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Appendix 4.A – Tasks on economic decision making 
 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE RP: 
Imagine you are actually faced with the choice described in the problems below and indicate 
the decision you would make in each case. There is no correct answer to such problems. 
Type 'a' to choose option a, 'b' to choose option b, 'c' to choose option c and so on. 
After reading these instructions, if you have no questions, type spacebar to go to the 
questionnaire. 
QUESTIONS 1 TO 15 OF THE RP: 
Questions optionA_1 optionB_1 
1) In addition to what you own, you have 
been given 1,000 pounds. You are now 
asked to choose between 
A) 50% chance of a further 1,000 pounds B) A further 500 pounds for sure 
2) In addition to what you own, you have 
been given 2,000 pounds. You are now 
asked to choose between 
A) Lose 500 pounds for sure 
B) 50% chance to lose 1,000 
pounds 
3) Choose between 
A) 33% chance of 2,500 pounds; 66% 
chance of 2,400 pounds; 1% chance of 0 
pounds 
B) 2,400 pounds for sure 
Choose between A) 34% chance of 2,400 pounds B) 33% chance of 2,500 pounds 
5) Choose between A) 3,000 pounds for sure B) 80% chance of 4,000 pounds 
Choose between A) 25% chance of 3,000 pounds B) 20% chance of 4,000 pounds 
7) Choose between A) 90% chance of 3,000 pounds B) 45% chance of 6,000 pounds 
Choose between A) 2% chance of 3,000 pounds B) 1% chance of 6,000 pounds 
9) Choose between A) 7% chance of 10 pounds B) 0.7 pounds for sure 
Choose between A) 7% chance of 1,000 pounds B) 70 pounds for sure 
11) Choose between A) 80% chance to lose 4,000 pounds B) Lose 3,000 pounds for sure 
Choose between 
A) 20% chance to lose 4,000 pounds 
B) 25% chance to lose 3,000 
pounds 
Choose between  
A) 45% chance to lose 6,000 pounds 
B) 90% chance to lose 3,000 
pounds 
Choose between A) 1% chance to lose 6,000 pounds B) 2% chance to lose 3,000 pounds 
15) Consider the following two-stage game. 
In the first stage, there is a probability of 




QUESTION 16 OF THE RP (MEASURING THE EMU AS INEQUALITY AVERSION): 
 




A) 28 pound for sure  
 
B) A 50% chance of 24 pounds and a 50% chance of 36 pounds 
 
C) A 50% chance of 20 pounds and a 50% chance of 44 pounds 
 
D) A 50% chance of 16 pounds and a 50% chance of 52 pounds 
 
E) A 50% chance of 12 pounds and a 50% chance of 60 pounds 
 
F) A 50% chance of 2 pounds and a 50% chance of 70 pounds 
 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DA: 
You are serving as the administrator of a GAME OF CHANCE THAT IS TO BE PLAYED BY A 
GROUP OF PEOPLE. Being a game of chance, OUTCOMES ARE ASSIGNED COMPLETELY AT 
RANDOM, e.g., by a computer generating random numbers. There are 100 persons in this 
group. All 100 members are entered in the game. REMEMBER YOU ARE ADMINISTRATING AND 
NOT PLAYING THE GAME OF CHANCE YOURSELF. 
In the following questions you will be asked to make choices about what outcomes will be 
assigned to the people playing. You do not know any of these persons, and none of them know 
you or know that you are the person selecting the outcomes that they will be assigned. The 
game is conducted publicly in an assembly; the people will be aware of what they receive and 
what others receive. You will not be there while the game is conducted, nor get reports back 
afterwards. 
In the following questions you will be given a choice between different packages of outcomes. 
Each question is completely independent. That is, when you are offered the choice between 
the outcome packages, they are in no way an alternative to previous choices and no one is 
aware of the choices you made when given previous offerings or that such alternatives existed.  
75% to end the game without winning 
anything, and a probability of 25% to move 
into the second stage. If you reach the 
second stage you have a choice between 
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You may use a calculator or any other tool, if you would like. Your job as administrator is not 
an indirect attempt to test your mental math abilities.  
Type 'a' to choose option a, 'b' to choose option b, 'c' to choose option c and so on. 
After reading these instructions, if you have no questions, type spacebar to go to the 
questionnaire. 
QUESTIONS 1 TO 15 OF THE DA: 
Questions optionA_1 optionB_1 
1) In addition to what all people in the 
group own, they have been given 1,000 
pounds. You are now asked to choose 
between 
A) 50 people receive a further 1,000 
pounds 
B) All people receive a further 500 
pounds 
2) In addition to what all people in the 
group own, they have been given 2,000 
pounds. You are now asked to choose 
between 
A) 50 people lose 1,000 pounds B) All people lose 500 pounds  
Choose between 
A) 33 people receive 2,500 pounds; 66 
people receive 2,400 pounds; 1 person 
receives 0 pounds 
B) All people receive 2,400 pounds  
Choose between A) 34 people receive 2,400 pounds B) 33 people receive 2,500 pounds 
Choose between A) 80 people receive 4,000 pounds B) All people receive 3,000 pounds  
Choose between A) 25 people receive 3,000 pounds B) 20 people receive 4,000 pounds 
Choose between A) 90 people receive 3,000 pounds B) 45 people receive 6,000 pounds 
Choose between A) 1 person receives 6,000 pounds B) 2 people receive 3,000 pounds 
Choose between A) All people receive 0.7 pounds  B) 7 people receive 10 pounds 
Choose between A) 7 people receive 1,000 pounds B) All people receive 70 pounds  
Choose between A) 80 people lose 4,000 pounds B) All people lose 3,000 pounds  
Choose between A) 20 people lose 4,000 pounds B) 25 people lose 3,000 pounds 
Choose between  A) 45 people lose 6,000 pounds B) 90 people lose 3,000 pounds 
Choose between A) 1 people lose 6,000 pounds B) 2 people lose 3,000 pounds 
This game will take place in two rounds 
and both stages are public. In Round 1, 
75 randomly selected people in the 
group are eliminated and receive 
nothing. 25 people move on to Stage 2 
of the game. In stage 2, you may award 
one of following packages  




QUESTION 16 OF THE DA (MEASURING INEQUALITY AVERSION THE ETA/EMU): 
Imagine now that MANY OTHER PEOPLE WERE INCLUDED IN THE GROUP and that they will be 
UNIFORMLY DISTRIBUTED BETWEEN A MAXIMUM AND A MINIMUM INCOME AMOUNT YOU 
HAVE TO CHOOSE. So, for example, if you choose a maximum of 100 and a minimum of 90 
pounds, 10% of the people will receive 91 pounds, other 10% will receive 92, and so on up to 
100 pounds. If you choose a maximum of 110 and a minimum of 85 pounds, 4% of the people 
will get 86 pounds, other 4% will get 87 pounds, and so on up to 110 pounds. Indicate among 
the 6 following distributions the one you would like the people in the group to participate in: 
 
A) People will be uniformly distributed between 308 and 319 pounds  
 
B) People will be uniformly distributed between 264 and 396 pounds 
 
C) People will be uniformly distributed between 220 and 484 pounds 
 
D) People will be uniformly distributed between 176 and 572 pounds  
 
E) People will be uniformly distributed between 132 and 660 pounds 
 
F) People will be uniformly distributed between 22 and 770 pounds 
 
MEASURING TIME CONSISTENCY: 
This task involves your choosing on behalf of someone you have never and will never meet 
between receiving a sum of money on a specific day and another sum of money on another 
specific day. There is no risk that this person will not receive the money. There are 40 choices 
to make. The first ten pairs of choices are about receiving £100 today versus receiving a larger 
amount 7 days from now; the second ten pairs of choices are about receiving £100 in 2 days 
from now versus receiving a larger amount of money in 9 days from now; the third ten pairs of 
choices are about receiving £100 in 31 days from now versus receiving a larger amount of 
money in 38 days from now; the fourth ten pairs of choices are about receiving £100 in 31 days 
from now versus receiving a larger amount of money in 38 days from now.  
REMEMBER THE MONEY WILL BE RECEIVED BY SOMEONE ABOUT WHOM YOU KNOW 
NOTHING AND THERE IS NO RISK SHE WILL NOT RECEIVE THE MONEY. 
Starting with the today versus 7 days from now questions please indicate your most preferred 
choice across the questions with a single tick (√). 
Example: question 1 is asking whether you prefer the referred person to receive £100 today or 




   A    B 
   Today                  7 days from now 
Question 1) £100  £101 
Question 2) £100   £104 
Question 3) £100   £107 
Question 4) £100   £110 
Question 5) £100   £113 
Question 6) £100   £116 
Question 7) £100   £119 
Question 8) £100   £122 
Question 9) £100   £125 
Question 10) £100               £128 
    
2 days from now  9 days from now 
Question 11) £100  £101 
Question 12) £100   £104 
Question 13) £100   £107 
Question 14) £100   £110 
Question 15) £100   £113 
Question 16) £100   £116 
Question 17) £100   £119 
Question 18) £100   £122 
Question 19) £100   £125 
Question 20) £100               £128 
 
                  31 days from now       38 days from now 
Question 21) £100   £101 
Question 22) £100   £104 
Question 23) £100   £107 
Question 24) £100   £110 
Question 25) £100   £113 
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Question 26) £100   £116 
Question 27) £100   £119 
Question 28) £100   £122 
Question 29) £100   £125 
Question 30) £100   £128 
 
        301 days from now  308 days from now 
Question 31) £100   £101 
Question 32) £100   £104 
Question 33) £100   £107 
Question 34) £100   £110 
Question 35) £100   £113 
Question 36) £100   £116 
Question 37) £100   £119 
Question 38) £100   £122 
Question 39) £100   £125 
Question 40) £100   £128 
 
MEASURING THE EMU AS INTERTEMPORAL INEQUALITY AVERSION:261 
Now I have a few questions about your preferences for OTHER PEOPLE’S spending and saving 
as they get older. To make the questions comparable for all respondents in the survey, let’s 
suppose that you will have to choose for a group of people who are now 50 years old, that 
they [and their partners] will live to be 80. Furthermore, suppose that there will be no 
inflation, and their income after taxes is guaranteed to be £3000 each month from age 50 to 
age 80. 
Card I contains several possible patterns of monthly spending before retirement, the darker 
bars, and after retirement, the clearer bars. By saving part of their income before retirement, 
they can have more to spend after retirement, as in choice 3. Or they could borrow and spend 
more before retirement, spending less and repaying the loan after retirement, as in choice 1.  
What would you choose for them? 
 
                                                          
261 From participants 11 to 32 the questionnaire was slightly different. They were presented with 4 cards 
(I, II, VI and V), where II had just 4 options. The only difference is that for the first participants some 





Here is another card (II) with 5 spending patterns for before and after retirement. As before, 
by saving part of their income before retirement, they can have more to spend after 
retirement.  
What would you choose for them? 
 
 
Here is another card (III) with 2 spending patterns for before and after retirement. As before, 
by saving part of their income before retirement, they can have more to spend after 
retirement.  














































































Here is another card (IV) with 5 spending patterns for before and after retirement. As before, 
by saving part of their income before retirement, they can have more to spend after 
retirement.  




Here is another card (V) with 5 spending patterns for before and after retirement. As before, 
by saving part of their income before retirement, they can have more to spend after 
retirement.  




















































































































Appendix 4.B – Tasks on psychological traits assessment  
 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE MODEL FREE MODEL BASED TASK: 
Welcome to SPACE VOYAGER! You will be playing a game where your goal is to find as many 
gems as possible. On every turn, you will make a choice between two spaceships, which will 
bring you to a planet, which may or may not yield a gem. You must read all of the instructions 
carefully. The experimenter will ask you some questions about the way the task works before 
you begin. 
Choose a spaceship: 
 
 or   
 
 Get taken to a planet: 
 
 
 or   
 
Collect your yield: 
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   or      
 
There are two things for you to learn in order to do well.  
 
1. Each spaceship has a preferred planet. At the start of each turn, you will be able to 
choose between two spaceships, which appear on the screen. One of these spaceships 
usually brings you to one of the planets, and the other spaceship usually brings you to 
the other planet. For example, one spaceship that you choose might bring you to one 
of the planets on 7 out of 10 turns. But that means that on 3 out of 10 turns, it will 
take you to the other planet, by mistake. These chances are fixed and you will have a 
sheet that tells you which spaceship leads to which planet. Learning which spaceships 
are more (or less) likely to bring you to each planet is very important to playing the 
game well. If you can do this, you will be able to make good choices that will bring you 
to the planets that are currently best.  
 
2. You need to keep track of which planets have the highest chance of yielding a gem. If a 
planet yields a gem, it will appear after the planet. If not, you will see a rock instead. 
Every time you go to a planet, the computer will decide whether or not that planet will 
yield a gem based on a 'chance', which has been assigned to that planet. The two 
planets have different chances of yielding a gem. Importantly, the chances of each 
planet yielding a gem will change slowly, and independently, over time. It is your job to 
keep track of which planet is currently best and to try and get to this planet.  There are 
no strange patterns to this game, such as a planet yielding gems on every other choice. 
The computer is not trying to play tricks on you; it strictly works on the chance 
assigned to each planet, which will change slowly over time. 
 
Now that you understand these two parts, we will remind you how they fit together in the 
game you are about to play. On each turn, you have a choice between two spaceships, you will 
choose a spaceship by clicking on it with the mouse. It will take you to a planet and you will see 
if that planet yields a gem. After you find out whether or not your planet yielded a gem, you 
will go back to the start and make another choice and try to earn another gem and so on. 
While some of the planets may become very good at times (that is, they often yield a gem), 
these same planets may become bad later in the game. You need to stay on top of which 
planets are best. You must use this information to make good choices that are likely to bring 




INSTRUCTIONS KEPT BY THE PARTICIPANT WHILST GOING THROUGH MODEL FREE MODEL 
BASED TASK (IN TREATMENT 1): 



















INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE RME TASK: 
Task instructions 
I will show you 36 different set of eyes. For each set of eyes, 4 different words will be shown in 
each corner of the screen.  
Choose which word best describes what the person in the picture is thinking or feeling by 
pressing: 
'Q' for the upper left corner 
'P' for the upper right corner 
'A' for the lower left corner 
'L' for the lower right corner 










You may feel that more than one word is applicable but please choose just one word, the word 
which you consider to be most suitable. Before making a choice, make sure that you have read 
all the 4 words. 
You should try to do the task as quickly as possible but you will not be timed. If you really do 
not know what a word means you can look it up in the definition handout. 
Press the spacebar to view an example. 
EXAMPLE OF A TRIAL IN THE RME: 
SERIOUS                                                                                                                                         ALARMED
ASHAMED                                                                                                                                BEWILDERED 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DIGIT SPAN (PART 1 AND PART  2): 
PART 1: 
You will see digits appearing on the screen. Read each digit aloud when presented. 
Your task is to remember the list of digits in the same order as presented. 
After you are showed the complete list of digits, please type your response on the keyboard. 
PLEASE DO NOT USE THE NUMBER KEYBOARD THAT CAN BE LOCKED BY THE 'NUM LOCK' KEY. 
Press the spacebar to proceed 
The blue multiplication sign indicates the beginning of a trial. You will hear a short beep when 
each digit is presented. 
We will start with a serie of 2 digits. After three trials we will add an extra digit to the serie of 
digits. 
Remember that the order of digits is important! 




Welcome to the second part! 
You will again see digits appearing on the screen.  
Now your task is to remember them in the REVERSE order as presented. 
In other words, you have to start with the last number I presented. 
For example I show you 3 and 7, then you enter 7 and then 3. 
Press the spacebar to start! 
QUESTIONS AND EXPLAINED ANSWERS FOR THE CRT: 
(1) A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How much does 
the ball cost? _____ cents 
Say the ball costs X. Then the bat costs $1 more, so it is X + 1. So we have bat + ball = X + (X + 1) 
= 1.1 because together they cost $1.10. This means 2X + 1 = 1.1, then 2X = 0.1, so X = 0.05. This 
means the ball costs 5 cents and the bat costs $1.05 
(2) If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100 machines to 
make 100 widgets? _____ minutes 
If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, then it takes 1 machine 5 minutes to make 
1 widget (each machine is making a widget in 5 minutes). If we have 100 machines working 
together, then each can make a widget in 5 minutes. So there will be 100 widgets in 5 minutes. 
(3) In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 48 days 
for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover half of the 
lake? _____ days 
Every day FORWARD the patch doubles in size. So every day BACKWARDS means the patch 
halves in size. So on day 47 the lake is half full.  










1. I can easily tell if someone else wants to 
enter a conversation.         
2. I prefer animals to humans.         
3. I try to keep up with the current trends 
and fashions.         
4. I find it difficult to explain to others 
things that I understand easily, when they 
don't understand it first time. 
        
5. I dream most nights.         
6. I really enjoy caring for other people.         
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7. I try to solve my own problems rather 
than discussing them with others.         
8. I find it hard to know what to do in a 
social situation.         
9. I am at my best first thing in the 
morning.         
10. People often tell me that I went too far 
in driving my point home in a discussion.         
11. It doesn't bother me too much if I am 
late meeting a friend.         
12. Friendships and relationships are just 
too difficult, so I tend not to bother with 
them. 
        
13. I would never break a law, no matter 
how minor.         
14. I often find it difficult to judge if 
something is rude or polite.         
15. In a conversation, I tend to focus on 
my own thoughts rather than on what my 
listener might be thinking. 
        
16. I prefer practical jokes to verbal 
humour.         
17. I live life for today rather than the 
future.         
18. When I was a child, I enjoyed cutting 
up worms to see what would happen.         
19. I can pick up quickly if someone says 
one thing but means another.         
20. I tend to have very strong opinions 
about morality.         
21. It is hard for me to see why some 
things upset people so much.         
22. I find it easy to put myself in somebody 
else's shoes.         
23. I think that good manners are the most 
important thing a parent can teach their 
child. 
        
24. I like to do things on the spur of the 
moment.         
25. I am good at predicting how someone 
will feel.         
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26. I am quick to spot when someone in a 
group is feeling awkward or 
uncomfortable. 
        
27. If I say something that someone else is 
offended by, I think that that's their 
problem, not mine. 
        
28. If anyone asked me if I liked their 
haircut, I would reply truthfully, even if I 
didn't like it. 
        
29. I can't always see why someone should 
have felt offended by a remark.         
30. People often tell me that I am very 
unpredictable.         
31. I enjoy being the centre of attention at 
any social gathering.         
32. Seeing people cry doesn't really upset 
me.         
33. I enjoy having discussions about 
politics.         
34. I am very blunt, which some people 
take to be rudeness, even though this is 
unintentional. 
        
35. I don't tend to find social situations 
confusing.         
36. Other people tell me I am good at 
understanding how they are feeling and 
what they are thinking. 
        
37. When I talk to people, I tend to talk 
about their experiences rather than my 
own. 
        
38. It upsets me to see an animal in pain.         
39. I am able to make decisions without 
being influenced by people's feelings.         
40. I can't relax until I have done 
everything I had planned to do that day.         
41. I can easily tell if someone else is 
interested or bored with what I am saying.         
42. I get upset if I see people suffering on 
news programmes.         
43. Friends usually talk to me about their 
problems as they say that I am very 
understanding. 
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44. I can sense if I am intruding, even if the 
other person doesn't tell me.         
45. I often start new hobbies but quickly 
become bored with them and move on to 
something else. 
        
46. People sometimes tell me that I have 
gone too far with teasing.         
47. I would be too nervous to go on a big 
roller coaster.         
48. Other people often say that I am 
insensitive, though I don't always see why.         
49. If I see a stranger in a group, I think 
that it is up to them to make an effort to 
join in. 
        
50. I usually stay emotionally detached 
when watching a film.         
51. I like to be very organized in day-to-
day life and often make lists of the chores I 
have to do. 
        
52. I can tune in to how someone else 
feels rapidly and intuitively.         
53. I don't like to take risks.         
54. I can easily work out what another 
person might want to talk about.         
55. I can tell if someone is masking their 
true emotion.         
56. Before making a decision I always 
weigh up the pros and cons.         
57. I don't consciously work out the rules 
of social situations.         
58. I am good at predicting what someone 
will do.         
59. I tend to get emotionally involved with 
a friend's problems.         
60. I can usually appreciate the other 
person's viewpoint, even if I don't agree 
with it. 
    
 
EQ SCORING: 
“Definitely agree” responses scored 2 points and “slightly agree” responses scored 1 point on 
the following items: 1, 6, 19, 22, 25, 26, 35, 36, 37, 38, 41, 42, 43, 44, 52, 54, 55, 57, 58, 59, 60. 
224 
 
“Definitely disagree” responses scored 2 points and “slightly disagree” responses scored 1 
point on the following items: 4, 8, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 18, 21, 27, 28, 29, 32, 34, 39, 46, 48, 49, 
50. 
Items 2, 3, 5, 7, 9, 13, 16, 17, 20, 23, 24, 30, 31, 33, 40, 45, 47, 51, 53, and 56 are just fillers. 
THE AUTISM QUOTIENT (AQ) QUESTIONNAIRE: 






















3. If I try to imagine something, I find it very easy 










4. I frequently get so strongly absorbed in one 




















6. I usually notice car number plates or similar 










7. Other people frequently tell me that what I’ve 










8. When I’m reading a story, I can easily imagine 





















10. In a social group, I can easily keep track of 
























































15. I find myself drawn more strongly to people 










16. I tend to have very strong interests which I get 





















18. When I talk, it isn’t always easy for others to get 





















20. When I’m reading a story, I find it difficult to 


































































26. I frequently find that I don’t know how to keep 










27. I find it easy to “read between the lines” when 










28. I usually concentrate more on the whole 





















30. I don’t usually notice small changes in a 































33. When I talk on the phone, I’m not sure when 


































36. I find it easy to work out what someone is 










37. If there is an interruption, I can switch back to 




















39. People often tell me that I keep going on and on 










40. When I was young, I used to enjoy playing 










41. I like to collect information about categories of 
things (e.g. types of car, types of bird, types of 










42. I find it difficult to imagine what it would be like 













































































49. I am not very good at remembering people’s 










50. I find it very easy to play games with children 











SCORING THE AQ: 
“Definitely agree” or “slightly agree” responses scored 1 point, on the following items: 1, 2, 4, 
5, 6, 7, 9, 12, 13, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 26, 33, 35, 39, 41, 42, 43, 45, 46. “Definitely 
disagree” or “slightly disagree” responses scored 1 point, on the following items: 3, 8, 10, 11, 





Appendix 4.C – Drupp et al. (2015) survey test 
 
Imagine that you are asked for your advice by an international governmental organization that 
needs to determine the appropriate social discount rate for calculating the present value of 
risk-free cash flows of public projects with intergenerational consequences. For its calculations, 
the organization needs single values for the components of the social discount rate. While this 
does not capture all of the important complexities of social discounting, including time 
horizon-dependent individual discount rates, it does reflect most existing policy guidance on 
the matter. Your answers will therefore help to improve the current state of decision-making 
for public investments. Specifically, you are asked to provide your recommendations on the 
single number, global average and long-term (>100 years) values of the following determinants 
of the social discount rate:  
1. Growth rate of real per-capita consumption [X percent per year].  
2. Rate of societal pure time preference (or utility discount rate) [X percent].  
3. Elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption [X].  
4. Real risk-free interest rate [X percent per year]. Remember that this should be a global 
average and long-term forecast.  
5. What relative weight (summing up to 100 percent) should the governmental body place on 
the following rationales for determining the social discount rate:  
(a) Normative issues, involving justice towards future generations [X percent], and  
(b) Descriptive issues, involving forecasted average future returns to financial assets [X 
percent]?  
6. What is your recommended real social discount rate for evaluating the certainty-equivalent 
cash flows of a global public project with intergenerational consequences [X percent per year]?  
7. What minimum and maximum real social discount rate would you be comfortable with 






Appendix 4.D – EMU estimates analysis: intervals 
 
Table 4D.1. EMU estimation per context considering all participants 
 EMU 
RP (risk aversion) 1.485509-2.413786 
DA (inequality aversion) 6.989844-11.68653 
EIS 4.65625-6.472807 
Source: see text. Standard errors are shown in parenthesis. 
 
Table 4D.2. EMU estimation per context regarding the 50% most/least empathetic/reflective 
HIGHLY EMP/REF RP DA EIS 
H_MFMB 1.264709-2.5207 5.64163-9.96907 4.765167-7.6616 
H_CRT 0.9879005-2.183 5.325162-11.578 4.146398-6.5415 
H_RME 1.216407-2.2254 7.360069-15.027 4.233577-6.7880 
H_EQ 1.38184-2.67818 7.29103-16.2071 3.539261-5.0659 
L_AQ 1.171377-2.4701 6.18446-12.2567 4.122461-7.0119 
LOW EMP/REF - - - 
L_MFMB 1.250395-2.5917 6.278338-17.219 3.662341-5.5848 
L _CRT 1.611494-3.0558 6.633779-12.892 4.430905-7.1803 
L _RME 1.391348-3.2260 4.453534-9.7002 4.326367-6.9110 
L _EQ 1.234697-2.5960 4.704884-9.5382 4.965778-8.0986 
H_AQ 1.39441-2.76323 5.980205-13.421 4.175888-6.3410 
Source: see text. Standard errors are shown in parenthesis. 
 
Table 4D.3. EMU estimation per context regarding the 30% most/least empathetic/reflective 
HIGHLY EMP/REF RP DA EIS 
H_MFMB 1.325643-3.4835 4.251437-9.8618 4.341467-8.4936 
H_CRT 1.054058-2.3524 4.507457-15.139 4.071101-7.5221 
H_RME 1.3165-2.882179 6.300845-17.509 3.84038-6.11204 
H_EQ 1.111342-2.9934 5.59933-26.6995 3.612555-5.6658 
L_AQ 1.264803-3.0247 5.257327-11.340 3.22143-5.12713 
LOW EMP/REF - - - 
L_MFMB 1.374933-2.9367 4.621913-21.422 3.43105-5.27117 
L _CRT 1.301647-3.5126 5.554348-11.779 4.320541-7.6004 
L _RME 0.8054184-2.645 4.077658-11.555 3.861011-7.6465 
L _EQ 1.019741-2.9206 3.855784-10.250 4.358516-8.4165 
H_AQ 0.8291521-2.244 3.755888-10.890 3.626937-6.4168 
Source: see text. Standard errors are shown in parenthesis. 
 
Table 4D.4. EMU estimation per context for participants with more (less) than 24 years old 












Table 4D.5. EMU estimation per context for participants choosing (not choosing) time 
consistently for others 
 EMU  
TC (choosing time consistently for others)_RP 0.2579241-3.735429 





Source: see text. 
 
  
                                                          
262 All participants in this category have EMU above 7.75. 
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Appendix 4.E – Second and third analyses regressions (EMU estimates) 
 
6 initial regressions for the second analysis: 
1) EMU ~ MFMB + RME + DUMrp263 + DUMda264 + AGE24 + TIME.CONS  
 
                Value Std. Err (Naive SE)      z        p 
(Intercept)     0.356   2.4384     2.2865  0.146 8.84e-01 
data$MFMB      -0.778   1.5128     1.3176 -0.515 6.07e-01 
data$RME        0.198   0.0873     0.0825  2.262 2.37e-02 
data$DUMrp     -3.654   0.6332     0.7284 -5.771 7.90e-09 
data$DUMda      1.524   0.7982     0.7531  1.910 5.61e-02 
data$AGE24      0.303   0.9398     0.7985  0.322 7.47e-01 
data$TIME.CONS  2.098   0.7919     0.9167  2.649 8.07e-03 
Log(scale)      1.271   0.1045     0.0762 12.165 4.80e-34 
 
Gaussian distribution 
Loglik(model)= -331.7   Loglik(intercept only)= -365 
 Chisq= 66.51 on 6 degrees of freedom, p= 2.1e-12  
(Loglikelihood assumes independent observations) 
Number of Newton-Raphson Iterations: 5  
n=205 (17 observations deleted due to missingness) 
 
2) EMU ~ MFMB + EQ + DUMrp + DUMda + AGE24 + TIME 
 
                 Value Std. Err (Naive SE)      z        p 
(Intercept)     4.7107   1.4726     1.3843  3.199 1.38e-03 
data$MFMB      -0.2602   1.4767     1.3385 -0.176 8.60e-01 
data$EQ         0.0186   0.0247     0.0244  0.753 4.51e-01 
data$DUMrp     -3.7398   0.6500     0.7399 -5.753 8.75e-09 
data$DUMda      1.4137   0.7964     0.7630  1.775 7.59e-02 
data$AGE24      0.1326   0.9663     0.8290  0.137 8.91e-01 
data$TIME.CONS  2.3174   0.7337     0.9307  3.158 1.59e-03 
Log(scale)      1.2889   0.1051     0.0764 12.267 1.37e-34 
 
Gaussian distribution 
Loglik(model)= -334.3   Loglik(intercept only)= -365 
 Chisq= 61.39 on 6 degrees of freedom, p= 2.4e-11  
(Loglikelihood assumes independent observations) 
Number of Newton-Raphson Iterations: 5  
n=205 (17 observations deleted due to missingness) 
 
3) EMU ~ MFMB + AQ + DUMrp + DUMda + AGE24 + TIME.CONS  
 
                 Value Std. Err (Naive SE)      z        p 
(Intercept)     5.2467   1.0522     1.0249  4.986 6.15e-07 
data$MFMB      -0.2960   1.4483     1.3428 -0.204 8.38e-01 
data$AQ         0.0258   0.0596     0.0510  0.432 6.65e-01 
data$DUMrp     -3.8018   0.6356     0.7425 -5.981 2.22e-09 
data$DUMda      1.3374   0.7887     0.7632  1.696 9.00e-02 
data$AGE24     -0.1235   0.9383     0.8205 -0.132 8.95e-01 
data$TIME.CONS  2.4042   0.6997     0.9494  3.436 5.90e-04 
Log(scale)      1.2915   0.1060     0.0762 12.179 4.02e-34  
 
Gaussian distribution 
Loglik(model)= -334.4   Loglik(intercept only)= -365 
                                                          
263 It represents a dummy indicating EMUs measured as risk aversion. 
264 It represents a dummy indicating EMUs measured as inequality aversion. 
233 
 
 Chisq= 61.06 on 6 degrees of freedom, p= 2.7e-11  
(Loglikelihood assumes independent observations) 
Number of Newton-Raphson Iterations: 5  
n=205 (17 observations deleted due to missingness) 
 
4) EMU ~ CRT + RME + DUMrp + DUMda + AGE24 + TIME.CONS  
 
                Value Std. Err (Naive SE)      z        p 
(Intercept)     0.616   2.4729     2.2898  0.249 8.03e-01 
data$CRT       -0.162   0.2115     0.2639 -0.766 4.44e-01 
data$RME        0.192   0.0859     0.0819  2.230 2.58e-02 
data$DUMrp     -3.679   0.6337     0.7300 -5.806 6.42e-09 
data$DUMda      1.490   0.7972     0.7549  1.869 6.16e-02 
data$AGE24      0.337   0.9025     0.8033  0.374 7.08e-01 
data$TIME.CONS  2.140   0.7299     0.9137  2.932 3.37e-03 
Log(scale)      1.271   0.1045     0.0763 12.161 5.03e-34 
 
Gaussian distribution 
Loglik(model)= -331.7   Loglik(intercept only)= -365 
 Chisq= 66.54 on 6 degrees of freedom, p= 2.1e-12  
(Loglikelihood assumes independent observations) 
Number of Newton-Raphson Iterations: 5  
n=205 (17 observations deleted due to missingness) 
 
5) EMU ~ CRT + EQ + DUMrp + DUMda + AGE24 + TIME.CONS 
 
                 Value Std. Err (Naive SE)      z        p 
(Intercept)     4.8033   1.4803     1.3830  3.245 1.18e-03 
data$CRT       -0.1643   0.2160     0.2678 -0.761 4.47e-01 
data$EQ         0.0194   0.0242     0.0242  0.804 4.22e-01 
data$DUMrp     -3.7666   0.6474     0.7404 -5.818 5.95e-09 
data$DUMda      1.3802   0.7956     0.7637  1.735 8.28e-02 
data$AGE24      0.1955   0.9386     0.8347  0.208 8.35e-01 
data$TIME.CONS  2.3280   0.6972     0.9269  3.339 8.40e-04 
Log(scale)      1.2875   0.1056     0.0764 12.188 3.59e-34 
 
Gaussian distribution 
Loglik(model)= -334.1   Loglik(intercept only)= -365 
 Chisq= 61.72 on 6 degrees of freedom, p= 2e-11  
(Loglikelihood assumes independent observations) 
Number of Newton-Raphson Iterations: 5  
n=205 (17 observations deleted due to missingness) 
 
6) EMU ~ CRT + AQ + DUMrp + DUMda + AGE24 + TIME.CONS 
 
                 Value Std. Err (Naive SE)       z        p 
(Intercept)     5.4056   1.0683     1.0804  5.0600 4.19e-07 
data$CRT       -0.1404   0.2183     0.2726 -0.6432 5.20e-01 
data$AQ         0.0226   0.0595     0.0513  0.3800 7.04e-01 
data$DUMrp     -3.8222   0.6339     0.7431 -6.0296 1.64e-09 
data$DUMda      1.3108   0.7874     0.7642  1.6648 9.60e-02 
data$AGE24     -0.0669   0.9140     0.8289 -0.0732 9.42e-01 
data$TIME.CONS  2.4109   0.6512     0.9446  3.7022 2.14e-04 
Log(scale)      1.2905   0.1062     0.0763 12.1471 5.95e-34 
 
Scale= 3.63  
 
Gaussian distribution 
Loglik(model)= -334.3   Loglik(intercept only)= -365 
 Chisq= 61.28 on 6 degrees of freedom, p= 2.5e-11  
(Loglikelihood assumes independent observations) 
Number of Newton-Raphson Iterations: 5  
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n=205 (17 observations deleted due to missingness) 
 
Final regression for second analysis: 
EMU ~ RME + DUMrp + TIME.CONS 
     
               Value Std. Err (Naive SE)      z        p 
(Intercept)     2.10   2.2601     2.1149  0.927 3.54e-01 
data$RME        0.17   0.0821     0.0804  2.074 3.81e-02 
data$DUMrp     -4.64   0.4925     0.5612 -9.421 4.45e-21 
data$TIME.CONS  2.15   0.7312     0.9210  2.942 3.26e-03 
Log(scale)      1.29   0.0992     0.0738 13.002 1.20e-38  
 
Gaussian distribution 
Loglik(model)= -349.2   Loglik(intercept only)= -381.7 
 Chisq= 64.88 on 3 degrees of freedom, p= 5.3e-14  
(Loglikelihood assumes independent observations) 
Number of Newton-Raphson Iterations: 4  
n=217 (5 observations deleted due to missingness) 
 
6 initial regressions for the third analysis: 
1) EMU ~ MFMB + RME + AGE24 + TIME.CONS  
 
                Value Std. Err (Naive SE)      z        p 
(Intercept)    -0.328   2.7378     2.7637 -0.120 9.05e-01 
data$MFMB      -0.675   1.6806     1.6732 -0.402 6.88e-01 
data$RME        0.200   0.1014     0.1045  1.977 4.80e-02 
data$AGE24      0.314   1.0620     1.0199  0.296 7.67e-01 
data$TIME.CONS  2.146   0.9567     1.1361  2.243 2.49e-02 
Log(scale)      1.520   0.0795     0.0749 19.124 1.59e-81 
 
Gaussian distribution 
Loglik(model)= -360.9   Loglik(intercept only)= -365 
 Chisq= 8.19 on 4 degrees of freedom, p= 0.085  
(Loglikelihood assumes independent observations) 
Number of Newton-Raphson Iterations: 3  
n=205 (17 observations deleted due to missingness) 
 
2) EMU ~ MFMB + EQ + AGE24 + TIME.CONS   
     
                 Value Std. Err (Naive SE)       z        p 
(Intercept)     4.2004   1.5076     1.5605  2.7861 5.33e-03 
data$MFMB      -0.1459   1.6323     1.6880 -0.0894 9.29e-01 
data$EQ         0.0151   0.0282     0.0307  0.5352 5.92e-01 
data$AGE24      0.1034   1.0927     1.0524  0.0946 9.25e-01 
data$TIME.CONS  2.3738   0.8997     1.1467  2.6385 8.33e-03 
Log(scale)      1.5318   0.0806     0.0751 19.0007 1.68e-80 
 
Gaussian distribution 
Loglik(model)= -362.6   Loglik(intercept only)= -365 
 Chisq= 4.77 on 4 degrees of freedom, p= 0.31  
(Loglikelihood assumes independent observations) 
Number of Newton-Raphson Iterations: 3  
n=205 (17 observations deleted due to missingness) 
 
3) EMU ~ MFMB + AQ + AGE24 + TIME.CONS   
     
                 Value Std. Err (Naive SE)      z        p 
(Intercept)     4.5338   1.0899     1.1464  4.160 3.18e-05 
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data$MFMB      -0.1670   1.6108     1.6910 -0.104 9.17e-01 
data$AQ         0.0243   0.0665     0.0642  0.366 7.14e-01 
data$AGE24     -0.1122   1.0533     1.0391 -0.106 9.15e-01 
data$TIME.CONS  2.4525   0.8715     1.1669  2.814 4.89e-03 
Log(scale)      1.5333   0.0813     0.0750 18.851 2.88e-79 
 
Gaussian distribution 
Loglik(model)= -362.6   Loglik(intercept only)= -365 
 Chisq= 4.67 on 4 degrees of freedom, p= 0.32  
(Loglikelihood assumes independent observations) 
Number of Newton-Raphson Iterations: 3  
n=205 (17 observations deleted due to missingness) 
 
4) EMU ~ CRT + RME + AGE24 + TIME.CONS  
 
                Value Std. Err (Naive SE)       z        p 
(Intercept)    -0.112   2.7520     2.7572 -0.0407 9.68e-01 
data$CRT       -0.171   0.2299     0.3325 -0.7433 4.57e-01 
data$RME        0.196   0.0989     0.1036  1.9796 4.77e-02 
data$AGE24      0.360   1.0288     1.0275  0.3496 7.27e-01 
data$TIME.CONS  2.179   0.9030     1.1322  2.4130 1.58e-02 
Log(scale)      1.520   0.0800     0.0749 18.9856 2.24e-80 
 
Gaussian distribution 
Loglik(model)= -360.8   Loglik(intercept only)= -365 
 Chisq= 8.29 on 4 degrees of freedom, p= 0.082  
(Loglikelihood assumes independent observations) 
Number of Newton-Raphson Iterations: 3  
n=205 (17 observations deleted due to missingness) 
 
5) EMU ~ CRT + EQ + AGE24 + TIME.CONS  
     
                 Value Std. Err (Naive SE)      z        p 
(Intercept)     4.2825   1.5008     1.5550  2.853 4.32e-03 
data$CRT       -0.1642   0.2374     0.3359 -0.692 4.89e-01 
data$EQ         0.0158   0.0276     0.0306  0.572 5.67e-01 
data$AGE24      0.1707   1.0697     1.0615  0.160 8.73e-01 
data$TIME.CONS  2.3765   0.8721     1.1427  2.725 6.43e-03 
Log(scale)      1.5311   0.0814     0.0751 18.820 5.22e-79 
 
Gaussian distribution 
Loglik(model)= -362.5   Loglik(intercept only)= -365 
 Chisq= 5 on 4 degrees of freedom, p= 0.29  
(Loglikelihood assumes independent observations) 
Number of Newton-Raphson Iterations: 3  
n=205 (17 observations deleted due to missingness) 
 
6) EMU ~ CRT + AQ + AGE24 + TIME.CONS 
 
                 Value Std. Err (Naive SE)       z        p 
(Intercept)     4.6959   1.1011     1.2123  4.2648 2.00e-05 
data$CRT       -0.1413   0.2381     0.3415 -0.5937 5.53e-01 
data$AQ         0.0204   0.0662     0.0648  0.3083 7.58e-01 
data$AGE24     -0.0479   1.0342     1.0513 -0.0463 9.63e-01 
data$TIME.CONS  2.4477   0.8321     1.1617  2.9415 3.27e-03 
Log(scale)      1.5329   0.0818     0.0750 18.7429 2.21e-78 
 
Gaussian distribution 
Loglik(model)= -362.6   Loglik(intercept only)= -365 
 Chisq= 4.83 on 4 degrees of freedom, p= 0.3  
(Loglikelihood assumes independent observations) 
Number of Newton-Raphson Iterations: 3  
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n=205 (17 observations deleted due to missingness) 
 
Final regression for third analysis: 
EMU ~ RME + TIME.CONS  
 
                Value Std. Err (Naive SE)       z        p 
(Intercept)    0.0271   2.5906     2.6728  0.0105 9.92e-01 
data$RME       0.1889   0.0956     0.1020  1.9752 4.83e-02 
data$TIME.CONS 2.1977   0.8911     1.1391  2.4662 1.37e-02 
Log(scale)     1.5325   0.0786     0.0734 19.4897 1.34e-84 
 
Gaussian distribution 
Loglik(model)= -377.7   Loglik(intercept only)= -381.7 
 Chisq= 7.86 on 2 degrees of freedom, p= 0.02  
(Loglikelihood assumes independent observations) 
Number of Newton-Raphson Iterations: 3  








In chapter 1 I estimated the EMU having in view its use in the Ramsey rule (which has been 
increasingly used to determine the SDR) by the EASA. In doing so I compared different estimation 
methods inside the EASA framework and tested the constancy of the parameter across income 
level, countries, time, tax units, and in comparison with another two methodologies. This is, I 
systematically approached works estimating the EMU via EASA by testing the extent to which 
variants within the methodology produce different results, examined some of the EASA 
assumptions (constancy over time and income) and investigated the robustness of the EMU 
estimates across methodologies and countries in a way that was hitherto lacking.  
After reviewing works estimating the EMU by the EASA I described the dataset on income tax 
obtained from the 9 countries considered (UK, Sweden, Norway, Italy, Ireland, Germany, France, 
Denmark and Belgium). After presenting results concerning the constancy of the parameter 
cross income level, countries, time and tax unit, and suggesting a value for the EMU based on 
the estimates obtained via EASA, I compared the EASA estimates with EMU estimates obtained 
with two other methodologies: one using data on consumption growth rate and other using data 
on insurance. 
The value suggested for the parameter was 1.5. It was the estimate obtained utilizing all the 
data and the best (according to the study) methodology within the EASA (considering NICs, not 
considering SI and using single people as tax units). The constancy tests show the parameter 
varies with time and tax unit, and that although it also varies significantly across countries and 
income, the variation is very small. It suggests that not considering changes of the EMU through 
time may be an issue, but that it is reasonable to assume it is constant over income level. 
Moreover, although it can be regarded as robust across the countries considered, but not across 
tax units. The results regarding the comparison of different approaches in the EASA show the 
method is more suitable for single people as tax units. 
The estimates obtained with the EASA are consistent with estimates obtained with the two other 
methodologies mentioned above. It reinforces the value of 1.5 suggested by the EASA. It also 
must be said that the methodologies compared are similar in that they are based on revealed 
preferences of the overall population, but different not just in terms of the estimation 
procedure, but also in that the EMU is interpreted differently in each approach.  
The main shortcoming of the EMU estimate obtained with the EASA in chapter 1 is that the 
method assumes Governments set income tax schedules based solely on the EASP; something 
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which can be disputed. Moreover, other ways to obtain the SI can be devised, such that the ones 
estimated in the study can be challenged.265 
For future work it would be interesting to include other countries in the analysis, given all 9 
nations considered are similar in many aspects. It would enrich the study by providing more 
material to test EMU estimates’ robustness across countries. The reason more nations were not 
included is that to organize income tax information in order to obtain a large amount of 
observations on the ATR and MTR for a wide range of income levels in a dataset as the one used 
to derive the results would be significant research in itself. It would be, nonetheless a useful 
contribution. The necessary data to start to fill this gap might be found by simulating taxes 
according to the legislation of the different countries (as is the case for the dataset utilized 
herein). Yet another idea would be to expand the research in the sense of estimating the EMU 
using the general tax burden instead of just income taxes. This is, to derive the ATR and MTR 
e.g. including sales taxes. 
In chapter 2 I investigated the determinants of the EMU parameter as estimated by the EASA. 
The variables hypothesized to affect the EMU were selected among those expected to affect tax 
progressivity, given the parameter can also be regarded as an index of tax progressivity. A fixed 
effects model with time trend was applied as the empirical strategy of investigation. 
Notice the parameter concerned is seen as a constant given that the EASA assumes the iso-
elastic utility function. Nonetheless, it is reasonable to think there are factors influencing 
people’s (and Governments’) inequality aversion as shown by the degree of progression of 
income tax schedules and thus that there are factors causing the parameter to vary. Another 
assumption underlying the EASA is that Government’s inequality aversion represents peoples’ 
inequality aversion because of the democratic process (obviously it only applies to democracies), 
which has not been clearly challenged so far.  
In chapter 2 I allow for the possibility that the EMU, as measured by the EASA, varies according 
to political, economic and demographic variables, and allow instead for the possibility that 
Governments do not necessarily represent peoples’ preferences, but are influenced by other 
factors in the way they set the progressivity level of income tax schedules. In doing so I advance 
the debate on the legitimacy of the EASA technique.  
                                                          
265 As an example, one could think of the minimum wage as an alternative way to obtain a reasonable SI 
value instead of individual’s the tax-free income used to estimate the SI herein. 
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After introducing the chapter and establishing that the EMU measures income tax progressivity 
(as well as inequality aversion), I reviewed works investigating the determinants of tax 
progressivity in order to get insight into possible factors determining the EMU. After, I give more 
details on the data used and on the empirical strategy implemented. Next, I present and discuss 
the results regarding the analysis and conclude. 
The results show basically that the dependency ratio,266 Government stability, openness, 
population size and governmental expenditure with education are all factors affecting the EMU. 
From these variables only the population size strongly affects the EMU, which in my opinion 
weakens the reliability of the EASA, but not much, given the evidence favouring the technique 
found in chapter 1 and the fact all other factors considered fail to cause strong variation on EMU 
estimated by the EASA. 
In future work I think it would be important to revisit the explanations regarding the mechanism 
through which the explanatory variables considered affect the EMU – be it seen as reflecting 
people’s or Governments’ inequality aversion – and test whether some of them should be given 
preference in view of statistical evidence. For example, I argued population size may affect the 
EMU by affecting societal inequality aversion via the ‘sense of community’ (McMillan and 
Chavis, 1986) or by affecting governmental decision-taking by the remoteness of the central 
Government from the people. It would be interesting to gather statistics better measuring these 
two aspects and test which explanation is more appropriate. The research proposed would shed 
light on the extent to which the setting of income tax schedules by Governments depends on 
the general population’s will.   
In chapter 3 I investigate causality between income inequality and income tax progressivity. The 
study builds on Scheve and Stasavage (2016), which dedicate part of their study to the same 
issue. The main difference is that besides using other progressivity and inequality indexes, we 
apply new causality tests to approach the issue.  
In the literature review I identify SS as the only work formally testing (i.e. by using statistical 
causality tests) causality between progressivity and inequality.267 Other works are found 
addressing the same issue, but not formally.  They suggest that if the relation between the 
variables existed before it does not anymore. 
                                                          
266 Percentage of those with more than 65 and less than 14 in the population. 
267 It must be noticed their study was published when the present one was ongoing. 
240 
 
While SS used top marginal income tax rates as index of progressivity, we used two standard 
progressivity measures, the Liability Progression (LP) and Residual Progression (RP), both first 
presented by Musgrave and Thin (1948). We argued these are better measures of progressivity 
mainly due to the fact that, differently from top rates, they stem directly from the general 
definition of tax progression (that the average tax rate grows with income), and are evaluated 
at a representative income level (APW). Moreover, we used GINI coefficients to measure income 
inequality instead of top income shares as SS. The advantage of the GINI is that they take into 
consideration the whole income distribution, while the top income shares are restricted to top 
incomes.  
Besides using standard Granger non-causality tests (similar to SS) we also used Dumitrescu and 
Hurlin’s (2012) Granger non-causality in heterogeneous panels tests. The main difference 
between the two methodologies is that the latter allows for parameters to vary across panels, 
which thus produces tests that reflect better the variability across the countries considered. 
Also, I tested the variables stationarity before using them in the causality analysis – which is not 
done by SS.  
After introducing the chapter, I reviewed the literature concerning the matter under 
consideration and described the methodology regarding the measurement of income inequality 
and income tax progressivity. Then I gave more details about the data used to perform the 
analysis. Next, I presented the results concerning the causality and stationarity tests and 
concluded the chapter. 
The results showed causality in both directions, i.e. from progressivity to inequality and vice-
versa.  It suggests Governments take into consideration the level of income inequality to set 
income tax schedules, which challenges SS’s conclusions. In terms of policy making it means 
administrations responsible for setting income tax schedule are sensitive to arguments 
regarding income inequality. It confirms the widespread assumption that Governments do use 
income tax to address distributional issues – even if some think that this link is now broken and 
that Governments have given up trying. 
It must be noted that the RP and LP indexes are local progressivity measures calculated at the 
Average Production Wage (APW) (which is the most representative income level), and therefore 
do not consider progressivity for the whole income distribution. Also, it is important to notice 
the GINI coefficients are derived with slightly different income definitions and that I made use 
of interpolations to complete the GINI series.  
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In the fourth chapter I investigated how psychological traits perceived as socially desirable 
(empathy, reflectiveness, time consistency when choosing for others and maturity) affect the 
value of the EMU parameter. Such relationship sheds light on the normative significance of the 
EMU estimates. I also examined how such traits affect the EMU context-sensitivity, which gives 
insight into how well the Standard Welfare Economic Model (SWEM) describes normative 
behaviour. The EMU was estimated in three different contexts: as risk aversion, inequality 
aversion and the Elasticity of Intertemporal Substitution (EIS). 
After introducing the chapter I review the literature on works relating psychological traits to the 
EMU and to the EMU context-sensitivity. There are works relating some of the traits considered 
with the value of the EMU, but none of them are primarily concerned with the EMU normative 
significance. This is, they do not use desirable traits and their potential relation with normative 
behaviour in order to derive more relevant EMU estimates. Moreover, there are no works 
relating psychological traits with EMU context-sensitivity.  
In the methodology section I described the experiment undertaken in order to gauge the EMU 
estimates in the different contexts and to gauge the traits. I also described the data collected 
and the empirical strategy adopted to verify how the traits affect the parameter and its context-
sensitivity. In both analyses I use different specifications of interval regressions. 
Regarding the EMU context-sensitivity analysis the results showed basically that more 
empathetic people treat contexts more differently. More specifically, the EMU as inequality 
aversion is not significantly different from the EMU as the EIS for the low empathetic. The same 
qualitative results are found for those choosing time consistently for others. The more mature 
and reflective participants, on the other hand, treated the different contexts more equally. It 
suggests the SWEM describes better people who are highly reflective, mature, low empathetic 
and do not choose time consistently for others.   
Regarding the relationship between psychological traits and the EMU value, the results show 
basically that the EMU tends to be higher for highly empathetic people, which suggests the ideal 
EMU is higher than indicated by EMU estimates derived with samples stemming from the 
general population (assuming empathy is a desirable trait and that psychological experiments 
are a better way of determining the EMU than the revealed preference estimates derived in 
earlier chapters). 
It is important to note the tasks designed to gauge the EMU are based on the SWEM, such that 
the value estimated is limited by the assumptions made in this framework (which imply the 
parameter is constant across the three contexts mentioned before). Due to time and resources 
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constraint it was not possible to obtain a sample as large and representative of the general 
population as I had desired. It caused me to have fewer observations on specific groups, such as 
those above 24 years old and non-students; also it would be ideal to have at least about 300 
participants.268 Finally, most of the tasks were not incentivized, which can give room for 
questions concerning the results. 
A potential future work stemming from chapter four would be to repeat the experiment using a 
more representative and larger sample. Another suggestion regarding future works would be 
related to using experiments based on models relaxing some of the assumptions of the SWEM 
(as for example using a utility function different from the iso-elastic) in order to obtain more 
accurate values for the EMU.  
Another outstanding challenge is to explain the apparently large difference between 
experimental and revealed-preference based estimates of the EMU. The main difficulty 
regarding this kind of investigation would be to obtain revealed preference data on the decisions 
made by individuals who are known to have particular psychological traits. The currently 
available microeconomic datasets do not give information which is relevant to determine 
respondent’s key psychological traits such as the degree of empathy and reflectiveness, making 
it difficult to specify the agents behind the choices presented in the data.  
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